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I.        INTRODUCTION 
Kaboni Savage led a regional drug trafficking operation 
in North Philadelphia referred to at trial as the Kaboni Savage 
Organization (KSO).  The KSO distributed large quantities of 
controlled substances and, not surprisingly, fiercely protected 
its network and territory through the use of guns and violence.  
Threats to the organization, whether perceived or real, were 
quickly tamped down or extinguished.  Early in the KSO’s 
operation, Savage took care of such threats himself, but as his 
power grew, his enforcers did his bidding without question.  
 Even while detained on criminal charges, Savage 
continued to manage the affairs of the KSO from his prison 
cell.  He led by retaliating against those who dared to cooperate 
with government agents and prosecutors.  What makes this 




of the prosecution’s main witness in a murder case; in a later 
case, he orchestrated the firebombing of the family home of 
another cooperating witness in a fashion that ensured no one 
would survive.  Eventually, Savage was charged with, inter 
alia, a dozen counts of murder in aid of racketeering, among 
other serious offenses.  The Government sought the death 
penalty. 
 This appeal follows the jury’s guilty verdict on all 
charges and the imposition of a sentence of death.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Savage began his career in illegal drug trafficking by 
selling for others.  By the early 1990s, he was peddling 
phencyclidine (PCP) on his own, operating predominantly out 
of his mother’s house on Darien Street in North Philadelphia.  
Before long, he was a distributor selling PCP in various forms, 
as well as marijuana.  He utilized numerous dealers who 
controlled drug corners in the vicinity of Erie Avenue in North 
Philadelphia.  For a time, he was in a partnership distributing 
crack cocaine.  But by the late 1990s, Savage had come into 
his own.  He was “running everything,” A17:8749,1 dealing in 
“more than five, six, seven kilos” of cocaine at a time.  
A17:8759. 
 As his cocaine sales increased, Savage began to dilute 
the drug and then recompress it to increase the quantity.  His 
 
1 The citation to A17:8749 indicates that the quotation is from 




profit margin rose accordingly.  In the early 2000s, Savage’s 
“right-hand man” was Eugene Coleman.  A21:10960–61.  
Coleman helped distribute cocaine to various individuals in the 
“family”—Savage’s distribution network—and also handled 
proceeds from the drug sales.  A17:8728, 8764.  Savage’s inner 
circle included “enforcers” who carried out Savage’s 
commands without hesitation.  Among the enforcers were 
Kareem Bluntly and Lamont Lewis.  Although loyal to Savage 
for a time, Coleman and Lewis eventually cooperated with the 
Government prior to their respective guilty pleas in February 
2004 and April 2011.  Both testified at Savage’s trial about the 
operations of the KSO and its use of violence.  
And that violence was often deadly.  For example, in 
March 1998, when Savage was in the vicinity of competitor 
Tybius Flowers’s drug corner, a driver by the name of Kenneth 
Lassiter accidentally bumped into Savage’s car.  A 
confrontation ensued and Savage demanded that Lassiter pay 
for the damage.  Despite Lassiter’s apology, Savage “pulled a 
gun out . . . and shot him once.”  A13:6461.  Lassiter died from 
the gunshot wound.  Flowers witnessed the murder.   
More violence followed.  Mansur Abdullah belonged to 
the Savage “family,” and he and Savage would supply each 
other with cocaine.  It was Savage who first taught Abdullah 
how to dilute and recompress cocaine, which eventually raised 
the suspicion in Savage’s mind that Abdullah was 
overcharging him.  In September 2000, Abdullah visited 
Savage to collect a debt.  Savage paid him with cash placed in 
a red sneaker box.  He then directed Kareem Bluntly to 
accompany Abdullah back to his home, ostensibly to provide 




Bluntly was armed.  Coleman was directed to pick up Bluntly 
soon afterward.  When Coleman and Bluntly returned a half-
hour later, Bluntly handed Savage the red sneaker box with the 
cash still inside.  Although Bluntly had carried out the 
instruction to shoot Abdullah, he was unsure if Abdullah was 
actually dead.  Savage instructed Coleman to find out.  
Coleman followed orders and later confirmed that he saw 
Abdullah “keeled over” in his car.  A17:8823.  Philadelphia’s 
assistant medical examiner determined that the cause of death 
was multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest and abdomen.  
Carlton Brown was another victim of multiple gunshot 
wounds to the head and chest.  Although Brown was a member 
of the Savage family, Savage suspected Brown of killing 
Savage’s good friend Ronald Walston.  Savage instructed 
Lewis that “he ha[d] to do it,” which Lewis understood to mean 
he had to kill Brown.  A21:10923.  Lewis obeyed, and Brown 
died. 
Lewis also killed Barry Parker at Savage’s direction.  It 
appeared Parker was attempting to take over Steven 
Northington’s drug corner, so Northington complained to 
Savage, his supplier.  Savage replied to Northington that 
“[n]obody come and take nothing.  You have to handle your 
business.  This is what we do.”  A17:8850.  On February 26, 
2003, at Savage’s command, Lewis left Savage’s house with 
Northington, who identified Parker at the drug corner.  Lewis 
then eliminated Northington’s competition by shooting Parker 
several times in the chest.  Clearly Savage did not hesitate to 
protect his organization by killing those who threatened to 




He also had no qualms about murdering those he 
believed were cooperating with law enforcement.  In March of 
2003, Savage suspected that Tyrone Toliver, Coleman’s friend, 
was a “snitch.”  A17:8873.  When Toliver had difficulty filling 
a cocaine order, he looked to Savage to supply him.  Although 
Savage did not have cocaine available, he agreed to help and 
directed Coleman to take Toliver to Coleman’s apartment 
where the organization regularly recompressed cocaine.  
Bluntly arrived at the apartment shortly thereafter.  To 
Coleman’s surprise, Bluntly shot Toliver in the head.  At 
Savage’s direction, Bluntly and Coleman disposed of the body. 
In addition to the benefit of eliminating someone 
Savage thought was a snitch, the Toliver murder allowed 
Savage “to put some dirt on” Coleman.  A21:10959.  Coleman 
knew a lot about the KSO’s operations, and “everybody 
thought [Coleman] was weak and if he got into some trouble, 
he would tell.”  A21:10960.  
Around this same time, in a further effort to assure the 
loyalty of those closest to him and to thwart any thoughts his 
allies might have of cooperating with law enforcement, 
Savage, along with Lewis and two other high-ranking members 
of the KSO, made a pact.  In short, the men agreed that if any 
one of them cooperated with law enforcement, “our mothers’ 
lives would be in danger.”  A21:10960.  Although Coleman 
was not present when the deadly pact was made, Savage made 
sure that Coleman learned of it.   
In 2004, Savage was prosecuted for Lassiter’s murder.  
While jailed awaiting trial, Savage continued to intimidate and 




working with the Government.  First, Savage set his sights on 
eyewitness Tybius Flowers, the prosecution’s main witness.  
Savage told Lewis, who was also in jail, that he was not 
worried because Flowers “would never make it to court.”  
A21:10915.  Savage made similar remarks to another prisoner.  
Savage’s prophecy came true when Flowers was killed in a 
shower of bullets as he sat in his car outside of his aunt’s house 
the night before trial.  While there were no eyewitnesses, 
Northington later told a fellow prisoner of his disdain for 
snitches and disclosed that “he [had] slumped [Flowers] and 
sent him to rat heaven.”  A23:11738–40.  Savage, too, revealed 
he had played a part in Flowers’s murder, advising the same 
fellow prisoner that he had “spanked the case” and would be 
released soon.  A23:11831.   
Savage’s brutal efforts paid off.  Lacking Flowers’s 
testimony, the prosecution foundered and Savage was 
acquitted of Lassiter’s murder.  He was released from 
Philadelphia County prison on April 8, 2004.  But within a 
week, federal authorities arrested him on drug trafficking and 
other charges.2  Even while detained, Savage continued to 
direct the KSO’s operations from his jail cell.  He was enraged 
that Coleman, who was also in jail, was assisting the 
 
2 A jury ultimately convicted Savage in December 2005 of 14 
federal counts related to charges stemming from his role in the 
KSO, including conspiracy to distribute cocaine, money 
laundering, firearm offenses, and threatening to retaliate 
against witnesses.  On April 27, 2006, he was sentenced to 
thirty years’ imprisonment.  We affirmed the conviction and 
sentence.  See United States v. Walker, 392 F. App’x 919, 921 




prosecution.  Coleman received threats from other inmates who 
had connections to the KSO.  While in the visiting room of the 
prison, Coleman saw Savage’s sister, Kidada Savage.  She 
encouraged him not to “let these crackers break you.”  
A18:8938.  Kidada later wrote to Coleman, encouraging him 
not to reveal anything to federal agents, closing her letter with 
the statement: “Death before Dishonor (to your family).”  
A18:8946.  Coleman understood that parenthetical to threaten 
his personal family, not members of the KSO.  Later, when 
Coleman was in a holding cell in the federal courthouse, 
Savage and one of his associates were placed in an adjacent 
cell.  Immediately, Savage spoke of killing the “rats” and told 
Coleman that his family should die as well.  A18:8953–54.   
By this time, Savage had instructed Kidada to have 
Lewis firebomb Coleman’s family home in retaliation for 
Coleman’s cooperation with the Government.  In a telephone 
call from prison on the evening of October 8, 2004, Savage 
spoke with both Kidada and Lewis.  Lewis agreed to do 
anything Savage ordered, even if it meant “kill[ing] somebody 
for him.”  A21:10981.  After the call concluded, Kidada 
relayed to Lewis the directive from Savage to firebomb the 
Coleman house.  She instructed Lewis to torch the home late 
that night when “everybody”—Coleman’s mother and 
brother—would be there.  A21:10986.  Kidada drove Lewis to 
the block where Coleman lived and “pointed out the house.”  
A21:10988.  She also informed him that guns and a pit bull 
may be inside.  Lewis told Kidada that his cousin, Robert “BJ” 
Merritt, would help him.  Kidada promised Lewis $5000 for 




Around 4:00 a.m. the following morning, Lewis and 
Merritt took two cans filled with gasoline to Coleman’s house.  
Lewis kicked in the door and fired his gun twice.  Merritt lit 
and threw both cans into the house, causing an explosion.  Fire 
then ravaged the structure, resulting in the deaths of all six 
occupants: Coleman’s mother, Marcella Coleman; his infant 
son, Damir Jenkins; his twin-brother’s fifteen-year-old son, 
Sean Rodriguez; his sister Regina Nash’s twelve-year-old son, 
Tajh Porchea; his cousin, Tameka Nash (whom Coleman 
regarded as a sister); and Tameka’s ten-year-old daughter, 
Khadijah Nash. 
Acting on Kidada’s instruction, Lewis called her and 
left a message that Savage’s order had been carried out.  It was 
not until later that Lewis learned that four children had died in 
the fire.  When Lewis confronted Kidada about the children in 
the house, Kidada responded to Lewis, “F*** ’em.”  
A21:11006.  Kidada paid Lewis only part of the $5000 he had 
been promised.  Merritt received a used car and $500.   
Subsequent recordings of prison conversations between 
Savage and others demonstrated his complicity in the Coleman 
firebombing.  They also revealed Savage’s great satisfaction 
that the killings had taken place, and the intercepted 
conversations revealed plans to kill yet other witnesses and 
their families.  Savage’s continued threats were troubling 
enough that in February 2007, the United States Attorney 
General authorized the Bureau of Prisons to impose Special 
Administrative Measures (SAMs) restricting Savage’s 
communications with others, including his family.  See 28 
C.F.R. § 501.3.  In April 2009, an indictment in this case was 




Steven Northington as defendants.  United States v. Savage, 
No. 2:07-cr-550, ECF 51 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2009). 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 The Fourth Superseding Indictment was later filed in 
May 2012 against Savage, Merritt, Northington and Savage’s 
sister, Kidada Savage.  By the time of trial,3 the charges against 
Savage were as follows:  
 one count of conspiracy to participate in a 
racketeering (RICO4) enterprise, 18 U.S.C. § 
1962(d); 
 twelve counts of violent crime in aid of racketeering 
(VICAR) murder, § 1959(a)(1), for the Lassiter, 
Abdullah, Brown, Parker, Toliver, Flowers, and six 
arson murders; 
 one count of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, 
§ 1959(a)(5), for the conspiracy to commit the arson 
murders;  
 one count of retaliating against a witness, § 1513, for 
the arson murders in retaliation for Eugene 
Coleman’s testimony and other cooperation; and 
 
3 Before trial, the District Court dismissed a witness tampering 
count under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A). 
4 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 




 one count of using fire to commit a felony, § 
844(h)(1), for the fire used to commit VICAR 
murder at the Coleman house. 
Shortly after Savage was indicted in 2009, the District 
Court appointed Christopher Warren as counsel of record.  
Because the charges carried a maximum penalty of death, the 
District Court also appointed Timothy Sullivan as learned 
capital-qualified counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005.5  
Savage sought a replacement for Warren, so in 2010 the 
District Court appointed Christian Hoey and allowed Warren 
to withdraw.  Sullivan’s conditional appointment as a federal 
magistrate judge spurred further substitution.  In November 
2012, the District Court granted Savage’s motion to appoint 
additional learned counsel, appointing William Purpura.  The 
District Court then allowed Sullivan and his associate to 
withdraw in December 2012.  At trial, Hoey and Purpura acted 
as counsel of record. 
The Government provided pretrial notice of its intent to 
seek the death penalty for the VICAR murder and witness 
retaliation counts,6 as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a).  The 
District Court rebuffed Savage’s attempts to strike the notice. 
 
5 The District Court later allowed Sullivan’s associate, Brett 
Cook, to join the defense team. 
6 When retaliation against a witness consists of killing a person, 
as in this case, the punishment is that associated with murder 
and manslaughter. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1), (2)(A); see also 




The extensive pretrial proceedings also addressed the 
composition of the jury.  The District Court rejected defense 
efforts to limit potential jurors to residents of Philadelphia 
County and to expand the source of potential jurors beyond 
voter registration lists. 
 Hundreds responded to the summons to jury service and 
filled out questionnaires at the District Court’s instruction.  The 
District Court and counsel questioned potential jurors during 
voir dire proceedings that began on November 5, 2012.  After 
thirty days of voir dire, jury selection concluded.  The panel 
was composed of ten white jurors, two black jurors and six 
alternates—five white and one black.  Although Savage 
interposed Batson challenges to the exclusion of certain black 
jurors, the District Court determined that the Government 
exercised its peremptory strikes on a race-neutral basis. 
Trial began on February 4, 2013.  The Government’s 
case featured more than seventy witnesses, over a thousand 
exhibits and many recordings of intercepted conversations.  On 
the fifty-fifth day of trial, the jury returned a verdict finding 
Savage guilty of all counts.  At the conclusion of the guilt 
phase, the District Court placed the jurors in recess for seven 
days (extended an eighth day), after which the penalty phase 
commenced. 
The capital sentencing hearing, conducted pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) before the same jury, took seven days.  
The jury was presented with evidence of both aggravating and 
 





mitigating factors under § 3592, and on May 31, 2013, it 
unanimously voted that Savage be sentenced to death on each 
of the thirteen eligible counts, pursuant to §§ 3591(a)(2) and 
3593(e).   
On June 3, 2013, the District Judge formally 
pronounced a sentence of death on each eligible count: twelve 
VICAR murders plus witness retaliation.  Savage was also 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the racketeering conspiracy, 
as well as two ten-year terms of imprisonment for the VICAR 
conspiracy and the use of fire to commit a felony.  The District 
Court waived a $1600 special assessment as to all counts. 
  After sentencing, Savage moved for a judgment of 
acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a new 
trial under Rule 33 and arrest of judgment under Rule 34.  The 
District Court denied those requests in September 2014. 
Savage timely appealed from final judgment and the 
denial of his new-trial motion.7  Although he raises a host of 
issues on appeal, he does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence for any of the crimes of conviction.   
IV.  IF ANY GAPS EXIST IN THE RECORD, THEY DO NOT 
ENTITLE SAVAGE TO RELIEF. 
We first address Savage’s most foundational claim of 
error, an error which he contends prevented him from proving 
 
7 The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal charges 
against Savage pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 




that he preserved certain issues while also eclipsing his ability 
to spot and raise other issues.  Despite the vast appellate record 
before us—over eighteen thousand pages spanning more than 
thirty-four volumes—Savage contends he lacks access to “at 
least 50 letters, e-mails, and other undocketed written 
communications that the district court exchanged with the 
parties.”  Def. Br. 339.  He also claims the record omits “at 
least 50 unrecorded” oral communications involving the 
District Court, including sidebars, in-chambers charge 
conferences to hammer out jury instructions, and conversations 
between the District Court and jurors where counsel was not 
present.  Id.  Savage argues these alleged omissions violate the 
Constitution, the Federal Death Penalty Act and the Court 
Reporter Act.  But “the real centerpiece of [his] argument” is 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.  Oral Argument Tr. 
126:20–24. 
Rule 10 provides appellants a way to reconstruct 
missing portions of an appellate record.  And though we have 
previously granted a new trial when an incomplete record 
prejudiced an appellant, see Simmons v. Beyer, 44 F.3d 1160, 
1168-69 (3d Cir. 1995), we have always required appellants to 
attempt Rule 10 reconstruction before seeking relief.  See, e.g., 
Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 2016). 
Yet Savage attempts to skirt that prerequisite.  He 
argues that before forcing him to undertake Rule 10 
reconstruction, we should permit him to take wide-ranging 
discovery from the District Court—including searching the 
District Judge’s files for any undocketed written 
communications and scouring his personal notes for insight 




Savage contends the District Court’s refusal to submit to that 
examination entitles him (at least) to a presumption that the 
defense properly preserved all issues or (at most) to a new trial. 
Quite simply, Savage overreaches.  The record in its 
existing form enables us to decide his appeal consistent with 
precepts of fundamental fairness and with our obligation under 
the Federal Death Penalty Act to “review the entire record.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3595(b).  If indeed gaps exist—and the Government 
argues there are none—Savage’s failure to pursue Rule 10 
reconstruction forecloses relief. 
*      *      * 
We can easily dispatch Savage’s constitutional claim.  
Although due process demands a record “sufficiently 
complete” to facilitate “an adequate review of [the 
defendant’s] conviction . . . . neither the Supreme Court, nor 
our Court, has held that due process requires a verbatim 
transcript of the entire proceedings or that an incomplete record 
confers automatic entitlement to relief.”  Fahy v. Horn, 516 
F.3d 169, 190 (3d Cir. 2008).  That’s hardly surprising, since 
at the time of the Founding and for generations thereafter, 
contemporaneous (let alone verbatim) accounts of trial 
proceedings in federal court were the exception and not the 
norm.  See Oswald M. T. Ratteray, Verbatim Reporting Comes 
of Age, 56 Judicature 368, 368–69, 373 (1973); see also Miller 
v. United States, 317 U.S. 192, 198–99 (1942).8  We decline to 
 
8 Indeed, incomplete transcription remained common in some 
state courts until relatively recently.  See Oliver v. Zimmerman, 




graft what is a relatively modern development onto the Due 
Process Clause or any other constitutional guarantee.  The 
Constitution does not require an all-encompassing trial record 
to identify issues for appeal. 
The same goes for Savage’s Federal Death Penalty Act 
claim.  As he points out, § 3595(b) obliges us to “review the 
entire record” in capital cases.  But that subsection also 
specifies a minimum set of contents the “record” must include: 
1. “the evidence submitted during the trial”;  
2. “the information submitted during the sentencing 
hearing”; 
3. “the procedures employed in the sentencing 
hearing”; and  
4. “the special findings returned” as to aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 
Id.; cf. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (“[I]t is 
important that the record on appeal disclose to the reviewing 
court the considerations which motivated the death sentence in 
every case in which it is imposed.”).  Savage does not dispute 
either that the current record clears these statutory minima or 
that it adequately discloses why he received the death penalty.  
 
in Pennsylvania is that only testimony of witnesses and 
statements of the court are transcribed as of course.  Opening 
and closing speeches are not transcribed unless requested by 
counsel, but any objection lodged during the course of such 





Nor does Savage explain why, even if our § 3595(b) 
obligation extends beyond the four discrete categories we have 
enumerated, it stretches so far as to cover the items he claims 
are missing.  At most, we think our obligation to “review the 
entire record” is cabined by Rule 10(a), which defines “the 
record on appeal” as “the original papers and exhibits filed in 
the district court; the transcript of proceedings, if any; and a 
certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district 
clerk.”  In other words, § 3595(b) does not reach the 
untranscribed conversations and many9 of the unfiled writings 
 
9 Insofar as any of the writings Savage identifies could be 
considered “original papers and exhibits filed in the district 
court,” he has failed to adequately demonstrate any non-
speculative prejudice from the absence of those writings on 
appeal.  Relatedly, Savage has not articulated how the 
purportedly missing items could or would give rise to “any 
difference[s] . . . about whether the record truly discloses what 
occurred in the district court,” and, indeed, failed to have any 
such differences settled by the District Court, as is his 
obligation.  Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(1).  Neither Rule 10(a) nor 
§ 3595(b), to the extent that statute incorporates Rule 10(a), 
provides an appellant relief in such circumstances.  See United 
States v. Smart, 448 F.2d 931, 936 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The 
missing documents would appear to have no significance to the 
issues which could be advanced on appeal.  Those records 
necessary for prosecution of the appeal—the minutes of the 
trial and the minutes of the suppression hearing—are intact and 
were available to [the appellant] and his appellate counsel. 
[The appellant] has failed to show any prejudice to his right to 




Savage claims are missing here.  Indeed, for those 
communications (or their reconstructions) to have become part 
of the “record on appeal,” Savage needed to move to 
supplement the record.  Cf. United States v. Moreno, 857 F.3d 
723, 727 (5th Cir. 2017).  He did not, so there is no Federal 
Death Penalty Act violation. 
That leaves his Court Reporter Act claim, which—as 
Savage acknowledged at oral argument—applies only to any 
untranscribed oral communications.  The Court Reporter Act 
requires “[e]ach session of the court” to be “recorded 
verbatim,” including “all proceedings in criminal cases had in 
open court.”  28 U.S.C. § 753(b).  Though the Act does not 
prescribe a remedy for violations, courts have awarded relief 
up to a new trial.  E.g., Simmons, 44 F.3d at 1168–69; see 
United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 170–72 (3d Cir. 
2013); see also United States v. Kelly, 167 F.3d 436, 438 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (collecting cases). 
Litigants typically seek relief under the Court Reporter 
Act when an unanticipated technical malfunction, human error 
or natural disaster renders transcripts of proceedings 
unavailable.  See, e.g., Kelly, 167 F.3d at 437 (recording and 
notes destroyed in a fire before they could be transcribed); 
United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560, 562 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(transcripts “permanently lost”); United States v. Sierra, 981 
F.2d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 1992) (court-reporting system 
malfunctioned); United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1380 
(9th Cir. 1990) (court reporter “unable to locate her trial notes 
and tapes”); United States v. Preciado-Cordobas, 981 F.2d 
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1993) (transcription unavailable because 




down the proceedings” and since the “backup” “tape 
recording” “either could not be found or was unintelligible”); 
United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(court reporter’s tape recorder malfunctioned).  But a few 
courts have concluded that “[t]he duty to comply with” the 
Court Reporter Act “lies with the court, not the parties,” and 
they have granted relief when a district court held off-the-
record sidebars—something Savage claims occurred in this 
case.  United States v. Nolan, 910 F.2d 1553, 1560 (7th Cir. 
1990); see also, e.g., United States v. Haber, 251 F.3d 881, 
889–90 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 
1504, 1529–30 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Garner, 581 
F.2d 481, 488–89 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Sierra, 981 F.2d at 
127 (“The Court Reporter Act applies to all proceedings in 
open court, which includes sidebar conferences.”). 
At the outset, we question whether Savage 
appropriately invokes the Court Reporter Act for the first time 
on appeal.  To be sure, remanding a case for record 
reconstruction or a new trial over a Court Reporter Act 
violation makes some sense when a conversation everyone 
thought was being recorded evades transcription because of an 
unforeseeable circumstance.  In such a case, no one could have 
known to raise the Court Reporter Act in the District Court.  
Yet granting Savage’s request for relief under the Court 
Reporter Act—raised now for the first time—makes far less 
sense.  His trial counsel apparently knew the untranscribed 
conversations were not being recorded and thus arguably 
“waive[d] an objection to the court’s failure to comply with 
§ 753(b) . . . by acquiescing in the court’s procedure.”  Nolan, 




581 F.2d at 488 & n.4.  But even were we to excuse Savage’s 
failure to object at trial, his Court Reporter Act claim still fails 
on its merits.  We cannot excuse Savage’s failure to pursue 
Rule 10 reconstruction. 
Only when a defendant shows a “colorable need” for the 
missing transcripts will we grant Court Reporter Act relief.  
Fahy, 516 F.3d at 190 (quoting Karabin v. Petsock, 758 F.2d 
966, 969 (3d Cir. 1985)).  To show a colorable need, a 
defendant must do two things.  First, a defendant must make “a 
specific showing of prejudice.”  Sierra, 981 F.2d at 125.  In 
other words, a defendant must particularly assert what the 
missing record would show and why it would justify relief.  See 
id. at 127.  Second, a defendant must explain why Rule 10(c)’s 
record-reconstruction procedure cannot cure the prejudice.  See 
Roberts, 826 F.3d at 124–25 (collecting cases).10 
 
10 Every circuit to consider this issue has agreed that an 
appellant must specifically show prejudice and explain why 
Rule 10 reconstruction won’t work before obtaining Court 
Reporter Act relief.  See Kelly, 167 F.3d at 438 (collecting 
cases).  That said, the Fifth Circuit has relaxed those 
requirements when an appellant has new counsel on appeal and 
the alleged omission is “substantial and significant.”  Selva, 
559 F.2d at 1306.  (The Eleventh Circuit follows that rule as 
binding precedent, since it predates 1981 legislation splitting 
the original Fifth Circuit into the present-day Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits.  See Preciado-Cordobas, 981 F.2d at 1212.)  
Savage tries to engraft that partial exception onto our caselaw, 
but we have already refused.  See Sierra, 981 F.2d at 126 




Savage comes closest to alleging prejudice by 
speculating that a more complete record might show that he 
preserved objections to various legal issues we must otherwise 
review under the heightened plain-error standard applicable to 
unpreserved error.  We address standard-of-review issues as 
we encounter them in the following Parts.  To resolve his Court 
Reporter Act claim, we need only note that Savage has never 
 
and explaining how it perversely incentivizes “defendant[s] to 
dismiss trial counsel and seek appointment of new counsel on 
appeal”); see also Haber, 251 F.3d at 889–90. 
     What’s more, even under the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
standard, Savage still would not obtain relief: the omissions he 
alleges don’t qualify as “substantial and significant.”  Whether 
a gap counts as substantial and significant in those courts 
“depends upon the likelihood that error which could be pursued 
on appeal occurred during those parts of the trial for which we 
do not have a verbatim transcript, and which the reconstruction 
does not allow us to review.”  Preciado-Cordobas, 981 F.2d at 
1214.  In practical terms, gaps relating to “indispensable part[s] 
of the proceedings, both in terms of time spent and potential 
influence on the outcome,” might justify reversal.  Id.  But 
“[m]ere speculation, entirely unsupported or contradicted by 
the record, that error may have been committed during an 
unrecorded part of the trial simply is not enough to support a 
finding that omissions are substantial and significant.”  Id.  The 
latter aptly describes Savage’s approach here.  Savage does not 
dispute that we know what happened during the most critical 
trial stages.  Rather, he seeks a new trial because we don’t 





formally sought to reconstruct any untranscribed 
conversation—even though Rule 10 “provides a specific 
mechanism by which the parties can have [a] dispute over the 
contents of the trial court record resolved, and clearly places 
the responsibility for initially creating the record on the 
appellant.”  Roberts, 826 F.3d at 123. 
Savage argues it would be futile to pursue Rule 10 
reconstruction since his attorneys on appeal did not participate 
in his trial and therefore cannot be expected to know what went 
on in the untranscribed conferences.  But Rule 10 provides for 
that eventuality: a defendant may submit a declaration saying 
he does not remember what happened, passing the ball to the 
government to document its recollection and giving the 
defendant a chance to object before allowing the District Judge 
to resolve any remaining discrepancies in accordance with the 
provided documentation and with any notes he has retained and 
his own recollections.  At least one court of appeals has 
approved that very procedure under similar circumstances.  See 
United States v. Wilson, 16 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1994). 
That reasoning also thwarts Savage’s stunning request 
for discovery of the District Court’s files, the District Judge’s 
personal notes, and the work-product of every lawyer involved 
in the case.  Of course, the District Judge may rely on his notes 
and recollection in certifying a reconstruction’s accuracy—just 
as prosecutors may rely on their notes and recollections to rebut 
an appellant’s initial reconstruction.  But it does not follow that 
Savage can discover everyone else’s notes or recollections.  
Savage cites no rule entitling him to such discovery, and we 




questions and perverse incentives that such a rule would surely 
precipitate. 
In short, Rule 10’s text puts the ball in Savage’s court.  
The Rule and our caselaw require a collaborative 
reconstruction effort that includes opposing counsel and the 
District Judge.  But it starts with the appellant.  Otherwise, an 
appellant could “manufacture his own disputes, attribute legal 
significance to them, and then claim that they only can be 
resolved by an examination of testimony that is unavailable.”  
Sussman, 709 F.3d at 172.  That appears to be what Savage 
attempts here, and it is an approach we will not countenance. 
*      *      * 
We close this Part with three observations from our 
supervisory perch as a Court of Appeals, and from our shared 
perspective as three former trial judges.  First, the record 
omissions Savage most often rehashes include the two 
untranscribed charge conferences (one during the guilt phase 
and one during the penalty phase), plus “extensive[]” 
undocketed emails swapping proposed jury instructions (which 
we view as a “virtual” charge conference).  Def. Br. 344.  To 
the extent Savage claims that this constitutes legal error, 
neither Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 nor the Court 
Reporter Act require on-the-record charge conferences.  Still, 
and even though off-the-record charge conferences routinely 
occur in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (and elsewhere), 
we observe that the practice does have the potential to allow a 
legal error to go unnoticed and uncorrected.  Relative to the 
costs of an entire criminal prosecution—especially a four-year, 




expense saved or convenience gained by a charge conference 
conducted without a court reporter present. 
Second, when it comes to making motions and 
preserving objections, the obligation rests with trial counsel to 
ensure the record reflects all motions or objections.  Deciding 
to raise or to forgo a potentially meritorious objection often 
entails balancing fraught—and sometimes countervailing—
considerations, both tactical and strategic.  We will not bless a 
result where any potential record gap empowers creative 
counsel to resuscitate a waived objection on appeal. 
Third, Savage credibly alleges that the District Court 
twice talked to the jury without counsel or a court reporter 
present.  We know about the first conversation because the 
transcript from the last day of the Government’s guilt-phase 
case reveals that the District Judge advised counsel, after the 
Government rested: “I’m going to go back and talk to the jury 
and tell them what we’re doing, the fact that we’re not going 
to be back until next Monday.”  A25:13393–94; see also id. at 
13406 (“Ladies and gentlemen, at this point we’re going to 
recess, and let you go back to get some lunch. It’s 12 o’clock. 
I understand lunch is on its way up. I will come back and talk 
to you briefly to advise you of the schedule that we are going 
to be operating from here on. Okay?”).  But the actual 
discussion was not transcribed, and we are unaware of its being 
restated on the record later. 
We know about the second conversation because, in a 
break during the various closing arguments, an attorney 
brought up a “housekeeping matter”: “I believe the Court 




they are available tomorrow or not.”  The District Judge 
responded, “They will be here tomorrow if—I told them also 
tomorrow if I can charge—if I can begin charging the Jury in 
the morning, first thing, then we will do that and let them 
deliberate. However, if closings—if closing statements are still 
going on tomorrow morning, we are going to recess until 
Monday and let them come back on Monday for the charge.”  
A28:14848.  Here too, this after-the-fact summary is the only 
information we have about the judge–jury exchange.  
Though we cannot know exactly what was said, what 
we do know assures us that the conversations were entirely 
scheduling-related.  That said, we further stress the advisability 
of having counsel present for all interactions between the court 
and jurors, and our preference that such interactions be 
transcribed.  See also Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1529 n.37. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY SUBSTITUTING 
COUNSEL. 
Savage claims that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel because the District Court waited until four 
days before voir dire began to substitute new lead counsel.  We 
conclude that the District Court’s substitution constituted 
neither structural nor trial error.11 
 
11 We leave for a future date the question of whether a 
structural error claim is subject to waiver or forfeiture.  That 
said, we are not persuaded by the Government’s argument that 





On June 23, 2009, the District Court appointed Timothy 
Sullivan to represent Savage as learned capital-qualified 
counsel.  Christian Hoey was appointed to represent Savage 
alongside Sullivan on February 19, 2010.  In January 2011, 
Sullivan was appointed as a U.S. Magistrate Judge, but because 
this appointment was contingent on the current incumbent of 
that magistrate judgeship being confirmed as a district court 
judge, there remained uncertainty as to if and when Sullivan 
would assume his new office.  While the record does not make 
clear when Sullivan first brought this issue to the District 
Court’s attention, it does contain representations that Sullivan 
advised the District Court of his pending appointment as early 
as January 2011. 
The District Court addressed the issue of Sullivan’s 
pending appointment during a June 2012 hearing.  Soon 
afterward, on June 19, 2012, Sullivan submitted a letter to the 
District Court proposing the appointment of William Purpura 
as additional learned capital-qualified counsel.12  The letter 
explained that  
[i]f circumstances warrant, and Mr. Sullivan 
seeks leave to withdraw from this case in the 
near-future, Mr. Purpura has indicated that he 
wishes the Court to be on notice that he might 
request a short continuance until October 2012.  
This request will only be made if Mr. Purpura 
 
12 Around this time, Sullivan’s associate, Brett Cook, also 




requires additional time to prepare for trial and 
for any penalty hearing case.  Mr. Purpura is 
prepared to meet with the Court to discuss these 
matters.   
A33:17393.  Accompanying the letter was an account of Mr. 
Purpura’s considerable capital case experience.  Sullivan 
followed up with the District Court’s courtroom deputy via 
email on June 25, 2012, writing, “Mr. Purpura is anxious to 
receive word from the Court on his appointment since each day 
counts now.”  A4:1864.  The record does not reveal a response 
to Sullivan’s letter and follow-up email. 
On either June 24 or July 24, 2012,13 Savage submitted 
a pro se, ex parte “emergency motion” for appointment of new 
counsel or to proceed pro se.  A4:1858–63.  Savage asserted 
that the District Court was “well aware” of Sullivan’s pending 
appointment, that Sullivan was “preoccupied” with his 
appointment, and that Sullivan was “underperforming” in 
preparing Savage’s case.  Id. at 1858.  Savage also claimed that 
Sullivan “knows nothing about the basic facts,” did not visit 
him unless there was to be a hearing, was “wholly ineffective,” 
“cares nothing about my case,” and like Hoey, was a 
“compulsive liar[].”  Id. at 1858–59, 1862.  Moreover, Savage 
alleged that there were disputes between Sullivan and Hoey 
resulting from ineffective communication. 
 
13 While the motion was dated June 24th, Savage states in the 
body of the motion that he is writing on the 24th of July.  That 





He then requested “concerned dedicated counsel” to 
protect his Sixth Amendment rights.  Id. at 1858.  Savage 
closed stating: “If a man/attorney does not want to be apart 
[sic] of a defense team, why would I want him to defend me or 
why would the court keep him on my case[?]”  Id. at 1862. 
On August 10, 2012, the District Court’s courtroom 
deputy forwarded Savage’s letter to Sullivan, observing that 
the letter was received in chambers and adding simply, “Please 
advise.”  Id. at 1857.  The District Court took no further action 
with respect to Savage’s self-styled motion. 
Savage, through counsel, moved ex parte for 
appointment of Purpura as additional learned counsel on 
October 16, 2012.  This motion explained that Sullivan could 
be sworn in before the end of the year (at which time he would 
immediately assume his duties as a magistrate judge) and that 
“Mr. Purpura will be prepared to move forward with the 
representation of Mr. Savage under existing [sic] Court’s 
schedule.”  A33:17390.  It also expressed that “[t]he 
appointment of Mr. Purpura must occur as soon as possible in 
order to permit him sufficient time to familiarize himself with 
the discovery, work with Mr. Sullivan and become familiar 
with the mitigation evidence, the aggravating evidence and for 
any penalty hearing.”  Id.  Counsel further represented that 
“Mr. Savage has no objection to Mr. Purpura replacing Mr. 
Sullivan, if necessary.”  A33:17391. 
On November 1, 2012, the District Court held a hearing 
to address the motion for appointment of counsel.  Sullivan 
advised the District Court that he had discussed the matter with 




consents to the relief that we seek.”  A7:3312.  The District 
Court then confirmed this, asking Savage: “You are satisfied if 
this Court were to go ahead and make that appointment; is that 
correct?”  Id.  Savage responded, “Yes.”  Id.  The District Court 
then turned to Purpura and asked if he was “ready to take over 
representation of Mr. Savage,” to which Purpura replied: 
Your Honor, I cannot represent that I’m ready to 
take over the representation of Mr. Savage.  I 
don’t think the Court would expect me to make 
that representation.  I have met with Mr. Savage.  
We met back in June.  At that time I know Mr. 
Sullivan filed the first motion on this particular 
issue.   
Obviously jury selection starts on Monday.  I’ve 
talked to Christian Hoey, who seems to know the 
case almost as well as Mr. Savage himself, as far 
as going through the discovery.  So we have gone 
through everything there.   
Mr. Cook, as well, and Mr. Sullivan, has had this 
case in litigation as well as the defense.  I believe 
that I can add right now a lot to this team to keep 
this train on the track and to go forward at this 
point.  But if the Court is asking me specifically, 
if at this very moment could I step into the shoes 
of Mr. Sullivan who has been here for three and 
a half years, I would have to honestly tell the 




A7:3312–13.  Seeking clarification, the District Court inquired 
further: “[A]re you satisfied that you can get yourself up to 
speed so that this matter is not going to be delayed?”  A7:3313–
14.  Purpura responded,   
Judge, I can tell the Court honestly that I am 
experienced in Federal as well as State capital 
cases.  I would do nothing except this particular 
case, whatever amount of time it took me per 
day.   
Teresa Whalen[14] is a close associate and friend 
of mine.  I’ve tried capital cases in the District of 
Maryland with her, and I know that she will help 
bring me up to speed as well as everybody else.  
It’s a big team effort.   
So the answer is yes, I’ll do everything in my 
power to be brought up to speed, and I have the 
experience to do it.  I hope to make Mr. Savage 
satisfied of that as well. 
A7:3314.  The Government did not object to the motion, and 
after conferring with the local office of the Federal Public 
Defender, the District Court recorded the appointment of 
Purpura.15 
 
14 Teresa Whalen was an attorney representing co-defendant 
Kidada Savage. 
15 The District Court entered an order formally appointing 




The initial hardship stage of jury selection had already 
taken place on September 26 and 27, 2012, but voir dire began 
on November 5, 2012, less than a week after Purpura’s oral 
appointment.  Savage then moved, on December 13, 2012, for 
the appointment of additional associate counsel Marta Kahn 
and Brady Locher.  No order reflecting their appointment 
appears in the record, however, and neither Kahn nor Locher 
appear as counsel of record on the District Court docket.  
Nevertheless, the Government avers—and the record 
reflects—that Kahn did participate as additional counsel.  
Sullivan and Cook moved to withdraw on December 19, 2012, 
which the District Court granted. 
At no time did either side seek a continuance. 
Voir dire concluded on Tuesday, January 29, 2013.  The 
following Monday, February 4, 2013, the guilt phase of trial 
got underway.  Although substantial discovery was conducted 
pretrial, Purpura never told the Court that he was inadequately 
prepared or that he needed more time.  The trial concluded 
more than three months later, with the jury returning a guilty 
verdict on all charges on May 13, 2013.  The proceedings next 
advanced to the penalty phase, which began on May 21, 2013.  
The jury returned a death penalty verdict on May 31, 2013. 
B. Savage did not suffer a constructive denial of 
counsel: there was no structural error. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”  




constructive denial of the assistance of counsel requires per se 
reversal.16  See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989). 
The Supreme Court has held that “it is a denial of the 
accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial 
with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective aid and 
assistance of counsel.”  White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 
(1945); see also United States ex rel. Tillery v. Cavell, 294 F.2d 
12, 20 (3d Cir. 1961) (“Effective aid and assistance of counsel 
is of necessity impossible where counsel is not given 
reasonable time to consult with the accused and prepare the 
case.”).  Yet the Court has declined to “fashion a per se rule 
requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy 
appointment of counsel.”  Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
54 (1970); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 661 
 
16 “In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), the 
Supreme Court recognized a distinction between structural 
defects, which require reversal, per se, and trial errors, which 
require a reviewing court to engage in harmless error analysis. 
Structural defects are defects in the constitution of the trial 
mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless-error standards. 
A structural defect affect[s] the framework within which the 
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself. Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot 
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt 
or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as 
fundamentally fair.”  Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 357 (3d 




(1984) (“[E]very refusal to postpone a criminal trial will not 
give rise to [a presumption of prejudice].”).   
Instead, courts must look to whether “the surrounding 
circumstances make it unlikely that the defendant could have 
received the effective assistance of counsel.”  Cronic, 466 U.S. 
at 666; see also id. at 659–60 (circumstances necessitating a 
per se reversal may exist “when although counsel is available 
to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, 
even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance 
is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate 
without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial”).  This 
question  
necessarily involves a comparison of the time of 
the appointment with all the attendant 
circumstances, such as the gravity of the charge, 
the experience of appointed counsel, the extent 
of his knowledge and participation in similar 
cases, his opportunity for preparation and even 
what he may have been told by the defendant 
which may reduce the area of necessary 
preparation. 
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1970).   
Precedent provides some insight into the circumstances 
that constitute a constructive denial of counsel requiring per se 
reversal.  In Avery v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that 
there was no denial of counsel where counsel was appointed 
three days before a capital trial began.  308 U.S. 444, 453 




the assistance of zealous and earnest counsel” who “contested 
every step of the way leading to final disposition of the case.”  
Id. at 450.  “That the examination and preparation of the case, 
in the time permitted by the trial judge, had been adequate for 
counsel to exhaust its every angle is illuminated by the absence 
of any indication, on the motion and hearing for new trial, that 
they could have done more had additional time been granted.”  
Id. at 452.    
We similarly held, in Tillery, that per se reversal was 
not warranted where an attorney was appointed to represent a 
defendant on the day of trial.17  294 F.2d at 22.  There, the 
attorney had practiced law for fifteen years, had met with the 
defendant twice prior to trial, and had heard his account of the 
crime.  Id.  The defendant had also failed to disclose any 
witness or alibi requiring investigation.  Id. at 20–22.  
Likewise, in United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, we held 
that the late appointment of counsel did not require per se 
reversal where counsel had “a good reputation and solid 
credentials” and was able to review a colleague’s notes from 
an interview with the defendant, but did not have time to 
interview the defendant himself, did not ask for a continuance 
when witnesses did not appear because he “had no reasonable 
expectation” that the witnesses would help, and “was unable to 
say that he had been insufficiently prepared to go to trial.”  394 
F.2d 748, 752–54 (3d Cir. 1968), overruled on other grounds 
by Moore, 432 F.2d 730. 
 
17 As federal capital cases rarely involve a constructive denial 




In contrast, the Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
trial counsel who merely goes through the motions is really no 
counsel at all.  The Court concluded in Powell v. Alabama that 
per se reversal was required since the defendants “were not 
accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense”: the 
representation provided was “pro forma rather than zealous 
and active”; “[n]o attempt was made to investigate” and “[n]o 
opportunity to do so was given”; and the defendants were 
instead “hurried to trial.”  287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932). 
We similarly held, in United States ex rel. Washington 
v. Maroney, that the defendant was constructively denied 
assistance of counsel where counsel was appointed the day of 
trial, made no pretrial preparations, consulted with the 
defendant only briefly in the back of the courtroom, did not 
object to the admission of a possibly coerced confession, and 
failed to impeach the key government witness or call any 
character witnesses on the defendant’s behalf.  428 F.2d 10, 
14–15 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Vance v. Lehman, 64 F.3d 119, 
122 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining that the per se rule may apply 
where counsel fails to subject the prosecution’s case to 
adversarial testing, has little or no legal training, or is prevented 
from assisting the defendant). 
Savage argues that Purpura’s late substitution 
constituted a constructive denial of counsel that requires per se 
reversal.  Several facts weigh in favor of Savage’s claim:   
 The District Court appointed Purpura only four days 
before voir dire began.  See Moore, 432 F.2d at 735 (“A 





 The guilt-phase trial lasted slightly longer than the time 
Purpura had between appointment and trial to prepare.  
See Washington, 428 F.2d at 14 (“[C]ounsel for an 
indigent defendant, held in custody, must be appointed 
by the court sufficiently far in advance of trial to enable 
counsel adequately to prepare the defense.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 This was a complex death penalty prosecution involving 
conduct that extended over more than a decade and 
involved twelve murders.  Discovery was substantial, 
including numerous recordings that would have 
required significant time to review.  See, e.g., 
A34:18093 (MR. PURPURA: “We understand the 
Government has given us volumes of evidence, actually 
probably too much evidence for me to review.  We are 
trying to review it and trying to catch up. . . . At this 
point I’m having difficulty between the forest and the 
trees.”); A34:18100 (MR. PURPURA: “The amount of 
discovery here is so gargantuan that we have no 
notice.”); cf. United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 
1413–14 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that the district 
court’s determination that twenty-four days was 
sufficient for counsel to prepare was not an abuse of 
discretion where the district court stated the amount of 
evidence was rather discrete, intermittent and of small 
quantity). 
 The District Court may have been aware of Sullivan’s 
potential exit from the case as early as January 2011, but 




U.S. at 54 (“Unquestionably, the courts should make 
every effort to effect early appointments of counsel in 
all cases.”).  Because courts have an independent 
obligation to ensure that the rights of criminal 
defendants are protected, this delay does give us 
pause.18  See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 
(1976) (“When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Court 
has been particularly sensitive to insure that every 
safeguard is observed.”); Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 71 (1942), superseded on other grounds by 
Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“Upon the trial judge rests the duty 
of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for 
the essential rights of the accused.”). 
Nonetheless, Savage fails to take into account numerous 
facts that undermine his constructive denial of counsel claim: 
 In addition to representing to the District Court that he 
had the experience to familiarize himself with the case 
in a timely manner and that he was prepared to 
undertake the efforts necessary to do so, Purpura 
affirmatively stated to the District Court that he could 
be ready for trial.  See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12 
(1983) (“In the face of the unequivocal and 
uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the 
court that he was fully prepared and ‘ready’ for trial, it 
 
18 We also recognize that this substitution involved lead 
counsel, the only capital-qualified counsel then on the record.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3005; see also § 3599; Martel v. Clair, 565 





was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a 
continuance. On this record, it would have been 
remarkable had the trial court not accepted counsel’s 
assurances.”). 
 The District Court’s statements on the record indicate 
that it thought Purpura would be able to adequately 
prepare in the amount of time available.  See, e.g., 
A34:18070 (THE COURT: “I would anticipate that Mr. 
Purpura could get up to speed by that time.”). 
 Purpura was an experienced death penalty counsel. 
 Savage did not lodge any pro se objection to the 
substitution or lack of a continuance. 
 Neither Purpura nor Savage pro se moved for a 
continuance. 
 Sullivan consistently indicated a desire to remain on the 
case while his appointment to a judgeship was pending 
and was uncertain about if or when he would need to 
withdraw.  He even contributed to and participated in 
over six weeks of voir dire. 
 Hoey’s contribution to Savage’s defense was 
substantial.  He was on the case almost from the 
beginning, remained after Sullivan withdrew, and 
according to Purpura, seemed to know the case almost 





 The District Court had to weigh significant issues of 
judicial administration, including the involvement of 
multiple defendants and the availability of numerous 
attorneys.19 
Considering all the attending circumstances, we 
conclude that Savage did not suffer a constructive denial of 
counsel.  First, Purpura was an experienced capital-qualified 
counsel.  Second, Purpura relied on his experience in 
representing to the District Court that he could get “up to 
speed” in time for trial.  Third, neither Purpura nor Savage 
himself moved for a continuance or indicated that Purpura was 
unprepared to proceed to trial.  Given that capital defense 
counsel are not, as a rule, timid creatures, we have every reason 
to believe that if Purpura thought he needed additional time to 
prepare, he would have moved for a continuance.  Fourth, 
although Purpura was lead counsel and the only capital-
qualified counsel, Hoey had been a member of Savage’s 
defense team for several years, and he remained on the team to 
assist Purpura in both preparing and trying the case.  See United 
States v. Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 149–50 (3d Cir. 2003) 
 
19 See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11–12 (“Trial judges necessarily 
require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least 
of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, 
and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden 
counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. 
Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on 
matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary 
insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 
request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel.” 




(defendant was not “left bereft of counsel”).  Fifth, it is 
reasonable for us to infer that Purpura inherited some work 
product from Sullivan and Hoey.  Sixth, and most importantly, 
our careful examination of the record confirms that Purpura 
provided Savage with zealous representation throughout trial.  
See United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186, 
1195–96 (3d Cir. 1969) (“This is not a case where belated 
appointment of counsel may have resulted in the failure to call 
witnesses . . . or in the failure to raise defenses of which counsel 
was unaware or which he was unprepared to pursue, or in an 
improvident plea of guilty.” (internal footnotes omitted)), aff’d 
sub nom. Chambers, 399 U.S. 42.  In fact, it is unclear to us 
what more Purpura could have done had he requested and 
received additional time to prepare.20 
 The situation that the District Court confronted was not 
one where, “although counsel is available to assist the accused 
during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully 
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small 
that” per se reversal is required.  Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–60.  
Thus, there was no structural error. 
 
20 Savage has alleged that the late appointment of Purpura 
violated both his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his 
enhanced right to capital counsel under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3305 & 
3599, but Savage was never without capital counsel.  We 
conclude that his statutory right to capital counsel was not 





C. The District Court committed no trial errors in 
the substitution of counsel. 
 In addition to his structural error claim, Savage alleges 
that the District Court erred in delaying the substitution of 
counsel by (1) overlooking Sullivan’s June 2012 letter; (2) 
failing to adequately address Savage’s pro se, ex parte 
emergency motion; and (3) granting substitution in November 
2012 without a continuance.   
  1. Standard of Review 
We review a district court’s decision regarding 
substitution for an abuse of discretion.  See Martel, 565 U.S. at 
663–64.  While “[t]here are no mechanical tests for 
determining an abuse of discretion,”  United States v. Restaino, 
405 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1968), the Supreme Court has held 
that a motion for substitution should be granted when it is in 
the “interests of justice,” Christeson v. Roper, 574 U.S. 373, 
377 (2015).  See also Martel, 565 U.S. at 652 (holding that 
district courts “should employ the same ‘interests of justice’ 
standard that [is applied] in non-capital cases” in evaluating 
motions to replace capital counsel).  “[F]actors a court of 
appeals should consider in determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion . . . ‘include: the timeliness of the motion; 
the adequacy of the district court’s inquiry into the defendant’s 
complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, including 
the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication 
between lawyer and client (and the client’s responsibility, if 
any, for that conflict).’”  Christeson, 574 U.S. at 377 (quoting 
Martel, 565 U.S. at 663); see also United States v. Goldberg, 




include “the efficient administration of criminal justice; the 
accused’s rights, including the opportunity to prepare a 
defense; and the rights of other defendants awaiting trial who 
may be prejudiced by a continuance”).   
An abuse of discretion may also occur where a court 
makes no inquiry into a defendant’s request to substitute 
counsel.  See Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098; United States v. 
Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1982); see also McMahon v. 
Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 942 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Even when the 
trial judge suspects that the defendant’s contentions are 
disingenuous, and motives impure, a thorough and searching 
inquiry is required.”).21   
2. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in its handling of counsel’s June 
2012 letter. 
 Savage treats Sullivan’s June 2012 communication as 
akin to a motion.  Yet it was no more than a letter and did not 
purport to be anything other than that.  As such, the District 
Court was not called upon to grant or deny relief. 
Even if we were to conclude that the District Court 
should have acted based on the letter, the District Court did so 
 
21 Welty and its progeny are the basis for much of our Court’s 
substitution of counsel caselaw.  Yet for our purposes, they are 
hardly a perfect fit.  The court in Welty, for instance, denied 
substitution.  674 F.2d at 187.  Here, the District Court 
eventually granted relief by appointing Purpura.  Furthermore, 




approximately four months later with the appointment of 
Purpura.  Savage’s only objection is that the District Court 
should have acted sooner.  Given the deference afforded to 
district courts in matters of case administration, see Morris, 
461 U.S. at 11–12; Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 611–12 
(3d Cir. 1989), we see no abuse of discretion in the District 
Court’s failing to substitute counsel promptly upon receipt of 
Sullivan’s letter. 
3. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in forwarding Savage’s pro se, 
ex parte emergency motion to counsel. 
In his June/July 2012 pro se, ex parte emergency motion 
seeking substitution of counsel or to proceed pro se, Savage 
made several allegations that may have constituted good cause: 
Sullivan was not working on the case diligently; 
communication between Savage and Sullivan had broken 
down; and Savage felt that Sullivan was untrustworthy.  The 
District Court did not directly address these claims.  Rather, the 
courtroom deputy transmitted Savage’s letter to Sullivan, 
asking counsel to advise the District Court. 
Considering the procedural history of this case, the 
District Court’s actions were appropriate.  Savage had 
previously submitted numerous pro se filings seeking 
substitution of counsel or permission to proceed pro se.  The 
District Court held hearings to address each of those motions 
in turn, and Savage always retracted his grievances.  While 
courts must proactively address motions, given Savage’s past 
actions and the deference afforded to district courts in matters 




no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s handling of 
Savage’s pro se, ex parte emergency motion. 
4. The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by substituting counsel without 
a continuance in November 2012. 
 For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in substituting 
Purpura for Sullivan.   
 First, Purpura was a highly experienced death penalty 
counsel.  His background could reasonably be expected to save 
him valuable preparation time, not to mention court time.  
Moreover, Purpura’s background and experience make it 
extremely likely that he would have sought a continuance if he 
believed he needed it.  See Moore, 432 F.2d at 735.  No 
continuance was sought. 
Second, Purpura affirmatively represented to the 
District Court that he would be ready for trial.  See Morris, 461 
U.S. at 12 (noting that it “would have been remarkable had the 
trial court not accepted counsel’s assurances”).   
Third, Purpura was hardly alone in representing Savage.  
He joined a team of committed lawyers, see Merlino, 349 F.3d 
at 149–50, that included Hoey—who had been on the case for 
nearly three years.  Hoey helped Purpura prepare and was 
involved extensively in voir dire, trial and sentencing. 
Finally, Sullivan consistently indicated a desire to 




uncertain as he was about if or when he would need to 
withdraw. 
*      *      * 
We are well satisfied that Savage did not suffer a 
constructive denial of counsel and that the District Court did 
not commit trial error in the handling of substitution of counsel. 
VI. SAVAGE’S VICINAGE ARGUMENT LACKS MERIT. 
 Section 3235 of Title 18 provides that a trial in a capital 
case “shall be had in the county where the offense was 
committed.”  18 U.S.C. § 3235.  Savage contends that the 
“language and history” of this statutory section “show that it 
encompasses the right to a jury drawn from the county of the 
offense.”  Def. Br. 115.  The District Court disagreed, and so 
do we.22  
 Section 3235 has its roots in the 1789 Judiciary Act.  
The relevant section provided  
[t]hat in cases punishable with death, the trial 
shall be had in the county where the offence was 
committed, or where that cannot be done without 
great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least 
shall be summoned from thence. 
 
22 Because statutory interpretation presents a question of law, 
we exercise plenary review.  United States v. Randolph, 364 





Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 88.  This statute 
remained unchanged until 1862.  At that time, Congress 
enacted a new law that specified “[t]hat so much of section 
twenty-nine of [the Judiciary Act] . . . as requires in cases 
punishable with death, twelve petit jurors to be summoned 
from the county where the offence was committed, be, and the 
same is hereby, repealed.”  Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 189, § 2, 
12 Stat. 589.  Thus, Congress explicitly eliminated in 1862 the 
requirement in the Judiciary Act for a local jury in a capital 
case.  Thereafter, in 1948, § 3235—Venue in Capital Cases—
was codified in its current form:   
The trial of offenses punishable with death shall 
be had in the county where the offense was 
committed, where that can be done without great 
inconvenience. 
18 U.S.C. § 3235.  Consistent with the 1862 repeal, the title 
and text of § 3235 omit any reference to vicinage or a 
requirement for a jury to be summoned from the county where 
the offense occurred. 
 In light of this statutory history and consistent with the 
plain text of the statute, we conclude that the District Court did 
not err in rejecting Savage’s “attempt to import a ‘vicinage 
requirement’ into the statute.”  A1:29–30.  We agree with the 
District Court that “[t]here is nothing in § 3235 that requires 
the jury to be selected from the county of the offense.”  A1:29; 
see United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 
(1989) (instructing that “where . . . the statute’s language is 
plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 




470, 485 (1917)).  Inasmuch as our task in interpreting a statute 
is “to give effect to the intent of Congress,” we refuse to add a 
vicinage requirement that Congress eliminated more than a 
century ago.  United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 
534, 542 (1940). 
 Indeed, our caselaw already acknowledges the repeal of 
the Judiciary Act’s vicinage requirement in capital cases.  In 
Zicarelli  v. Gray, we addressed whether a state prisoner’s 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by a fair cross-section of the 
community was “violated when he [was] indicted for crimes 
arising out of acts occurring in one county of the state and 
[was] subsequently tried before a jury drawn exclusively from 
a second county in the state.”  543 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(en banc).  Our late colleague Judge Adams examined the 
vicinage requirement under English common law, the 
Constitution’s guarantee of a trial in the State where the crime 
occurred,23 and the 1789 Judiciary Act together with its 
requirements of vicinage in capital and noncapital cases.  Id. at 
475–76.  He distilled three themes from his historical review:   
First, the proposition that a trial must take place 
before a jury drawn from within the state and 
federal judicial district in which the crime was 
committed was considered salient enough to be 
 
23 Article III, § 2, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides in 
relevant part: “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and 
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall 
have been committed.”  The Sixth Amendment also guarantees 
that the trial shall be held in the district where the crime 




guaranteed by the Constitution.  Second, the 
concept that a criminal trial must be before a jury 
composed of residents of the county where the 
crime occurred was not deemed to be of 
sufficient consequence to be guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Rather, if such a rule was to be 
adopted, it would have to be done by Congress.   
Id. at 477–78 (footnote omitted).  The third theme concerned 
the vicinage of jurors in both capital and noncapital trials, 
prompting the observation that “[t]he mandate that 12 jurors be 
summoned from the county of the crime in capital cases was 
repealed in 1862.”  Id. at 478 n.60.   
 In short, no vicinage requirement has existed in capital 
cases since 1862.  If there is to be such a rule, Congress will 
need to enact it once again.24   
 Finally, we reject Savage’s assertion that the District 
Court’s denial of the motion to empanel a jury drawn solely 
from Philadelphia County amounted to structural error.  “The 
purpose of the structural error doctrine is to ensure insistence 
on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define 
the framework of any criminal trial.”  Weaver v. 
Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (emphasis 
 
24 Even if Savage’s argument had some traction, it would 
derive from the right to have the trial conducted in the county 
of the offense.  That right is not “absolute . . . , but only a 
qualified right in cases where such a trial could be had ‘without 
great inconvenience.’”  Brown v. United States, 257 F. 46, 48 




added).  Yet we observed in Zicarelli that the vicinage 
requirement of drawing a jury in a capital trial from “the county 
where the crime occurred was not deemed to be of sufficient 
consequence to be guaranteed by the Constitution.” 543 F.2d 
at 477–78.  Accordingly, there is no constitutional guarantee to 
support Savage’s contention that a structural error occurred 
when the District Court refused to seat a jury comprised solely 
of Philadelphia residents.   
 In sum, the District Court did not err in denying the 
motion to secure the jury from the county of offense pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3235.   
VII. SAVAGE HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A VIOLATION OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A JURY 
DRAWN FROM A FAIR CROSS-SECTION OF THE 
COMMUNITY. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is 
entitled to a trial by an “impartial” jury.25  One important step 
in furthering impartiality is to draw jurors from diverse 
segments of the population.  See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 
474, 480 (1990).  The Supreme Court has declared this method 
a constitutional guarantee by concluding that “the selection of 
a petit jury from a representative cross section of the 
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment 
 
25 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been 




right to a jury trial.”  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 
(1975). 
A corresponding statutory framework facilitates the 
selection of a representative jury.  The Jury Selection and 
Service Act of 1968 (JSSA) provides that federal juries are to 
be “selected at random from a fair cross section of the 
community.”  28 U.S.C. § 1861.  Federal district courts are 
tasked with creating jury-selection plans consistent with this 
fair-cross-section principle.  § 1863(a).  These plans generally 
must draw potential jurors from “voter registration lists” or 
“lists of actual voters,” but they also must identify other 
sources “where necessary to foster the policy and protect the 
rights secured by” the JSSA’s fair-cross-section principle.  
§ 1863(b)(2).   
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania has long drawn its potential jurors exclusively 
from voter registration lists.  See, e.g., Savage v. United States, 
547 F.2d 212, 214–16 (3d Cir. 1976) (unrelated case describing 
1968 version of jury-selection plan); A1:66 n.7 (describing 
2009 version applicable here).  That approach reflects the 
Eastern District’s assessment that “[v]oter registration lists 
represent a fair cross section of the community in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.”  U.S. Dist. Ct. for Eastern Dist. of 
Pennsylvania, Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and 




The Eastern District forms its jury pool through 
essentially three steps.26  Every two years, registered voters in 
the jurisdiction are randomly selected to populate a master jury 
wheel.  Then the master wheel is culled by randomly choosing 
individuals, mailing each of them a juror qualification form, 
and evaluating their responses to identify who is disqualified, 
exempt or excused from service.  The result is a qualified jury 
wheel.  Finally, individuals randomly selected from the 
qualified wheel are summoned to serve on venires (i.e., panels) 
of potential jurors in Eastern District trials. 
In preparing to challenge the Eastern District’s jury-
selection system, Savage sought discovery of extensive 
information that went into creating the master wheel, the 
qualified wheel and the venire.27  See 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f) 
(providing for discovery).  The District Court granted Savage’s 
discovery motion in part, providing him access to the Eastern 
District’s jury plan (2009 version) and spreadsheets containing 
statistical information about the race and ethnicity of:  
 
26 For purposes of this overview, the applicable 2009 version 
of the Eastern District’s plan—as described by the District 
Court in this case—does not differ from the presently operative 
2017 version.  See A1:66 n.7; 2017 Jury Plan §§ 3–7.   
27 Savage’s co-defendant Steven Northington filed this 
discovery motion and the follow-up motion to strike the 
venires.  We refer to both motions as filed by Savage since the 





 the potential jurors on the master and qualified 
jury wheels assembled in 2007, 2009 and 2011; 
 the grand jurors who returned the First 
Superseding Indictment; 
 the potential petit jurors who were summoned; 
and  
 the subset of potential petit jurors who 
“responded to the summons and showed up to fill 
out a jury questionnaire on September 26 and 27, 
2012.”28   
A1:39.   
Asserting a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community, 
Savage moved to strike the two panels of prospective jurors.29  
He urged the District Court to draw jurors instead from lists 
maintained by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania 
 
28 This was a case-specific jury questionnaire that the District 
Court administered to the panels of potential jurors. 
29 We assume the Eastern District summoned two panels 
because of the impending trial in this case.  See 2017 Jury Plan 
§ 7(b) (providing option of two panels in anticipation of “a 
highly publicized or extremely lengthy case or cases” calling 
for “an extraordinary [sic] large panel of jurors”).  In any event, 
two more panels were added later because of “the Court 
needing two additional panels to fill out questionnaires.”  




Courts, which supplemented voter registration rolls with 
various other sources.  The District Court denied the motion 
because Savage had not made a threshold showing of a fair-
cross-section violation under Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 
(1979), and United States v. Weaver, 267 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Savage now argues the District Court erred in 
determining that he failed to satisfy two prongs of the Duren 
standard. 
After briefing in this case concluded, a different panel 
of this Court decided a case presenting a fair-cross-section 
claim, Howell v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 939 F.3d 260 
(3d Cir. 2019), reh’g denied, No. 17-1758 (3d Cir. Nov. 26, 
2019), petition for cert. filed, Howell v. Garman, No. 19-8378 
(Apr. 24, 2020).  The Government raised Howell in a Rule 28(j) 
letter, to which Savage responded. The parties had a further 
opportunity to address Howell’s import at oral argument. 
A. Standard for a Fair-Cross-Section Challenge30 
Savage has the burden to establish a violation of his fair-
cross-section rights by identifying (1) “a ‘distinctive’ group in 
the community” (2) that was “not fair[ly] and reasonab[ly]” 
represented among potential jurors compared with its 
representation in the community (3) because of “systematic 
 
30 “Whether a defendant has been denied his or her right to a 
jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is a 
mixed question of law and fact, and is reviewed de novo.”  




exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.”31, 32  
Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.   
In Duren, women comprised 54% of the relevant 
population, but only approximately 15% of the weekly venires 
in state court.  Id. at 362–63, 365.  Recognizing that women 
were a distinctive group, the Supreme Court determined that 
their underrepresentation was not only unfair, but attributable 
to systematic exclusion because the underrepresentation 
“occurred not just occasionally but in every weekly venire for 
a period of nearly a year.”  Id. at 364–66.  The Court could 
easily pinpoint the exclusionary processes: the jury-selection 
system included several exemptions expressly for women, 
including an automatic exemption upon failure to respond to 
the summons and appear for service.  Id. at 361–62, 366–67. 
 
31 If Savage can make this prima facie showing, then the 
Government would “bear[] the burden of justifying this 
infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to 
be incompatible with a significant state interest.”  Weaver, 267 
F.3d at 237 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 368) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In this case, we need not reach the 
Government’s rebuttal burden.   
32 Savage forfeited the opportunity to pursue a JSSA claim here 
by failing to raise it in the District Court.  See United States v. 
Baxter, 951 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 2020), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 20-5133 (July 14, 2020).  But because the fair-cross-
section standard is equivalent for claims under the Sixth 
Amendment and the JSSA, Weaver, 267 F.3d at 236–37, 





Here, Savage established the first Duren prong by 
identifying a similarly distinctive group: black individuals.  
But the District Court correctly determined that he failed at the 
second prong because he had not demonstrated unfair and 
unreasonable representation of that group.  We also agree with 
the District Court’s third-prong determination that Savage did 
not show that any underrepresentation stemmed from 
systematic exclusion. 
B. Savage has not made a prima facie showing of a   
     fair-cross-section violation. 
1. Blacks are a distinctive group. 
To satisfy the first prong, Savage points to the alleged 
underrepresentation of Blacks among prospective jurors.  We 
ask whether that group is “sufficiently numerous and distinct 
from others in the population that if members of the group are 
systematically eliminated, the defendant’s right to a jury 
composed of a fair cross section of the community would be 
violated.”  Weaver, 267 F.3d at 239–40.  We routinely 
recognize that Blacks qualify as a distinctive group.  See, e.g., 
id. at 240; Howell, 939 F.3d at 266.  No further discussion is 
necessary on this point. 
2. Blacks were not unfairly or unreasonably 
represented on the qualified jury wheel. 
Savage argues that representation of Blacks among 
potential jurors was not “fair and reasonable” when compared 
to the proportion of that group within the Eastern District 




prong, we look to statistics to assess the degree, if any, to which 
Blacks were underrepresented.  Weaver, 267 F.3d at 240 
(noting the inquiry is “at least in part, a mathematical exercise, 
and must be supported by statistical evidence”).   
Our analysis involves (1) identifying that share of the 
Eastern District population who are Blacks; (2) determining 
the share of the Eastern District’s jury wheel or the venires in 
this case that consisted of Blacks; and (3) deploying statistical 
methods to evaluate any disparity between the two shares.  See 
id. at 240–44 (analyzing portion of master wheel); Duren, 439 
U.S. at 364–66 (using venires).   
Population Percentage.  Savage relied on census data 
compiled by a consulting firm to calculate that Blacks 
comprised 16.82% of the Eastern District population as of his 
2012 motion.  The District Court accepted this undisputed 
statistic.  But the District Court should have distilled the jury-
service-eligible population of Blacks in the Eastern District.  
See Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 319, 323 (2010); Howell, 
939 F.3d at 263, 266; Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1231 
(3d Cir. 1992) (en banc).  That jury-service-eligible statistic 
does not appear in the record, so despite the District Court’s 
error, we will consider the statistic representing the full 
population of Blacks in the Eastern District. 
Jury Wheel Percentage.  The District Court decided it 
was more appropriate to assess Blacks’ representation on the 
qualified wheel than either the master wheel or two venires 
assembled for Savage’s trial.  In the District Court’s view, the 
wheels would better capture any systematic exclusion.  And as 




racial data, so the District Court determined the qualified wheel 
reflecting juror questionnaire responses was preferable for fair-
cross-section purposes.  The District Court also noted the 
venire-based statistic was incomplete, for it did not account for 
two more venires empaneled while the fair-cross-section 
motion was pending. 
On appeal, Savage does not challenge the District 
Court’s reliance on the Eastern District’s qualified wheel33—
consisting of 8.37% black individuals,34 A1:71—so we will 
rely on it as well.  Precedent reinforces that the qualified wheel 
is a valid option for assessing a fair-cross-section claim.  See 
Duren, 439 U.S. at 363–64 (stating fair-cross-section principle 
with respect to “jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires 
from which juries are drawn” (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Savage, 547 F.2d at 214 
(construing cross-section challenge as targeting qualified 
wheel). 
Statistical Methods.  We work with two statistical 
inputs: Blacks represented 16.82% of the Eastern District 
population, but only 8.37% of the qualified wheel.  We 
evaluate the significance of this shortfall by calculating two 
 
33 Specifically, the District Court considered “the 2011 
Qualified Jury Wheel as of August 29, 2012.”  A71. 
34 Savage misattributes the 8.37% statistic to the master wheel 




metrics: absolute and comparative disparities.35  Howell, 939 
F.3d at 268.   
Absolute disparity is simply the difference between our 
two statistical inputs, or 8.45%.  See Weaver, 267 F.3d at 238.  
That means if we drew a venire of one hundred people from 
the qualified wheel, we would expect to find about eight fewer 
Blacks among them than if we drew one hundred people from 
the Eastern District at large.  See Howell, 939 F.3d at 268 n.7.   
Comparative disparity is the quotient of the absolute 
disparity and the population percentage.  Weaver, 267 F.3d at 
238.  We divide 8.45% by 16.82% for a comparative disparity 
of 50.24%.  Thus, Blacks were about half as likely to appear in 
the qualified wheel as we would expect based on their share of 
the Eastern District’s population.  See Howell, 939 F.3d at 268 
n.8; Weaver, 267 F.3d at 238 n.5.   
The two methods have countervailing weaknesses when 
it comes to evaluating the underrepresentation of a relatively 
small minority: Absolute disparity tends to understate any 
discrepancy, while comparative disparity tends to overstate it.  
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 242–43 (collecting cases).  So relying on 
these methods “can be misleading” when a group’s population 
percentage is small.  Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329; see, e.g., 
United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 313–14 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(denying fair-cross-section claim when group comprised 3% of 
 
35 We have also used a third metric, standard deviation, to 
assess the reliability of sample data.  See Howell, 939 F.3d at 
266–68.  But no sampling occurred here.  Instead we rely on a 




relevant population but 0% of venire, due to absolute disparity 
of merely 3%).  
Still, the Supreme Court has expressly left open the 
question of which method(s) courts should use to assess a fair-
cross-section challenge.  Berghuis, 559 U.S. at 329–30 
(mentioning absolute disparity, comparative disparity and 
standard deviation).  In Duren, the Court did not discuss any 
methods, but simply determined the second-prong showing 
was satisfied based on a side-by-side comparison of the 
percentages of women in the population (54%) and in the 
weekly venires (15%).  See 439 U.S. at 362–66.  That seemed 
to endorse the absolute disparity method.  See Weaver, 267 
F.3d at 242.  But more recently, in Berghuis v. Smith, the Court 
observed that “neither Duren nor any other decision of this 
Court specifies the method or test courts must use to measure 
the representation of distinctive groups in jury pools.”  559 
U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).   
This Court continues to use both absolute and 
comparative disparity methods, see Howell, 939 F.3d at 268–
69, because, when applied together, one method can be 
reasonably expected to offset the shortcomings of the other, see 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 241–43.  Nevertheless, taking our cues 
from Duren and persuasive authority, we have shown some 
solicitude for absolute disparity.  See id. at 242 (observing it 
“seems to be the preferred method of analysis in most cases”). 
 We considered the interplay of absolute disparity and 
comparative disparity most recently in Howell, where Blacks 
comprised 10.7% of the relevant population.  939 F.3d at 266, 




similar to absolute disparities in other cases where courts have 
found no constitutional violation, and in fact, numerous courts 
have noted that an absolute disparity below 10% generally will 
not reflect unfair and unreasonable representation.”  Id. at 268 
(collecting cases).  We were also persuaded by authority 
determining that “comparative disparities similar to the 
comparative disparity in [Howell], 54.49%, were insufficient 
to demonstrate unfair and unreasonable representation.”  Id. 
(collecting cases).  Evaluating the two statistical methods 
together in light of “factually similar cases,” we concluded that 
Howell had not met his burden under Duren’s second prong.  
Id. at 269.   
Savage argues that the District Court inappropriately 
took “bright-line” approaches dismissive of an absolute 
disparity under 10% and a comparative disparity for a small 
population.  These characterizations fail to appreciate the 
District Court’s nuanced treatment of the absolute and 
comparative disparities together.  With the benefit of Howell, 
we reach the same conclusion as the District Court—that the 
two disparities are insufficient to show unfair and unreasonable 
representation under Duren.36 
 
36 We easily dispose of Savage’s argument that the District 
Court failed to account for the “practical realit[ies]” of these 
absolute and comparative disparities.  Def. Br. 141–42.  He 
tries to explain, in layman’s terms, what the results of these 
methods say about underrepresentation of Blacks from the 
Eastern District.  The only authority he cites is inapposite.  See 
id. at 141 (citing Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren, 801 F.3d 584, 




Here, the absolute disparity of 8.45% is only slightly 
higher than the absolute disparities that fell short in Howell and 
other cases where a minority group’s population percentage 
was comparable to that of Blacks within the Eastern District.  
See 939 F.3d at 268 (absolute disparity of 5.83%; population 
percentage of 10.7%); United States v. Davis, 854 F.3d 1276, 
1295 (11th Cir. 2017) (absolute disparity of 6.7%; population 
percentage of 12.1%); United States v. Grisham, 63 F.3d 1074, 
1078–79, 1081 (11th Cir. 1995) (absolute disparity in one 
instance of 4.72%; relevant population percentage of 18.31%); 
United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 154–55 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(absolute disparity of 7.2%; population percentage of 15.6%); 
cf. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1230–32 (absolute disparity of 14.1% 
was “of borderline significance” in equal-protection analysis 
overlapping with fair-cross-section analysis; population 
percentage of 35.9%).   
Although Howell looked favorably on jurisdictions that 
have adopted 10% thresholds, see 939 F.3d at 268; see also 
Davis, 854 F.3d at 1295; Ashley, 54 F.3d at 314; Clifford, 640 
F.2d at 155; United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th 
Cir. 1980),37 we are wary of ossifying that consideration 
through a rule when our own precedent requires us to consider 
comparative disparity as well.38   
 
37 In Berghuis, the Supreme Court was asked to impose a 10% 
threshold, but the Court declined to reach the issue.  559 U.S. 
at 330 n.4.   
38 Just as the Supreme Court has “not augur[ed] or authorize[d] 
the fashioning of detailed jury selection codes by federal 




Turning to comparative disparity, the 50.24% figure 
here is similar to those deemed insufficient in other cases, 
especially Howell.  See 939 F.3d at 268 (comparative disparity 
of 54.49%; population percentage of 10.7%); United States v. 
Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796, 798–99 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(comparative disparities “rang[ing] from 38.17% to 51.22%”; 
population percentages ranging from 1.64% to 8.63%); United 
States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 
2000) (comparative disparities of 40.89% and 58.39%; 
population percentages of 7.9% and 2.74%, respectively); cf. 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 240, 243 (considering comparative 
disparities of 40.01% and even 72.98% to be “of questionable 
probative value” due to particularly small population 
percentages of 3.07% and 0.97%, respectively).   
Savage points out that the comparative disparity here 
exceeds the “about 40%” disparity we called “borderline” in 
Ramseur.  983 F.2d at 1230, 1232 (population percentage of 
35.9%).  But even if Ramseur lent some support when Savage 
filed his briefs, it is less helpful in the wake of Howell.  There 
we determined that a comparative disparity of 54.49%—higher 
than both Ramseur’s 40% and Savage’s 50.24%—was not 
enough to tip the scales.  The comparison with Howell is not 
quite open-and-shut, for the somewhat higher population 
percentage here (16.82% vs. Howell’s 10.7%) makes the 
comparative disparity a slightly more accurate indicator of 
underrepresentation.  But we are unpersuaded that the statistics 
in Savage’s case differ meaningfully.   
 
principle must have much leeway in application.”  Taylor, 419 




Savage attempts to bolster his comparative disparity 
argument by briefly invoking out-of-circuit authority that sets 
a more modest standard for establishing unfair and 
unreasonable representation.  In Garcia-Dorantes v. Warren, 
the Sixth Circuit decided that a habeas petitioner made the 
requisite showing based on a population percentage of 8.24%, 
an absolute disparity of 3.45%, and a comparative disparity of 
42%, caused by a glitch in the electronic jury selection system.  
801 F.3d 584, 590–93, 600, 603 (6th Cir. 2015).  Because the 
disparities in Savage’s case are somewhat larger, and the 
population percentage is somewhat higher, his case may clear 
the Sixth Circuit’s second-prong hurdle.  No matter, we must 
adhere to our own standard.  Moreover, Garcia-Dorantes is 
distinguishable on its merits for at least two reasons.   
First, the Sixth Circuit expressly prefers comparative 
disparity where small populations are involved because 
absolute disparity tends to understate discrepancies in those 
instances.  Id. at 601–02.  We agree with that premise, but we 
also recognize the tendency of comparative disparity to 
exaggerate discrepancies for small populations.  Weaver, 267 
F.3d at 242.  For that reason, we do not give comparative 
disparity pride of place.  See id. at 241–43.  Second, the 
Garcia-Dorantes court relied on non-Third Circuit precedent 
indicating that even more modest disparities met the second-
prong standard.  See 801 F.3d at 601–02 (citing Smith v. 
Berghuis, 543 F.3d 326, 336–39 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d on other 
grounds, 559 U.S. 314 (2010); United States v. Rogers, 73 F.3d 
774, 776–77 (8th Cir. 1996)).  We must look to Third Circuit 
caselaw, where Savage runs up against Howell and our other 




absolute and comparative disparities, but we are certainly not 
bound by it. 
Here, we have considered the absolute and comparative 
disparities together in light of the relevant authorities, Howell 
most particularly.  We conclude that Savage fails to meet his 
burden of proving that Blacks were unfairly and unreasonably 
represented on the Eastern District’s qualified jury wheel.  
Because Savage has not satisfied Duren’s second prong, he 
cannot establish a violation of his fair-cross-section rights.39   
3. Alternatively, Blacks were not 
systematically excluded from the qualified 
jury wheel. 
Even if Savage were able to meet Duren’s second 
prong, he would still need to show that Blacks were 
underrepresented on the Eastern District’s qualified jury wheel 
due to systematic exclusion from the jury-selection process.  
The District Court observed no such third-prong showing.  
Looking again to Howell, we agree. 
 
39 Although “petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly 
representative of the community,” the Supreme Court has 
never required “that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the 
community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population.”  Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.  Still, we note Savage’s 
concession elsewhere that two of twelve empaneled jury 
members (16.67%) were black, approximating their 16.82% 




This is not a case where an exclusionary process is 
“readily apparent” as it was with the several exemptions for 
women in Duren.  Howell, 939 F.3d at 269.  Even so, a 
defendant may establish an exclusionary process by identifying 
“a large discrepancy over time such that the system must be 
said to bring about the underrepresentation.”  Id. (quoting 
Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We evaluate evidence of “the nature of the system, length of 
time studied, and ‘efforts at reform to increase the 
representativeness of jury lists.’”  Id. (quoting Ramseur, 983 
F.2d at 1234–35).  From the record in this case, we are not 
convinced that these factors demonstrate systematic exclusion 
of Blacks. 
Nature of the System.  It goes without saying that 
overtly barring a racial group from jury service constitutes 
systematic exclusion from participation in the process.40  Such 
practices are offensive not only to the Constitution but to our 
values as a free society.  Similarly, if a jury-selection plan 
simply gave a racial group additional opportunities to opt out 
that were not provided to others, and members of that group 
often availed themselves of those opportunities, then the plan 
would be systematically excluding that group too.41  See 
Duren, 439 U.S. at 366–67 (evaluating results of exemptions 
for women).  Otherwise, “[a] selection process that is facially 
 
40 Such a plan would also violate the JSSA’s ban on excluding 
potential jurors based on protected characteristics such as race.  
28 U.S.C. § 1862.     
41 The absence of intentional discrimination is not dispositive 
of a fair-cross-section claim, Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244, unlike 




neutral is unlikely to demonstrate systematic exclusion.”  
Howell, 939 F.3d at 269.   
Savage has not identified anything on the face of the 
Eastern District’s jury selection process that draws racial 
distinctions.  The process relies exclusively on voter 
registration lists, consistent with other facially neutral 
processes this Circuit has upheld.  See id. (voter registration 
lists and driving records); Weaver, 267 F.3d at 237, 244–45 
(voter registration lists); Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1229, 1235 
(voter registration and licensed driver lists); Savage, 547 F.2d 
at 215 (voter registration list).   
We have, nevertheless, left open the possibility that 
drawing on voter registration lists alone might be actionable 
“under some circumstances” when use of those lists “over time 
did have the effect of sizeably underrepresenting a particular 
class or group on the jury venire.”  Weaver, 267 F.3d at 244–
45.  Accordingly, facial neutrality alone of a selection system 
is not dispositive. 
Length of Time Studied.  Even if a process is facially 
neutral, it might consistently produce disproportionately low 
representation of a particular group.  The Duren Court saw a 
large shortfall in women’s representation in “every weekly 
venire for a period of nearly a year,” reinforcing that 
exemptions for women generated their systematic exclusion 
from venires.  439 U.S. at 366–67.  Extrapolating from Duren, 
we have suggested that the use of a voter registration list alone 
might still run afoul of the third prong if it produced 
underrepresentation “over time”—enough time to deem the 




But we have yet to determine the duration that would have to 
be shown to constitute “persistence.”  A two-year showing is 
not necessarily enough, see Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1230, 1235, 
but something even shorter might suffice if the cause of the 
underrepresentation were as “readily identifiable” and the 
evidence as “similarly specific” as it was in Duren.  Howell, 
939 F.3d at 269–70 (eight months sufficient in Duren, but not 
six months in Howell).   
At oral argument, Savage conceded that he had not 
provided the District Court with any record of 
underrepresentation over time.  Oral Argument Tr. 185:15–
186:3; see also id. 186:19–20 (as noted by panel).  But Savage 
rejected the suggestion that this concession doomed his prima 
facie case; instead, he insisted that a showing of duration is not 
an “absolute requirement” to meet Duren’s third prong.  Id. 
186:19–187:12.  Howell forecloses that argument by stating 
flatly that a study of underrepresentation “must have 
demonstrated ongoing discrimination over a sufficient period 
of time.”42  939 F.3d at 269 (emphasis added).   
Savage’s failure to show the District Court that Blacks 
were underrepresented on an ongoing basis prevents him from 
establishing systematic exclusion.  While he points to other 
evidence he submitted to the District Court, none of that 
material is availing.43  Nor can we consider evidence Savage 
 
42 We read Howell’s reference to “discrimination” in context to 
include unfair and unreasonable representation resulting from 
a facially neutral system. 
43 In the District Court, Savage identified two pieces of point-




failed to present to the District Court.  See Howell, 939 F.3d at 
269 n.9.  Even if we were to consider such new evidence, as 
we occasionally have, S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 267 n.27 (3d Cir. 2013), the evidence 
 
Pennsylvania state legislation and a Pennsylvania state 
commission report.  See A2:529–30.   
In 2007, state legislation expanded the sources of potential 
jurors available to state courts, Act of July 17, 2007, P.L. 123, 
No. 37, § 3 (codified as amended at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 4521.1), and soon made information available to federal 
district courts in Pennsylvania as well “[u]pon request,” 
§ 4521.1(d)(2) (2008 amendment).  See also A2:529–30.   
Also in 2007, a state commission asserted that using voter 
and vehicle registration lists alone frequently distorts the 
representation of certain groups on venires, which as a result 
“may not be reflective of the community-at-large, particularly 
the minority community.”  A2:530; Def. Br. 145–46 (quoting 
Pa. Interbranch Comm’n for Gender, Racial, & Ethnic 
Fairness, Suggested Standardized Procedures for Jury 
Selection in Pennsylvania (Sept. 12, 2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
This “snapshot” evidence fails to demonstrate systematic 
exclusion in 2007, much less in 2012 when Savage moved to 
strike the venires.  Neither the state legislation nor the state 
report specifically addresses underrepresentation of Blacks on 
jury wheels or venires in federal court in the Eastern District of 




in his opening and reply briefs is likewise unpersuasive.44, 45  
 
44 In his opening brief, Savage argues that the federal district 
courts in Pennsylvania have failed to implement a jury-
selection lesson learned by their sister courts within the Third 
Circuit.  Federal district courts in New Jersey, Delaware and 
the Virgin Islands supplement voter lists with at least one other 
source.  See Dist. Ct. of Virgin Islands, Juror Selection Plan 
§ E (rev. Feb. 20, 2019) (voter registration and licensed driver 
lists); Plan of Implementation of U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of New 
Jersey Pursuant to Jury Selection & Service Act of 1968 
§ C(1)(a) (rev. Mar. 20, 2009) (voter registration lists, and if 
available, lists of licensed drivers, state income tax filers, and 
Homestead rebate application filers); Revised Plan of U.S. 
Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Delaware for Random Selection of Grand 
& Petit Jurors, as Amended § 4 (Dec. 22, 2008) (voter 
registration, licensed driver, and state ID card lists).  Yet this 
contrast suffers a flaw similar to Savage’s evidence in the 
District Court: the use of supplementary sources in other 
jurisdictions does not by itself demonstrate systematic 
exclusion of Blacks in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Savage’s opening brief also insists that “black people in 
Pennsylvania have faced significant challenges in participating 
in the voting process.”  Def. Br. 147 n.67.  This “one-sentence 
footnote”—devoid of authority or record citation—“falls far 
short of meeting the requirement that an appellant raise an issue 
in his opening brief or else waive the issue on appeal.”  United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008).   
45 Savage’s reply brief relies on two additional sources in an 




We need not reach Howell’s third factor, jury selection 
reform initiatives, to conclude that Savage has failed to 
demonstrate systematic exclusion.  His fair-cross-section 
challenge fails on these grounds as well.46      
 
article by the Chief Judge of the Eastern District, and another 
article reporting results of a voter study in Pennsylvania. 
Similar to the state commission discussed above, Chief 
Judge Juan R. Sanchez explains that a discrepancy in voter 
registration rates would generate underrepresentation of some 
groups among potential jurors.  Hon. Juan R. Sanchez, A Plan 
of Our Own: The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Initiative 
to Increase Jury Diversity, 91 Temp. L. Rev. Online 1, 13 
(2019).  According to the other article, a Pennsylvania state law 
enacted in 2012 reportedly disenfranchised voters in mostly 
black districts at a much higher rate.  Edward A. Purcell, Jr., 
Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the March and the 
Speech: History, Memory, Values, 59 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 17, 
54 (2014–2015) (citing study).   
Even assuming arguendo that this evidence is timely 
presented in reply, it hardly furthers Savage’s argument.  These 
observations are unspecific to the Eastern District, and they fail 
to demonstrate underrepresentation over time.  
46 It is presumably the Eastern District’s institutional role—not 
the role of Savage or the District Judge in this case—to conduct 
a study and make findings before deciding that voter 
registration lists must be supplemented with other sources.  
After all, the responsibility to create a jury-selection plan 
consistent with § 1861, and to modify it as needed, resides 




*      *      * 
The District Court correctly determined that Savage was 
unable to establish a prima facie violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of 
the community.  Even if Savage had not forfeited the 
corresponding statutory claim, he would still be unable to 
establish a prima facie violation of the JSSA. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE 
BATSON OBJECTION. 
 Savage raised a Batson47 challenge to the Government’s 
peremptory strike of Prospective Juror 185, a black female.  
The District Court determined that the Government’s reasons 
for striking Number 185 were race-neutral and that the 
 
of a reviewing panel comprised of the circuit’s judicial council 
and the district’s chief judge or designee.  28 U.S.C. § 1863(a). 
47 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), held that a 
prosecutor’s purposeful racial discrimination in the selection 
of the jury violated the state prisoner’s equal protection rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Savage asserts an 
analogous claim under “the implicit equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment.”  United States v. 
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1155 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing 
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1137 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
For ease of reference, we will refer to Savage’s claim as a 
Batson claim.  The critical inquiry for a trial court is “whether 
the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.”  Foster v. 
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. 




prosecution did not strike her because of race.  We conclude 
that the District Court did not clearly err.  
A.  Background 
 Savage raised his first Batson challenge when the 
Government exercised a peremptory challenge to Number 
185,48 the eighth black prospective juror to be considered.  The 
prior seven had been addressed as follows: 
 Number 2 was seated;   
 Number 11 was excused for cause; 
 
48 Prior to jury selection, the Government filed a motion 
seeking an anonymous jury panel and heightened jury security.  
The Government asked to shield from the parties, their 
attorneys and the public the prospective jurors’ names, 
addresses and employers.  The request was based on the 
“history of violence and intimidation” and a view that such 
safeguards were “necessary to protect jurors from the threat of 
danger posed by Defendants.”  A1:18.  The District Court 
granted the motion, ordered an anonymous jury, and required 
the shielding of each prospective juror’s name, address and 
place of employment.  The District Court noted these same 
measures had been taken in Savage’s 2005 federal jury trial 
and that, while detained in the Federal Detention Center in 
Philadelphia, Savage had “plotted to obtain the addresses and 
telephone numbers of the jurors” serving in that trial.  A1:20.  
In addition, the U.S. Marshals Service was ordered to transport 
the jurors each day from an undisclosed location to court and 




 Number 20 was stricken by the Government’s 
peremptory challenge; 
 Number 79 was excused for hardship; 
 Number 108 was excused for cause; 
 Number 110 was excused for “anonymity reasons,” 
A34:18041, which are not contained in the record; and 
 Number 118 was excused for hardship.49 
 Number 185, who was age thirty-one, lived in North 
Philadelphia with her seventy-eight-year-old grandmother, her 
eleven-year-old daughter and her brother.  According to her 
jury questionnaire, she was an unemployed home health aide 
who planned to return to college in the fall semester to pursue 
a nursing degree.  During voir dire, she stated that she was 
actively seeking part-time, evening work that would run from 
7:00 to 11:00 p.m.  She did not believe that such part-time work 
would interfere with her performance as a juror.  When asked 
her general view of the death penalty, she replied that it 
“depend[ed] on the circumstances” and that it isn’t “fair to 
judge someone for the death penalty without knowing the 
circumstances.”  A34:18019.  The prosecutor described her 
answers to questions on the subject as “straight down the 
middle.”  A34:18019. 
 But Number 185 resided in North Philadelphia, and the 
Savage prosecution involved drug transactions, violent crimes 
 
49 The circumstances supporting the excusal of these six black 
prospective jurors, including the peremptory strike of Number 
20, have been gleaned from the arguments made at the time of 




and murders that occurred in that part of the city.  The evidence 
to be presented at trial could be expected to involve frequent 
references to locations within North Philadelphia.  Yet when 
asked by the prosecutor if she had any concerns about being on 
the jury, she replied: “No.”   
 Neither side moved to strike Number 185 for cause.  
The prosecution did, however, exercise a peremptory strike.  In 
response, defendant Merritt raised a Batson challenge, which 
was joined by Savage, Northington and Kidada.  The 
prosecutor responded to the challenge this way: 
[F]irst of all, there’s been no prima facie case 
made in this case.  The government has, of 
course, seated one African-American juror. 
There’s no pattern of racial discrimination. 
Secondly, as to this juror, in an abundance of 
caution I would like to proffer our reasons for 
striking this juror; the primary reason being that 
she is unemployed and as a result she will be in 
court four days a week, all day long, would be 
unable to seek work during that time.   
She would also not be able to get work during 
that time and even if she were to obtain night 
shift work as she said she was seeking, that 
would take her working all day long in court, and 
then until 11 o’clock on the night shift.  That’s 
simply not conducive to being able to serve and 
to pay attention despite her statements that she 




So that is the first reason. 
The second reason is that in this case, especially 
with all of the events and all of the threats and 
the way this is from North Philadelphia, the fact 
that she lives in North Philadelphia is 
troublesome.  There are a lot of events that 
occurred, and even though these specific areas 
did not give this juror cause for concern, it still 
concerns the government. 
There are potentially 200, 250 witnesses in this 
case, many of them are going to be from North 
Philadelphia, who would testify to events that 
happened there.   
This is a case that involves violence, witness 
intimidation.  There’s even a statement in the 
Court, intercepted communications from Mr. 
Savage indicating that he wanted to go after a 
juror. It’s a big concern to the government that 
we would have a juror specifically from North 
Philadelphia. 
A34:18030–31.   
 Northington responded that the Government had not 
taken issue with seating Number 149—a white male—the day 
before, even though he would have been working seventy to 




business that he partially owned.50  Northington also pushed 
back on the Government’s second reason for striking Number 
185, pointing out that the crimes in this case had actually been 
committed in various parts of the city.  Counsel added that the 
Government had “already exercised strikes on minorities.”  
A34:18033.  The District Court interjected that some of the 
strikes of minorities had been made by the defense.  Merritt’s 
 
50 Number 149 testified that he was part-owner of a business 
and the “sole person in the organization that deals with 
contracts for new work.”  A34:17975.  He expressed his belief 
it would be a hardship to serve, but thought it was “doable.”  
Id.  When questioned further by Savage’s counsel, the 
prospective juror mentioned his two-hour commute into the 
city and stated that jury service would be “extremely difficult.”  
A34:17982.  Yet Number 149 acknowledged he was used to 
working long hours and believed he could be a fair and 
impartial juror.  The Government saw no need to strike for 
cause.  But Savage moved to strike for cause based on hardship 
and because he believed Number 149 was “substantially 
impaired from considering in a meaningful way mitigation 
circumstances based on this strong sense of accountability.”  
A34:18005.  In short, Savage considered Number 149 as 
moving “the needle towards the death penalty.”  A34:18006.  
The District Court rejected the request to excuse for hardship, 
highlighting the prospective juror’s “willingness to be fair and 
impartial.”  Id.  When Savage’s counsel argued that this 
prospective juror would be unable to give full attention to the 
case, the District Court disagreed.  After his unsuccessful bid 





counsel then noted that residents of North Philadelphia are 
primarily black, with Savage’s counsel then speculating that 
the Government was “disappointed they didn’t get [Number 
185] to say something” that would have been a basis to excuse 
her for cause.  A34:18036.  
 The District Court took the Batson challenge under 
advisement and commenced the voir dire of the last 
prospective juror of the day.  That person was excused, and the 
parties returned to the subject of the Batson challenge.  
Kidada’s counsel recounted that there had been eight black 
prospective jurors called and summarized the status of each.51  
She acknowledged that  
we don’t have a long laundry list of individuals 
to show that there is a pattern,  I think the case 
law talks about a pattern within the confines of 
the number of minorities that you actually bring 
into the courtroom and actually interview as we 
have done here.  Strictly with regard to race, our 
position is that the government has peremptory 
challenges of two of these African-Americans, 
and that if you expand on that, there was one 
 
51 As noted previously, Number 2 had been seated, Number 11 
was stricken for cause, Number 20 was removed by the 
Government’s peremptory strike, Number 79 was excused for 
hardship, Number 108 was removed for cause, Number 110 
was excused due to anonymity concerns, and Number 118 was 
excused for hardship.  Number 185 was the eighth black 




Hispanic that the government exercised a 
peremptory challenge today.52  
A34:18042.   
 Savage argued that excluding prospective jurors simply 
because they reside in North Philadelphia—especially when 
they have not expressed concern about serving on the jury—
was improper.  He asserted that the prosecution should have 
moved to exclude generally on that basis prior to voir dire if 
they were seeking such a limit on who from Philadelphia 
County could serve on the jury.  North Philadelphia, the 
defendants argued, comprises a vast area and that striking 
prospective jurors because they come from that part of the city 
is tantamount to “striking people on the basis of their race.”  
A34:18049.   
 The prosecution repeated that its primary concern was 
Number 185’s unemployment and that it did not “want 
unemployed people on the jury as a rule.  It doesn’t make any 
difference whether they are white, black or otherwise.”53  
A34:18049.  The Government noted that it was not challenging 
the prospective juror for cause, but using a peremptory strike.  
As to Number 185’s residing in North Philadelphia, the 
prosecutor stated that this was, for him, reason for having a 
“residual concern” about her.  Id. at 18051.  Finally, the 
 
52 The record does not indicate which prospective jurors were 
Hispanic and the extent to which they were challenged for 
cause or the subject of a peremptory strike. 
53 The prosecution also offered that it struck an unemployed 




Government emphasized that this prosecution was not only 
about drug dealing but also included episodes of violence and 
witness intimidation, pointing to Savage’s cellblock comments 
about “going after jurors.”  Id. at 18052.   
 The District Court ruled that the prosecution provided 
“race neutral reasons.”  A34:18055.  The judge declared:  
In looking at the situation, counsel has given me 
information with regard to what has transpired 
during the course of the jury selection that’s 
helpful information.  We do have one African-
American juror who was already selected to sit 
in this case.  There was one other African-
American juror that was excused as a result of a 
peremptory challenge by the government.  We 
now have this juror who is African-American, 
and the government has exercised a peremptory 
challenge. It does not appear to me that the 
government is exercising its challenges, at least 
at this juncture, based upon race.  As I said a 
minute ago, the reasons given by the government 
are race neutral.  It’s not unusual for an attorney, 
whether it be the defense or a prosecutor, to be 
concerned about a juror who may live in an area 
where the crime scene is by and large located.   
With regard to the juror’s hardship, there is no 
question but that having her here and looking for 
a job, and if she finds a job, working almost 





Under the circumstances, I’m going to deny the 
Batson challenge.  I think that the government 
has not exercised its challenge for racial reasons.  
A34:18055–56.  In response to a question from Northington’s 
counsel, the District Court acknowledged the broad expanse of 
North Philadelphia and gave leave to the defense to ask 
additional questions during voir dire of other prospective jurors 
from North Philadelphia “without getting into exactly where 
the juror lives.”54  Id. at 18057. 
 
54 Subsequently, Savage raised a Batson challenge to the 
exclusion of Number 364, a forty-six-year-old black woman.  
The District Court recounted the following: 
 
The Government offered the following reasons 
for the strike.  First of all, that the juror has 
indicated that she does not support the death 
penalty.  On the jury questionnaire she indicated 
that she was opposed to the death penalty and 
that it should be used only in extreme cases.  The 
Government also indicated that they were 
concerned that the juror’s son had been involved 
in a shooting incident.  He was shot while sitting 
in a car and that this was similar to a matter that 
is before this court, the Tybius Flowers shooting.  
The Government points out that the juror became 
very emotional during the questioning with 




 The voir dire process resulted in seventy-eight qualified 
prospective jurors who were neither removed for cause nor for 
hardship.  Of these seventy-eight, eleven were black.  After the 
parties exercised their peremptory strikes, the jury was 
comprised of ten white venirepersons, two black 
venirepersons, five white alternates, and one black alternate.  
The jury went on to find Savage guilty as charged. 
 Post-trial, Northington filed a timely motion for a new 
trial, which Savage joined.  The motion asserted, inter alia, that 
the District Court erred by rejecting the Batson challenges 
raised by the defense.  Judge Surrick noted that the 
Government’s reasons for striking Number 185 were: (1) that 
“she was unemployed, was actively seeking a job, and was 
looking for a position where she could work night shifts”; and 
(2) that “the Government had concerns about the juror’s 
 
The juror also indicated that the crime had not 
been solved and that she thought the police were 
indifferent in dealing with it.  The Government 
also indicated that the juror’s boyfriend was 
arrested on an assault charge and the juror visited 
that boyfriend in prison.  
 
The Government was concerned about all of 
these things and these are the reasons why they 
exercised the peremptory challenge.  These 
reasons are all race neutral and they are credible. 
 
A34:18073–74.  Savage does not challenge the District Court’s 




residency—North Philadelphia—in light of the circumstances 
of this case.”  A1:158.  The judge upheld his earlier conclusion 
that the strike had been for legitimate race-neutral reasons.  He 
explained that “[b]ased upon all of the circumstances, 
including the fact that, prior to this strike, an African-American 
juror had already been empaneled, and taking into account the 
prosecutor’s demeanor and credibility, we are satisfied that the 
Government’s reason for striking the juror was not pretextual 
and not in any way motivated by a discriminatory intent.”  
A1:159. 
B.  Applicable Law 
 In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court explained 
that “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in selection of the 
venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection because 
it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to 
secure.”  476 U.S. at 86.  When determining whether there has 
been purposeful discrimination in the striking of a prospective 
juror, the district court engages in a three-step process:   
First, a defendant must make a prima facie 
showing that a peremptory challenge has been 
exercised on the basis of race; second, if that 
showing has been made, the prosecution must 
offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in 
question; and third, in light of the parties’ 
submissions, the trial court must determine 





Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476–77 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Snyder Court emphasized that this 
analysis requires consideration of “all of the circumstances that 
bear upon the issue of racial animosity.”  Id. at 478. 
 In Hernandez v. New York, the Supreme Court 
instructed that when the prosecution offers to explain its 
reasons for exercising its peremptory strike “without any 
prompting or inquiry from the trial court,” “the preliminary 
issue [at step one] of whether the defendant had made a prima 
facie showing becomes moot.”  500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).  
“The second step of this process does not demand an 
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.”  Purkett v. 
Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995) (per curiam).  Rather, it 
requires 
[a] neutral explanation . . . mean[ing] an 
explanation based on something other than the 
race of the juror.  At this step of the inquiry, the 
issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s 
explanation.  Unless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the 
reason offered will be deemed race neutral. 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.   
 The third step requires the trial court “to determine if 
the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.”  
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.  “It is not until the third step that the 
persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant.”  Purkett, 
514 U.S. at 768.  “Step three of the Batson inquiry involves an 




evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of 
the attorney who exercises the challenge.”  Snyder, 552 U.S. at 
477 (internal quotation marks, bracket and citations omitted).  
This step requires the trial judge to decide “whether the 
prosecutor’s proffered reasons are the actual reasons, or 
whether the proffered reasons are pretextual and the prosecutor 
instead exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race.  The 
ultimate inquiry is whether the [government] was ‘motivated 
in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’”  Flowers, 139 S. 
Ct. at 2244 (quoting Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1754).   
 The “question of discriminatory intent [at step three] 
represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference 
on appeal.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364.  Because this finding 
will “largely turn on . . . credibility,” id., it is reviewed for clear 
error, id. at 369.  See also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 (“On appeal, 
a trial court’s ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must 
be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous.”).  As the Supreme 
Court has instructed, “where there are two permissible views 
of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot 
be clearly erroneous.”  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369 (quoting 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).   
 In ruling upon a Batson objection, the circumstances 
warranting consideration may include statistical evidence 
relating to the government’s use of peremptory strikes.  Miller-
El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41 (2005).  But side-by-side 
comparisons can be more powerful than statistics.  Id. at 241.  
“If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist 
applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is 
permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful 




C.  Savage’s Claims of Error  
 Against this legal backdrop, we turn to the substance of 
Savage’s Batson challenge.  Savage agrees there’s no need to 
address the first step in the analysis as the prosecution offered 
its reasons for exercising the peremptory strike.  See 
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.  Nor does Savage contend that the 
Government failed to offer race-neutral reasons for striking 
Number 185: the prospective juror’s unemployment and the 
safety concerns associated with her residence are both facially 
neutral.55  Savage tacitly acknowledges as much in that he 
targets the District Court’s engagement with the third step of 
the Batson analysis: its determination that there was no 
purposeful discrimination.  See Def. Br. 155–56.  Savage 
contends that the nondiscrimination finding was clearly 
 
55 Of course, the defense did assert during voir dire that striking 
Number 185 because she lived in North Philadelphia—an area 
that was in their view “predominantly” black—was simply a 
proxy for “striking people on the basis of their race.”  
A34:18034; 18049.  But the record here is devoid of evidence 
concerning the racial composition of North Philadelphia.  
Moreover, the Government did not simply identify where 
Number 185 resided as the reason for striking her.  It noted its 
concern about safety and security given the circumstances of 
the case that warranted the empanelment of anonymous juries 
in 2005 and again in this prosecution.  Considering the totality 
of the Government’s second reason for exercising a 





erroneous because the District Court procedurally and 
substantively erred.  
1.  Procedural Error in the District Court’s 
Analysis 
 The Supreme Court has reiterated that trial courts must 
consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of 
racial animosity” in ruling on a Batson objection.  Foster, 136 
S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478); see also 
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239.  Savage contends that the District 
Court failed to heed this instruction and engage with the 
evidence before it. 
 We cannot conclude that the District Court failed to 
consider all of the circumstances.  We have “note[d] that ‘a 
judge considering a Batson challenge is not required to 
comment explicitly on every piece of evidence in the record.’”  
Hardcastle v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 259 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 290 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Here, the 
District Court heard argument from counsel for all the parties, 
took the objection under advisement, entertained further 
argument from the parties, was very familiar with the security 
issues surrounding this prosecution, and had the opportunity to 
observe the demeanor of counsel and all prospective jurors 
before ruling on any challenges.   
2. Substantive Challenges to the District 
Court’s Ruling 
 Savage first faults the District Court for considering the 




on Sanchez v. Roden, 753 F.3d 279, 299 (1st Cir. 2014), in 
arguing that this observation by the judge constituted error.  In 
Sanchez, the First Circuit reviewed a ruling in a § 2254 petition 
and concluded that the Massachusetts Appeals Court had 
unreasonably applied Batson at step one by acknowledging the 
“presence of other black people on the jury.”  Id.  The First 
Circuit explained that “by focusing exclusively” on the fact 
that some black jurors had already been seated, the court “sent 
the unmistakable message that a prosecutor can get away with 
discriminating against some African Americans . . . so long as 
a prosecutor does not discriminate against all such 
individuals.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  Because the prosecution 
had not been required to articulate a race-neutral explanation 
for its challenge, the First Circuit vacated the judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
 Savage’s reliance on Sanchez is misplaced.  It is one 
thing for a court to “focus[] exclusively” at step one on the fact 
that some black individuals have been seated on a jury, Id.  
Such a narrow focus would be error.  But a court may—indeed 
should—consider all the circumstances at step three, including 
the status of black prospective jurors who were not excused for 
cause or hardship.  Here, it was Kidada who, in responding to 
the Government’s reasons for exercising its strike, initially 
reviewed the status of the seven black prospective jurors called 
prior to Number 185.  And contrary to Savage’s assertion, the 
District Court recited more than the mere fact that one black 
juror had been seated.  In ruling, the judge recounted the status 
of the three black individuals who had not been excused 
(Numbers 2, 20 and 185), and then considered the reasons 




District Court’s mentioning that Number 2, a black person, had 
been seated on the jury was insufficient, by itself, to constitute 
error in the ruling as to Number 185.  
a.  Number 149 and Number 185 are 
not similarly situated. 
 Savage asserts that the District Court “failed to consider 
or address the contrast between the Government’s treatment of 
Jurors 149 and 185.”56  Def. Br. 160.  In Savage’s view, 
 
56 In a footnote, Savage submits that the Government’s 
acceptance of other white prospective jurors with more 
pressing hardships further demonstrates that its reasons for 
striking Number 185 were pretextual.  Def. Br. 161 n.71.  He 
specifically refers to Numbers 315, 551 and 734.  But these 
prospective jurors were not comparable.  Savage cites the 
“extreme inconvenience” of Number 315’s unavailability to 
her children.  Id. (citing A33:17562).  Number 315, however, 
was a working mother with two children, and the concern she 
expressed was based in part on the possibility that the jury 
would be sequestered.  Number 551, Savage contends, had a 
more pressing hardship than Number 185 as his “employer 
could not find a replacement.”  Def. Br. 161 n.71.  But the 
concern expressed about a replacement was assuaged when 
Number 551 realized that finding a replacement was his 
employer’s concern and not his.  He therefore conceded he did 
not have a personal hardship that would affect juror service.  
As to Number 734, Savage cites her husband’s upcoming 
surgery and her caregiver responsibility for her eighty-eight-
year-old mother as hardships that were greater than Number 




Number 149, a white male, and Number 185, a black female, 
were similarly situated.  If both served, he claimed, each would 
be subject to extremely long days that might interfere with his 
or her service on the jury.  While the Government did not 
object to Number 149, it did move to strike Number 185.   
 Miller-El teaches that “side-by-side comparisons” can 
be “powerful” evidence “tending to prove purposeful 
discrimination.”  545 U.S. at 241.  Yet Savage correctly notes 
that the District Court did not discuss Number 149.  We do not 
consider this an oversight.  Number 149 had been voir dired 
and challenged by the defense just the day before, so the 
District Court no doubt recalled what that voir dire had 
revealed.  While there is some congruence between Numbers 
149 and 185 in that each would have been required to serve a 
long day (yet only if Number 185 was able to obtain 
employment) there were also significant differences.  Notably, 
Number 149 was not unemployed.  In fact, he was a business 
owner whose track record included regularly “work[ing] long 
hours.”  A34:18003.  Number 185 had no such track record, so 
her capacity and stamina for serving both on the jury and in a 
part-time job were unknown.  Further, the Government had no 
 
however, that Number 734’s caregiver responsibility was not 
for her mother, but her mother-in-law.  Moreover, that 
caregiver responsibility was simply companionship; her 
mother-in-law would not be in physical danger if she were to 
serve on the jury.  And although her husband’s surgery would 
require him to temporarily be in a sling, Number 734 stated 
that he could “take care of himself,” A34:18129, and that after 
the first four weeks of his recovery, her husband could then 




reason to be concerned for Number 149’s safety based on his 
area of residence.  Given the differences between Number 149 
and Number 185, the side-by-side comparison does not support 
Savage’s claim. 
b. The Government’s concern about 
Number 185’s safety was not 
baseless. 
 Savage also contends that the Government’s express 
concern for Number 185’s safety because she resided in North 
Philadelphia was baseless.  We acknowledge, as we must, that 
Number 185 denied knowing any of the prospective witnesses 
named on eleven pages of the jury questionnaire, and that she 
did not express concern about serving on the jury.  Yet her 
responses do not themselves render the Government’s stated 
safety concerns without merit.  The indictment charged Savage 
and others with participating in a RICO conspiracy that 
involved murders, drug trafficking and arson, not to mention 
tampering with and retaliating against a witness.  The District 
Court had already demonstrated its safety concerns by 
directing that the jury would serve anonymously and that 
special security measures were to be taken in transporting 
jurors to and from court.  And the District Court noted that an 
anonymous jury had been seated in Savage’s 2005 trial.  There 
was also the prosecution’s stark reminder that Savage had 
threatened to “go[] after jurors.”  A34:18052.   
Nor can we ignore that Number 185’s stated 
unfamiliarity with those named in the jury questionnaire did 
not rule out that she may have been unwittingly acquainted 




having previously seen the person somewhere or even knowing 
of a person by nickname.  Based on the foregoing, we reject 
Savage’s contention that the Government’s express concern 
regarding Number 185’s North Philadelphia residence lacked 
factual support.  
c.   Statistical evidence does not compel 
a conclusion that the Government’s 
peremptory strike was racially 
motivated. 
 Savage’s final argument in support of his Batson claim 
marshals statistical evidence that he claims demonstrates that 
the Government’s strike was motivated by race.57  Savage 
notes that of the seventy-eight prospective jurors in the venire, 
the Government exercised twenty-two peremptory strikes, and 
that six of them were against black prospective jurors.  This 
 
57 He asserts that statistical evidence was presented to, but 
ignored by, the District Court when the defense raised its final 
Batson challenge to Number 364.  At that time, Savage 
asserted that there was an “even greater pattern” of 
discrimination, A34:18065, as the Government had exercised 
twelve peremptory strikes and “50 percent of them have been 
against minorities, four African-Americans and two 
Hispanics.”  A34:18061.  Given the substance of Number 
364’s voir dire examination and her emotional response to the 
questioning about her son, the District Court was not obliged 
to comment on all of the evidence before ruling from the bench.  
There were several patently race-neutral grounds cited by the 
prosecution for striking Number 364, all of which the District 




yields a 27.3% strike rate against Blacks that “far exceeded 
[their] representation . . . in the venire as a whole (9.67%) as 
well as in the master jury wheel for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania (8.37%).”  Def. Br. 165.  
 Savage also points out that the Government struck six 
of the eleven black prospective jurors, which equates to a strike 
rate of 54.5%.  In contrast, the Government struck only sixteen 
of the sixty-seven non-black prospective jurors, yielding a 
23.9% strike rate. 
 Unsurprisingly, the Government contends that these 
statistics are not a basis for overturning the District Court’s 
Batson findings.  Rather than address the total number of 
Blacks in the venire, the Government focuses on the number of 
Blacks at the time of the second Batson challenge to Number 
364, when there were forty-three individuals in the venire, six 
of whom were black.  The Government highlights that it had 
accepted three Blacks: Number 2, who was the first black juror 
seated on the jury, and two others who, ironically, the defense 
had struck.   
 We acknowledge that there is more than one way to 
analyze the racial statistics presented in this case.  Most 
instructive for us are the numbers considered by the Supreme 
Court in its more recent Batson cases, Miller-El, Foster and 
Flowers—the total number of Blacks in the venire and the 
number of strikes of those black venire members.   
 In Miller-El, there were eleven Blacks in the venire.  




black prospective jurors, which constitutes a “strike rate”58 of 
91%.  Id. at 240–41.  These strikes were made “in a selection 
process replete with evidence that the prosecutors were 
selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race” by 
“shuffl[ing]” the jury59 and using “disparate lines of 
questioning . . . meant to induce qualms about applying the 
death penalty (and thus explain a strike),” id. at 265, as well as 
phrasing questions in a way “meant to induce a disqualifying 
answer,” id. at 266.  Given these circumstances, the Court 
rejected the state’s argument that it had not stricken two of the 
prospective jurors because they were black.  Id. 
 In Foster, stark numbers also contributed to the Court’s 
conclusion that the prosecution had violated Batson.  The 
venire’s composition in that case included four Blacks.  136 S. 
Ct. at 1743.  The government struck each of them, yielding a 
100% strike rate for the black prospective jurors.  Id. at 1742–
43.  Those numbers were accompanied by shifting 
explanations for why the strikes were made, 
misrepresentations about the record, and a copy of the 
prosecutor’s annotated file identifying not only which 
venirepersons were black but also focusing on race in several 
other respects with an eye to seating an all-white jury.  Id. at 
1744–45, 1754.  The Supreme Court commented that the 
 
58 Miller-El does not utilize the term “strike rate.”  But it did 
compute the percentage of Blacks in the venire that were 
stricken by the government.  For that reason, we use the term 
“strike rate.” 
59 Miller-El explained that jury shuffling is a Texas procedure 
that allows either party to rearrange the order in which the 




“sheer number of references to race in that file is arresting.”  
Id. at 1755.   
 Most recently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Flowers after concluding 
that the evidence demonstrated the state court had committed 
clear error in rejecting the defendant’s Batson challenge.  139 
S. Ct. at 2251.  The venire in Flowers’s sixth trial included six 
Blacks.  The state moved to strike five of the six Blacks in the 
venire, yielding a strike rate of 83%.  Id. at 2237.  The Supreme 
Court also considered the state’s repeated use of peremptory 
strikes in all of Flowers’s six trials, cumulatively removing 
forty-one of forty-two Blacks, an overall strike rate of 97.6%.60  
Id. at 2235–36.  This usage of strikes against black 
venirepersons was consistent with other evidence of 
discriminatory strikes.  Together, all the evidence convinced 
the Court that striking one of the black prospective jurors had 
been “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”  
Id. at 2248.  The Court “reiterate[d]” that it did not “decide that 
any one . . . fact[] alone would require reversal.”  Id. at 2251.  
Rather, it emphasized that “all of the relevant facts and 
circumstances taken together establish that the trial court at 
Flowers’s sixth trial committed clear error” in denying the 
defendant’s Batson objection.  Id.   
 Here, contrary to Savage’s characterization, the 
numbers are not comparable.  There were eleven Blacks among 
the prospective jurors.  The Government’s challenging of six 
of the eleven established a 54.5% strike rate.  That percentage 
 
60 At times, the state used all, or almost all, of its peremptory 




is well below the strike rates of 91% in Miller-El, 100% in 
Foster, and 83% in Flowers.   
 Moreover, the 54.5% rate in this case is not nearly as 
powerful as Savage contends because we may take into 
account the seating of the black alternate.  See Bond v. Beard, 
539 F.3d 256, 269–70 (3d Cir. 2008) (considering black 
alternates in determining whether the government’s strikes 
raised an inference of discrimination).  Accordingly, there 
were twelve Blacks in the venire thereby yielding a strike rate 
of 50%.  That strike rate, by itself, hardly supports Savage’s 
Batson claim.   
*      *      * 
 In sum, we conclude that Savage has failed to establish 
that the District Court clearly erred when it found that the 
Government’s strike of Number 185 was not motivated by 
race.  At the time of this Batson challenge, the District Court 
made a finding that the “government ha[d] not exercised its 
challenge for racial reasons.”  A34:18056.  Later, in ruling on 
post-trial motions, the District Court expressly took “into 
account the prosecutor’s demeanor and credibility” and found 
that the Government was not “motivated by a discriminatory 
intent.”  A1:159.  These factual findings are entitled to “great 





IX. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE DOCTRINE OF 
TRANSFERRED INTENT. 
This claim concerns the 2004 firebombing of the 
Coleman house.  Recall that Coleman’s mother, Marcella, was 
in the home with his infant son (Damir Jenkins), his twelve-
year-old nephew (Tajh Porchea), his fifteen-year-old nephew 
(Sean Rodriguez), his cousin (Tameka Nash) and her ten-year-
old daughter (Khadijah Nash).  All six individuals—two adults 
and four children—perished in the fire.  Savage was charged 
with the six murders as violent crimes in aid of racketeering 
(“VICAR”) under 18 U.S.C. § 1959.   
In his jury charge, Judge Surrick explained the doctrine 
of transferred intent.  That instruction was given to assist the 
jury in deciding whether, if it found that Savage had a specific 
intent to kill Marcella Coleman, such intent could be 
“transferred” to the five other victims to meet the intent 
element of the six VICAR murder charges.  Specifically, the 
District Court instructed: 
Now, in determining whether a defendant, in this 
instance Kaboni Savage, Robert Merritt, Kidada 
Savage, committed the murders of the Nash 
family as noted in Counts 10 through 15, you 
may find that any such crime was committed in 
aid of racketeering by applying the following 
principle of transferred intent.  The doctrine of 
transferred intent and its additional application 
says that if a defendant shoots one person with 




you are permitted to attribute or transfer the 
defendant’s intent to kill to the second person.  
Now, as applied in this case, ladies and 
gentlemen, that principle says that if a defendant 
planned to commit a murder to maintain or 
increase his or her position in an enterprise and 
in attempting to carry out that plan committed a 
murder of another person, the intent of the 
planned murder may be transferred to the other 
murders.  What this means for your purposes, 
ladies and gentlemen, is that the government 
may prove the fourth and fifth elements of the 
offense charged in Counts 11 through 15 by 
proving that on October 9, 2004, Defendants 
Kaboni Savage, Robert Merritt and Kidada 
Savage specifically intended to cause the death 
of Marcella Coleman for the purpose of 
maintaining or increasing their position in the 
enterprise, and then willfully set the fire that 
killed Tameka Nash, Sean Anthony Rodriguez, 
Tajh Porchea, Khadijah Nash and Damir 
Jenkins, as well as Marcella Coleman.  So the 
intent to kill Marcella Coleman is transferred to 
the other victims.   
A29:15197–99 (emphasis added).   
Savage claims this instruction incorrectly defined the 
doctrine of transferred intent and thereby impermissibly “gave 
jurors permission to ‘transfer’—or more accurately, to 
multiply—Savage’s alleged intent that Lamont would kill 




children.”61  Def. Br. 167.  In addition, because a similar 
instruction was given at sentencing, Savage claims the 
instruction “infected Savage’s capital-sentencing hearing, 
producing an unreliable death verdict.”  Id.  We are not 
persuaded. 
A. Standard of Review 
A defendant claiming error in jury instructions must 
inform the District Court of any specific objection and specify 
the grounds for it.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Cruz, 478 
F.2d 712, 718 (3d Cir. 1973); Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b).  
Savage did not object on the trial record to the transferred 
intent instruction, despite the District Court’s reminders to 
counsel that they should do so.  See A29:15225 (“All right, 
counsel, any additions or corrections to the Court’s charge?”); 
A29:15227 (In response to a reference to a discussion during 
the charge conference, the District Court stated: “You better be 
more specific because we were in chambers, and it’s not on the 
record.”).     
Because the claimed error is unpreserved, we review for 
plain error.  Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999) 
 
61 Although Savage seems to imply that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the murder convictions as to the arson 
victims other than Marcella Coleman, his claim challenges 
only the District Court’s jury instruction on transferred intent.  
Savage has therefore forfeited a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim.  See United States v. Baxter, 951 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 
2020) (declining to consider forfeited claim), petition for cert. 




(if a capital defendant fails to preserve an objection to a jury 
instruction, plain error review applies).  To prevail on plain 
error review, Savage must establish: (1) there was an error; (2) 
it was plain; (3) it affected his substantial rights (i.e., it affected 
the outcome of the proceeding); and (4) it affected the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of the proceeding.  United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–36 (1993).  An error is plain if it 
is “obvious” or “clear under current law.”  United States v. 
Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 
B. The “generic” doctrine of transferred intent in 
the context of VICAR murder 
The VICAR statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, “was enacted by 
Congress in 1984 as a violent crime corollary to the RICO 
statute.”  United States v. Jones, 566 F.3d 353, 361 (3d Cir. 
2009).  It proscribes certain violent crimes—including 
murder—when committed, inter alia, to maintain or increase 
one’s position in a racketeering enterprise.62  Although VICAR 
 
62 Section 1959(a)(1) provides:  
 
Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as 
consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, 
anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise 
engaged in racketeering activity, or for the 
purpose of gaining entrance to or maintaining or 
increasing position in an enterprise engaged in 
racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, 
assaults with a dangerous weapon, commits 




expressly applies to murder, it does not define it.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1959.  Savage argues that the absence of a definition indicates 
Congress’s desire to employ a “generic” definition of 
murder—and more specifically, transferred intent—for 
VICAR purposes.  He suggests that the source for a generic 
definition should be “indications of national legal consensus” 
such as “the Model Penal Code, learned treatises, and other 
sources that show how the majority of jurisdictions defined the 
crime.”  Def. Br. 180.   
Our Court has not had occasion to decide whether 
VICAR requires an instruction specific to state law, or if a 
“generic” definition is preferable.  Some jurisdictions view 
generic definitions as appropriate in RICO cases.  See United 
States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 588 (8th Cir. 2002) (“RICO’s 
reference to state crimes identifies the type of generic conduct 
which will serve as a RICO predicate and satisfy RICO’s 
pattern requirement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1208–09 (5th Cir. 
1995) (“[F]ederal courts typically require only a ‘generic’ 
definition of the underlying state crime in a RICO charge.”), 
vacated on other grounds by Moore v. United States, 519 U.S. 
802 (1996).  
 
threatens to commit a crime of violence against 
any individual in violation of the laws of any State 
or the United States, or attempts or conspires so 
to do, shall be punished—for murder, by death or 





But the VICAR statute requires a predicate act that is 
chargeable under state or federal law.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1959 
(prohibiting certain predicate acts in “violation of the laws of 
any State or the United States”).  So as the Second Circuit has 
observed, trial courts frequently instruct juries on the elements 
of the specific state or federal offense that is charged as the 
predicate act rather than outlining a “generic” version of the 
crime.  United States v. Carrillo, 229 F.3d 177, 184–85 (2d Cir. 
2000) (suggesting that the “best practice” is to instruct juries 
on the elements of the state offenses that are charged as 
predicate acts because, even if theoretically permissible, 
instruction on a “generic” offense risks prejudice to the 
defendant and possible reversal on appeal); see also United 
States v. Adkins, 883 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“[C]ourts, in certain circumstances, should instruct on the 
state definition or otherwise risk prejudice to the defendant.”).  
Notably, in Savage’s case, the District Court’s instruction on 
the elements of “murder” tracked Pennsylvania law because 
murder under Pennsylvania law was the predicate act charged, 
and Savage does not claim that the District Court erred by 
defining the predicate offense of murder under Pennsylvania 
law rather than “generically.”  See A29:15194 (“[I]n order for 
the state offense of murder to be considered as a racketeering 
act, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a member of the enterprise committed murder as defined by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”); see also A29:15172–73 
(defining murder under Pennsylvania law for RICO purposes).   
For purposes of Savage’s transferred intent claim, we 
need not choose between Pennsylvania’s state law definition 




essentially the same regardless of whether it is Pennsylvania’s 
definition or a generic version.  As the Supreme Court 
instructed in Taylor v. United States, a “generic” definition 
usually refers to the common law meaning of a term, unless 
contemporary usage and relevant statutes indicate a divergence 
from that definition.  495 U.S. 575, 592–93 (1990).  
Pennsylvania’s doctrine of transferred intent is rooted in the 
common law and is consistent with the formulation adopted in 
the Model Penal Code.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 303(b);63 
 
63 Section 303(b) codifies the doctrine of transferred intent.  It 
provides:  
 
When intentionally or knowingly causing a 
particular result is an element of an offense, the 
element is not established if the actual result is 
not within the intent or the contemplation of the 
actor unless:  
(1) the actual result differs from that designed or 
contemplated as the case may be, only in the 
respect that a different person or different 
property is injured or affected or that the injury 
or harm designed or contemplated would have 
been more serious or more extensive than that 
caused; or 
(2) the actual result involves the same kind of 
injury or harm as that designed or contemplated 
and is not too remote or accidental in its 
occurrence to have a bearing on the actor’s 





Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 1994) 
(Pennsylvania adopted the Model Penal Code’s version of 
transferred intent); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133, 
138 (Pa. 1993) (“The ‘transferred intent’ theory provides that 
if the intent to commit a crime exists, this intent can be 
transferred for the purpose of finding the intent element for 
another crime.”); see also, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. McCant 
v. Rundle, 211 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. 1965); Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 68 A. 53, 53 (Pa. 1907); Commonwealth v. 
Eisenhower, 37 A. 521, 521 (Pa. 1897).  We can discern no 
difference between a generic version and Pennsylvania’s 
articulation of the doctrine.   
The parties discuss the propriety of the District Court’s 
transferred intent instruction by considering cases from 
numerous jurisdictions, many of which rely on the common 
law doctrine, to establish that there is a consensus as to how 
the majority of jurisdictions define the doctrine.  Indeed, as 
Maryland’s Supreme Court has observed, “there is a singular 
unanimity among the decisions in the overwhelming majority 
of the states” concerning application of transferred intent.  
Gladden v. State, 330 A.2d 176, 181 (Md. 1974).  We therefore 
follow the parties’ approach and consider a broad survey of 
cases from jurisdictions throughout the United States before 
reaching our conclusions as to the “generic” meaning and 
application of the transferred intent doctrine. 
 
With section 303(b), Pennsylvania has adopted the Model 
Penal Code’s approach to transferred intent.  See Model Penal 




C. Savage fails to establish that the District Court’s 
transferred intent instruction clearly diverges 
from the “classic doctrine.”  
Both Savage and the Government agree that an 
instruction on transferred intent can be permissible during a 
jury charge on the meaning of intent in the context of VICAR 
murder, Def. Br. 181; Gov’t Br. 145, and we concur.  As the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded in United 
States v. Concepcion, transferred intent applies to VICAR 
crimes.  983 F.2d 369, 381–82 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United 
States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 141 (2d Cir. 1999). 
Savage raises a more narrow issue in challenging the 
District Court’s transferred intent instruction: he draws a 
distinction between “classic” or “generic” transferred intent—
the long-accepted common law legal principle that he concedes 
could apply in a VICAR murder case—and “expanded” or 
“multiplied intent,” which he argues is a novel legal theory.  
See Def. Br. 176, 188.   
According to Savage, transferred intent specifically and 
exclusively means that “a defendant, who intends to kill one 
person but instead kills a bystander, is deemed the author of 
whatever kind of homicide would have been committed had he 
killed the intended victim.”  Def. Br. 181 (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Wharton, 
Criminal Law § 144 at 197 (14th ed. 1979)).  Thus, transferred 
intent in Savage’s view: (1) is limited exclusively to situations 
in which the intended victim survives; and (2) applies only 
when there is one intended victim and one actual, unintended 




Savage is able to argue that because Marcella was murdered, 
the specific intent to murder her cannot “multiply” to the 
additional victims.   
We do not share this narrow view of the doctrine.  
Caselaw from numerous jurisdictions over many decades 
indicates that transferred intent, as it is generically and 
historically understood in the common law, applies to the 
circumstances of Savage’s case. 
We begin with United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 
(D.C. Cir. 1980), a case that recognized the deep historical 
roots of the common law doctrine of transferred intent and 
applied it in a manner contrary to Savage’s narrow approach.  
In Sampol, three defendants were accused of detonating a car 
bomb that killed the Chilean Ambassador to the United States 
along with another passenger.  The defendants were charged, 
inter alia, with first-degree murder as to both victims, and the 
jury found them guilty.  On appeal, the Sampol defendants 
argued that there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill the 
other passenger who was an unintended victim.  The Sampol 
court was unpersuaded: 
We reject this argument because of the doctrine 
of transferred intent.  Under this doctrine one 
who intends to kill one person and kills a 
bystander instead is deemed to have committed 
whatever form of homicide would have been 
committed had he killed the intended victim.  
There are even stronger grounds for applying 
the principle where the intended victim is killed 




Id. at 674 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).   
In reaching its determination, the Sampol court 
described the common law roots of the transferred intent 
doctrine, going back to the English courts of the 1500s and 
continuing through modern American statutory and common 
law.  Id. at 674–75.  Examination of the doctrine led the Sampol 
court to conclude that the defendants were accountable for both 
murders—despite the fact that the defendants had intended a 
single death (the ambassador’s) and had achieved that goal.  Id. 
at 675 (“[T]he mens rea of a defendant as to his intended victim 
will carry over and affix his culpability when such criminal 
conduct causes the death of an unintended victim.” (quoting 
Gladden, 330 A.2d at 189)).  Thus, in Sampol, common law 
transferred intent was not limited to what Savage would have 
us conclude is the “classic” scenario in which one unintended 
victim is killed rather than the intended target.  
 Similarly, in United States v. Weddell, the Eighth 
Circuit applied the doctrine of transferred intent to 
circumstances akin to Sampol.  567 F.2d 767, 768 (8th Cir. 
1977).  There, the defendant was convicted of two murders: a 
bullet passed through the intended victim and also killed an 
unintended victim.  Id.  The trial court instructed, among other 
things, that, once intent as to the intended victim was 
determined, the jury “could possibly find a lesser degree or no 
degree” as to the unintended victim, but not a greater degree.  




convictions and concluded that the instruction “adequately 
cover[ed] the applicable law.”64  Id. at 770. 
  Pennsylvania similarly interprets transferred intent 
more broadly than Savage suggests.  In Commonwealth v. 
Jones, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the claims 
of a defendant who was convicted of capital murder for 
participating, with two co-defendants, in “firing a barrage of 
twenty bullets at [a group of] people in the courtyard” resulting 
 
64 Savage contends that Weddell supports his claim that 
transferred intent does not apply to his circumstances, arguing 
that “the court of appeals approved the jury instructions 
because they did not direct the jury, if it found an intent to kill 
the first victim, to transfer that to the second one as a matter of 
law.”  Def. Br. 184.  We fail to see how the permissive nature 
of the jury instruction in Weddell supports Savage’s argument.  
The Weddell Court did not discuss, much less conclude, 
whether transferred intent is limited to a situation in which the 
intended victim survives or where there is only a single victim.  
To the contrary, the Weddell Court upheld the transferred 
intent instruction although the defendant murdered both an 
unintended and an intended victim.  See Weddell, 567 F.2d at 
768.  Moreover, the instruction in Weddell is consistent with 
the instruction in Savage’s case, inasmuch as they both contain 
permissive, not mandatory, language.  See A29:15198 (“The 
doctrine of transferred intent . . . says that if a defendant shoots 
one person with the intent to kill and inadvertently kills 
another, you are permitted to attribute or transfer the 




in two deaths.  610 A.2d 931, 935, 938 (Pa. 1992).65  The 
bullets were apparently intended for a specific victim, but that 
person was not hit.  Id. at 935.  The Jones Court rejected the 
defendant’s claim that he lacked specific intent to murder the 
two unintended victims: “[U]nder the doctrine of transferred 
intent, criminal responsibility is not affected by the fact that the 
bullets struck persons other than the one for whom they were 
apparently intended.”  Id. at 938.  Thus, Pennsylvania holds 
that the intent to kill one individual can “multiply”—to use 
Savage’s word—to apply to several unintended victims.  
Indeed, in another case decided the same year as Jones, 
Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court echoed this conclusion, and 
further observed that it would be “ludicrous” to hold otherwise.  
It stated: 
Appellant argues that the death sentence is 
excessive in this case because he . . . was 
 
65 Savage would have us limit our consideration to sources that 
existed in 1984—the year of the enactment of the VICAR 
statute.  He has not cited any authority to support that 
limitation.  In any event, the doctrine of transferred intent does 
not appear to have changed since 1984, so we need not take a 
position on the issue.  Absent some indication that a post-1984 
case has diverged from the common law “generic” doctrine, 
more recent caselaw buttresses our understanding just as pre-
1984 caselaw does.  In other words, although the transferred 
intent doctrine is of “ancient vintage,” “[i]t has lost none of its 
patina by its application over the centuries down unto modern 
times; its viability is recognized by its current acceptance and 





convicted of murder of the first degree based 
upon “transferred intent.” This position is 
ludicrous. The jury found that appellant did 
intend to kill and did kill, and he has no basis to 
compare himself with those who did not. One 
who intentionally kills, but whose fatal blow 
falls on a mistaken victim, is if anything more 
culpable than murderers who do not carelessly 
kill innocent bystanders. This type of murder . . 
. is the product of a heart turned not only 
against the intended victim but also against all 
those anonymous but within range of the murder 
weapon. 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 615 A.2d 716, 727 (Pa. 1992) 
(first and third emphases added). 
New Jersey takes the same approach as Pennsylvania.  
In State v. Worlock, the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected 
the claim that the successful murder of an intended victim 
meant that the specific intent could not transfer to the 
unintended victim.  569 A.2d 1314, 1324–25 (N.J. 1990).  
Although New Jersey codified the transferred intent doctrine 
in its penal code, the Worlock court recognized that the 
transferred intent doctrine is a long-standing principle that pre-
dates the adoption of the penal code.  The doctrine provides 
that “[w]hen a defendant intentionally shoots at one victim but 
kills another, his punishment should be consistent with his 
intent and not his bad aim.”  Id.  at 1325.  The Worlock court 
also observed that federal courts apply transferred intent in the 
same manner.  Id. (citing Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, and Weddell, 




defendant’s claim that he lacked specific intent to kill the 
unintended victim solely because he also killed the intended 
victim.66  Id. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has considered—
and rejected—the same arguments that Savage makes here.  In 
State v. Hinton, the defendant killed three individuals with a 
single shot of “triple ought” buckshot and was charged with 
three murders.  630 A.2d 593, 596 (Conn. 1993).  The 
defendant disputed the transferred intent jury charge, 
contending that the instruction was erroneous because (1) the 
intended victim was killed; and (2) there was more than one 
 
66 There are numerous jurisdictions that similarly interpret 
transferred intent.  For instance, the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals has concluded that “application of the transferred 
intent doctrine is not limited to situations in which the intended 
victim survives the deadly assault.”  Lloyd v. United States, 806 
A.2d 1243, 1251 (D.C. 2002); see also Hunt v. United States, 
729 A.2d 322, 326 (D.C. 1999).  And the Indiana Supreme 
Court concluded that a defendant’s intent to kill his wife 
transferred to the accidental death of their child, whom the wife 
was holding during the attack.  Noelke v. State, 15 N.E.2d 950, 
952 (Ind. 1938).  The Appellate Court of Illinois rejected a 
claim that transferred intent cannot apply when both an 
intended and unintended victim are killed.  People v. Young, 
635 N.E.2d 473, 481 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 
1300 (Ill. 1994).  And in Smith v. Commonwealth, the Supreme 
Court of Kentucky upheld a death sentence where the 
defendant, in the course of ultimately killing the single 
intended victim, also killed three unintended victims.  734 




victim.  Id. at 597.  “The defendant claims that because the 
court’s transferred intent instruction improperly allowed the 
jury to find him guilty of all three murders even if there had 
been only one intended victim, all three intentional murder 
convictions must be reversed.”  Id.   
The Hinton court rejected this argument.  It concluded 
that Connecticut’s statute codifying transferred intent “leads to 
the result that, when a person engages in conduct with the 
intent to kill someone, there can be a separate count of murder 
for every person actually killed by the conduct.”  Id. at 598.  
The Hinton court considered the typical usage of singular 
phrasing in the century-old description of the transferred intent 
doctrine—the same formulation that Savage relies upon—but 
it observed that the use of the singular was never intended to 
limit the doctrine’s application exclusively to single-victim 
scenarios.  “[A]lthough the traditional formulation of the 
doctrine of transferred intent is usually stated in singular terms, 
that does not mean that such intent, once employed, is thereby 
totally expended.”  Id. at 598 (citation omitted).  Concluding 
that such use of the singular should not rule out application of 
the doctrine to conduct that kills more than one unintended 
victim, and consistent with Sampol, Jones, Worlock and other 
cases, the Hinton court observed that “the purpose of 
deterrence is better served by holding defendant responsible 
for the knowing or purposeful murder of the unintended as well 
as the intended victim.”  Id. at 599. 
In yet another case, Commonwealth v. Melton, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed that “[w]e 
have never required that a defendant’s intent be directed at the 




2002).  Instead, “the requisite mens rea must be shown, but it 
does not need to be shown separately or independently for each 
victim.  Rather, once established as to any victim, it satisfies 
that element with respect to all other victims, even if those 
victims are unintended or even unknown to the defendant.”  Id. 
at 1098 (emphasis added).   
Although Melton concerned assault rather than murder, 
the opinion discussed the longstanding principle of transferred 
intent, citing numerous examples of decisions from many 
jurisdictions going back decades, including Sampol, Worlock 
and Hinton, in which the “principle of transferred intent applies 
to satisfy the element of intent when a defendant harms both 
the intended victim and one or more additional but unintended 
victims.”  Id. at 1097 (emphasis added).  The Melton court 
recognized that a minority of jurisdictions take the view that 
transferred intent does not apply in cases in which a defendant 
succeeds in perpetrating the intended crime against the 
intended victim.  Id. at 1098 n.7 (citing People v. Birreuta, 208 
Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal. 1984) and Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984 
(Md. 1993)).67  The Melton court expressly rejected that 
 
67 Notably, the portions of both cases cited as supporting the 
minority view have since been set aside in favor of the majority 
approach.  In 2002, the Supreme Court of California concluded 
that Birreuta’s transferred intent analysis was incorrect and 
that “[i]ntent to kill transfers to an unintended homicide victim 
even if the intended target is killed.”  People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 
1107, 1115 (Cal. 2002).  Similarly, in 2011, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland rejected the dictum in Ford and 
concluded that “transferred intent is fully applicable where 




minority view: “[t]o hold that a defendant who succeeds in 
perpetrating a crime on his intended victim cannot commit any 
form of intentional crime against anyone who is not his actual 
intended victim fails to recognize the harm perpetrated on 
others who are unfortunate enough to be injured or killed by 
the defendant’s criminal conduct.”  Id.     
Savage cites a handful of cases lending support to his 
narrow interpretation of transferred intent.  For instance, he 
points to Roberts v. State, in which the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas observed that, where the intended victim was 
pregnant—a fact of which the defendant was not aware—“we 
cannot use transferred intent to charge capital murder based on 
the death of the unintended [unborn] victim, as that would 
require using a single intent to support the requirement of two 
intentional and knowing deaths.”  273 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Tex. 
Ct. Crim. App. 2008).68  But the mere existence of a minority 
view of a legal doctrine hardly suggests that a jury instruction 
 
Henry v. State, 19 A.3d 944, 951 (Md. 2011).  Bland and Henry 
rely on many of the same cases we have cited in our discussion 
concerning the “classic” meaning of transferred intent, 
including Sampol, Worlock and Hinton.  
68 The Roberts court based its conclusion on the language of 
the Texas capital murder statute, which requires a discrete 
“specific intent to kill” as to each death.  Id.  The Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas has since limited Roberts, 
observing that its dictum requiring “proof of intent to kill the 
same number of persons who actually died” was improvident.  
Ex parte Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 
2012).  But Texas requires separate conduct to establish 




that was consistent with the majority view amounts to plain 
error.   
Numerous state and federal cases, decided both before 
and after VICAR’s 1984 enactment, reveal that the principle of 
transferred intent is not limited to scenarios in which the 
intended victim survives and there is only one unintended 
victim.  While we concede that the examples we have 
considered do not constitute an exhaustive study, they are more 
than sufficient to allow us to conclude—with confidence—that 
if there is any error in the District Court’s transferred intent 
instruction, such error is neither “clear” nor obvious.”  The 
District Court’s transferred intent instruction was not plainly 
erroneous.69 
D. The District Court did not plainly err by 
instructing the jury on transferred intent during 
the sentencing phase. 
During the sentencing phase of Savage’s trial, the 
District Court again instructed the jury on the doctrine of 
transferred intent.  See A32:16804–05.  Savage did not object.  
See A32:16841–47. Savage now contends this instruction was 
improper, claiming that “[n]either the language nor the history 
of the [Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3591,] 
 
69 Savage also contends that the prosecution made erroneous 
arguments by relying on a transferred intent theory.  For the 
same reasons we are unpersuaded that the transferred intent 
jury instruction was plainly erroneous, we are similarly 
unpersuaded that counsel’s arguments consistent with the jury 




suggests that Congress meant to incorporate . . . the transferred-
intent doctrine into the determination of aggravating factors at 
a capital-sentencing hearing.”  Def. Br. 187.  In addition, 
Savage challenges the transferred intent instruction as 
unconstitutional.  Relying upon Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782, 794, 800 (1982), he argues that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the use of transferred intent in a capital sentencing to 
substitute for proof of the actual mental state.  We do not agree. 
Savage has not identified any case holding that 
transferred intent cannot apply in a federal capital sentencing.70  
Indeed, there appears to be little federal authority on the 
subject, although several state courts have upheld the 
application of the doctrine in capital sentencing.  See People v. 
Shabazz, 130 P.3d 519, 524–25 (Cal. 2006); State v. Higgins, 
826 A.2d 1126, 1137–38 (Conn. 2003); Diaz v. State, 860 
So.2d 960, 969 (Fla. 2003); Williams, 615 A.2d at 727–28; 
Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 447 (Ky. 1987).  
 
70 Although Savage’s brief makes a passing reference to the 
effect that language and history of the FDPA prohibit the use 
of transferred intent in a federal capital sentencing proceeding, 
he provides no substantive argument concerning the language 
and history of the FDPA to support this position.  Such a 
passing reference is insufficient to raise the issue for our 
review.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162–63 
(3d Cir. 2008).  The issue is therefore forfeited.  See United 
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well 
settled that an appellant’s failure to . . . argue an issue in his 
opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  
Accordingly, we will focus, as Savage did, on whether caselaw 




And the Supreme Court has upheld on habeas review the 
application of transferred intent in a state capital proceeding.  
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 75–76 (2005). 
Savage’s sole support for his position that transferred 
intent cannot apply in a federal capital sentencing proceeding 
appears in a footnote in his brief wherein he argues that “the 
few state courts to consider the issue [of transferred intent as 
an aggravated factor at a capital sentencing] have expressly 
refused to read the doctrine into their death-penalty statutes.”  
Def. Br. 187 n.75.  He cites two “murder for hire” cases: 
Grandison v. State, 670 A.2d 398 (Md. 1995) and 
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1993).  Neither 
case stands for the proposition he advances. 
In Grandison, the defendant was sentenced to death for 
hiring an assassin to commit a double murder on his behalf.  
670 A.2d 398, 406–07.  The assassin killed one intended victim 
and, due to mistaken identity, killed a second, unintended 
victim.  In considering Grandison’s challenge to his sentence, 
Maryland’s highest court rejected his claim that the sentencing 
court erred by not instructing the jury on the doctrine of 
transferred intent.  Id. at 424.  According to Grandison, the 
aggravating circumstances of his “murder for hire” conviction 
necessarily relied on a transferred intent theory.  Id.  The 
Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed because, for purposes of 
capital sentencing, it did not matter if the victim was intended 
or unintended.  Rather, the specific aggravating factor under 
Maryland law concerned only whether or not Grandison hired 




intended or unintended murder victim was.71  Id.  Accordingly, 
while transferred intent might have played a role in 
Grandison’s conviction, it simply was irrelevant to the “murder 
for hire” aggravating factor at sentencing.  Id. at 425.   
Gibbs concerned the sentencing of an assassin who 
committed a murder for hire, rather than the individual who did 
the hiring.  626 A.2d 133, 135 (Pa. 1993).  Gibbs was hired to 
kill a woman’s husband but ultimately killed a security guard 
instead; he received a death sentence for that murder.72  Id.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether “the trial 
court erred in determining that the common law principle of 
transferred intent is applicable with respect to finding a 
‘contract killing’ an aggravating circumstance when the victim 
is not the person the killer was hired to kill.”  Id. at 136. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Gibbs’s 
petition seeking review of the refusal to issue an order 
 
71 Under then-applicable Maryland law, an aggravating factor 
for the death penalty included whether “the defendant 
employed or engaged another to commit the murder and the 
murder was committed under an agreement or contract for 
remuneration or promise of remuneration.”  Md. Code Ann., 
Crim. Law § 2-303(g)(1)(vii).  Section 2-303 was repealed in 
2013.   
72 Although there was some question as to whether Gibbs was 
hired to kill the security guard as well, see Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 
135, the possibility that the security guard was an intended 
victim was not relevant to consideration of the transferred 
intent issue because there was no challenge to the sufficiency 




precluding consideration of the death penalty.  The Superior 
Court ruled that the trial court erred in applying transferred 
intent to a “contract killing” as an aggravating circumstance 
because Gibbs killed an unintended victim rather than the 
individual he was hired to murder.  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed.  It concluded that the “plain language” of its 
aggravating factor statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(2), 
required the killing of the intended victim, not an unintended 
one.73  “The plain language of the statute does not include an 
unintended victim.  Rather the clear language requires that the 
defendant was to be paid to kill the victim.”  Id. at 138 
(emphasis added).   
Gibbs and Grandison simply do not demonstrate that 
the District Court in Savage’s case plainly erred in instructing 
on transferred intent at sentencing.  Both Gibbs and Grandison 
concerned specific statutory language in “murder for hire” 
aggravating factor statutes.  Neither case speaks to the 
applicability vel non of transferred intent at a capital sentencing 
absent the murder for hire context.  Rather, each relied on 
specific statutory language to determine whether transferred 
intent could apply under the particular circumstances.   
“Murder for hire” was not one of the aggravating factors 
in Savage’s sentencing.  More importantly, Savage does not 
argue that the aggravating factors that were at issue in his 
 
73 The statute provides, “[t]he defendant paid or was paid by 
another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another 
person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for 





sentencing included analogous language making the particular 
identity of the victim—and more specifically, whether the 
victim was intended or unintended—relevant, as it was in 
Gibbs and Grandison.   
Savage’s aggravating factors do not rely on whether the 
actual victim was the intended victim.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3592(c)(6) (“The defendant committed the offense in an 
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in that it 
involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim.”), 
(c)(9) (“The defendant committed the offense after substantial 
planning and premeditation to cause the death of a person or 
commit an act of terrorism.”), (c)(11) (“The victim was 
particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity.”), 
(c)(16) (“The defendant intentionally killed or attempted to kill 
more than one person in a single criminal episode.”).  For 
instance, one aggravating factor refers to “substantial planning 
and premeditation to cause the death of a person.”  
§ 3592(c)(9) (emphasis added).  The statutory language does 
not imply that the “person” must be an intended victim, and 
Savage offers nothing to persuade us otherwise. 
In support of his Eighth Amendment claim, Savage 
relies on Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794, 800, to argue that the Eighth 
Amendment “forbids application of felony-murder doctrine at 
capital sentencing to substitute for proof of [an] accomplice’s 
actual mental state.”  Def. Br. 188.  Enmund’s felony-murder 
analysis does not assist Savage.   
Enmund concerned a defendant who remained in the 
getaway car during a robbery that resulted in two unplanned 




convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule 
and was sentenced to death.  Id. at 786.  The Supreme Court 
held that imposition of the death penalty in such a circumstance 
violates the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 788.   
Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that it is 
cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to death 
if the defendant “aids and abets a felony in the course of which 
a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal 
force will be employed.”  Id. at 797 (emphasis added).  For 
death penalty purposes, consideration should have been limited 
to the crime in which Enmund actually participated—
robbery—rather than murder.  Id. at 801 (“For purposes of 
imposing the death penalty, Enmund’s criminal culpability 
must be limited to his participation in the robbery, and his 
punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility and 
moral guilt.”).   
Savage’s circumstances differ profoundly from 
Enmund’s, rendering Enmund unhelpful to our plain error 
review.  It was a decision specific to felony murder, and it was 
of central importance to the Supreme Court’s analysis that 
Enmund did not intend to kill anyone.  Id. at 798 (“Enmund 
himself did not kill or attempt to kill; and . . . the record before 
us does not warrant a finding that Enmund had any intention 
of participating in or facilitating a murder.”  (emphasis 
added)).  In contrast, the jury determined that Savage 
specifically intended the death of at least one individual, 
Marcella Coleman.  Because Savage acted with lethal intent, 
we are not convinced that Enmund clearly supports an Eighth 




*      *      * 
Savage has failed to show that the District Court’s 
transferred intent instructions, both during the trial and during 
the sentencing proceeding, were plainly erroneous.   
X. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN ITS 
JURY INSTRUCTION ON LAY OPINION EVIDENCE. 
At trial, Agent Kevin Lewis provided lay opinion 
testimony intended to assist the jury in understanding the 
meaning of certain coded words and phrases used during 
recorded conversations between Savage and his confederates.  
Savage claims that the District Court’s jury instruction 
concerning Lewis’s opinion testimony violated Rule 701 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence by suggesting that he was an expert. 
We conclude that the District Court’s lay opinion jury 
instruction is not plainly erroneous for two reasons.  First, the 
instruction is consistent with our Court’s caselaw.  Second, 
when viewed in context, the instruction did not mislead the jury 
or suggest that it should afford undue weight to Agent Lewis’s 
opinions. 
A. Standard of Review 
Savage argues that our review is de novo because he has 
raised a legal question as to whether the District Court 
presented the correct legal standard in its jury instructions.  See 
United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 779 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(“Where the challenge to a jury instruction is a challenge to the 




plenary review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  But 
Savage did not object on the record to the instruction on Agent 
Lewis’s testimony,74 and we have already rejected the claim 
that we should simply assume that Savage objected off the 
record during the District Court’s charging conference.  See 
generally supra Part III.  Accordingly, under Rules 30 and 52 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we review the 
instruction for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b); 
United States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 192 (3d Cir. 2003).  
We therefore “inquire whether there is (1) an error; (2) that is 
plain; and (3) that affected substantial rights.”  Salahuddin, 765 
F.3d at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted).  If all three of 
those inquiries are answered in the affirmative, we have 
discretion to grant relief “if the error seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of the proceeding.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  An error is “plain” if it is “obvious” or 
“clear under current law.”  Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 100 (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
B. The District Court’s instruction is consistent with 
our caselaw concerning lay opinion testimony.  
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 permits the introduction 
of lay opinion testimony that is “rationally based on the 
witness’s perception” and “helpful to clearly understanding the 
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue.”  Fed. R. 
Evid. 701(a), (b).  Rule 702, in contrast, provides for the 
admission of testimony by a qualified expert, which must be 
 
74 Savage raised other objections to the jury instructions, but 




based on, inter alia, “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge.”  Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).   
In 2000, Rule 701 was amended to add subsection (c), 
which bars lay testimony “based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 701(c).  Subsection (c) clarifies the distinction 
between lay opinion and expert opinion “to eliminate the risk 
that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be 
evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in 
lay witness clothing.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s 
note to 2000 amendments.  Subsection (c) “prohibits a party 
from ‘us[ing] Rule 701 as an end-run around the reliability 
requirements of Rule 702 and the disclosure requirements of 
[Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16].’”  United States v. 
Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 453 (3d Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) 
(quoting Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2008)).   
Here, Savage claims that the District Court’s instruction 
on Agent Lewis’s lay opinion testimony ran afoul of Rule 
701(c).75  The District Court instructed: 
 
75 Prior to trial, the Government moved in limine to admit 
Agent Lewis’s lay opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701.  
Robert Merritt and Kidada Savage opposed the motion; Kaboni 
Savage did not, although he earlier filed a preemptive motion 
requesting that the District Court grant him any pretrial relief 
sought by his co-defendants.  Kidada argued, inter alia, that 
Lewis’s testimony would violate Rule 701(c).  The District 




Ladies and gentlemen, witnesses are generally 
not permitted to state their own personal 
opinions about questions during the trial.  
However, a witness may be allowed to testify to 
his or her opinion if it is rationally based on the 
witness’ perception and is helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness’ testimony or to the 
determination of the facts at issue. 
I’m speaking now about the testimony you will 
remember of Special Agent Kevin Lewis.  In this 
case, Agent Lewis was permitted to offer his 
opinions as to the meaning of certain words or 
conversations.  He gave you these opinions 
based upon his perceptions. 
The opinions of this witness should be received 
and given whatever weight you think is 
appropriate, given all of the other evidence in 
this case and the other factors discussed in these 
instructions. 
 
acknowledged some risks in having Agent Lewis provide lay 
opinion testimony, but concluded that “such risks are mitigated 
by vigorous policing of the Government’s questioning to 
ensure Special Agent Lewis does not testify about clear 
statements or provide speculative opinions outside the realm of 
his rational perception.”  A1:96 (citation omitted).  Despite his 
co-defendants’ pretrial objection to the admission of Lewis’s 
opinion testimony,  Savage does not challenge on appeal the 




Now, ladies and gentlemen, in weighing Special 
Agent Kevin Lewis’ opinion testimony, you must 
consider his qualifications, the reasons for his 
opinions, the reliability of the information 
supporting those opinions, as well as the other 
factors discussed in these instructions for 
weighing the testimony of witnesses. 
You may disregard the opinion entirely, if you 
decide that the witness’ opinion was not based 
on sufficient knowledge or skill or experience or 
training or education.  You may also disregard 
the opinion if you conclude that the reasons 
given in support of the opinion are not sound, or 
if you conclude that the opinions are not 
supported by the facts shown by the evidence or 
if you think that the opinions are outweighed by 
other evidence. 
So, ladies and gentlemen, you have opinions that 
were offered to you by experts who have special 
training, skill, knowledge and experience.  You 
have opinions that were offered to you by Agent 
Lewis, a lay witness, based upon his perceptions 
and his experience as it relates to this matter.  It 
is for you to weigh those opinions and give them 




A29:15119–21 (emphasis added).76   
 
76 The District Court’s instruction varied from our Circuit’s 
model jury instruction on lay opinion testimony, which 
provides:  
 
Witnesses are not generally permitted to state 
their personal opinions about important 
questions in a trial.  However, a witness may be 
allowed to testify to his or her opinion if it is 
rationally based on the witness’ perception and 
is helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ 
testimony or to the determination of a fact in 
issue.  
In this case, I permitted (name) to offer (his)(her) 
opinion based on (his)(her) perceptions.  The 
opinion of this witness should receive whatever 
weight you think appropriate, given all the other 
evidence in the case and the other factors 
discussed in these instructions for weighing and 
considering whether to believe the testimony of 
witnesses. 
3d Cir. Model Criminal Jury Instructions § 4.09.  Our Model 
Jury Instructions are not binding on District Courts, however, 
and a variance from the model instruction does not necessarily 
constitute error.  United States v. Shannon, 766 F.3d 346, 352 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 259 




Savage focuses on the District Court’s mention of 
Agent Lewis’s qualifications, reasons for his opinions, and 
reliability of those opinions, as well as the District Court’s 
statement that the opinions may be disregarded if based upon 
insufficient knowledge, skill, experience, education or 
training.  He contends that this language pertains to expert 
witness testimony under Rule 702 and therefore improperly 
invited the jury to consider Lewis as an expert and “to trust 
Lewis unduly, despite his lay status.”  Def. Br. 193.  Savage 
argues that the purportedly erroneous instruction could 
reasonably have affected the outcome of the trial and 
sentencing. 
 The District Court’s instruction is not clearly erroneous 
because it is consistent with our Circuit’s caselaw addressing 
lay opinion testimony.  We require lay testimony to be 
grounded either in experience or specialized knowledge.  In 
Asplundh Manufacturing Division v. Benton Harbor 
Engineering, we held that “in order to be ‘helpful,’ an opinion 
must be reasonably reliable,” and Rule 701 therefore “requires 
that a lay opinion witness have a reasonable basis grounded 
either in experience or specialized knowledge for arriving at 
the opinion that he or she expresses.”  57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
In the time since Congress amended Rule 701, we have 
repeatedly affirmed our holding in Asplundh that the reliability 
of lay opinion testimony should be assessed in light of the 
 
this, or any, court.  They thus cannot invalidate the decisions 




witness’s relevant specialized knowledge and experience.  See, 
e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 484 F.3d 644, 649–50 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“In order to satisfy these . . . Rule 701 requirements, the 
trial judge should rigorously examine the reliability of the lay 
opinion by ensuring that the witness possesses sufficient 
special knowledge or experience which is germane to the lay 
opinion offered.” (quoting Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 1201)); Donlin 
v. Philips Lighting N. Am. Corp., 581 F.3d 73, 83 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“A trial judge must rigorously examine the reliability of 
a layperson’s opinion by ensuring that the witness possesses 
sufficient specialized knowledge or experience which is 
germane to the opinion offered.” (citing Asplundh, 57 F.3d at 
1200–01)).  We have clarified that “[w]hen a lay witness has 
particularized knowledge by virtue of her experience, she may 
testify—even if the subject matter is specialized or technical—
because the testimony is based upon the layperson’s personal 
knowledge rather than on specialized knowledge within the 
scope of Rule 702.”  United States v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 301 
(3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Donlin, 581 F.3d at 81).   
Thus, “as long as the technical components of the 
testimony are based on the lay witness’s personal knowledge, 
such testimony is usually permissible” under Rule 701.77  Id.; 
 
77 The permissibility of lay opinion testimony based upon 
specialized knowledge aligns with the advisory committee’s 
note to Rule 701, which explains that the amendment is not 
designed to prevent lay witnesses from testifying based on 
“particularized knowledge that the witness has by virtue of his 
or her position.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee note to 
2000 amendments; see also, e.g., Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & 




see also, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 514 
(5th Cir. 2011) (“Testimony need not be excluded as improper 
lay opinion, even if some specialized knowledge on the part of 
the agents was required, if it was based on first-hand 
observations in a specific investigation.”); United States v. 
Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2008) (agent’s 
testimony as to the meaning of coded terms is based on 
experience in the particular case and is therefore permissible 
under Rule 701).  Indeed, as one of our sister circuits has 
observed, it is appropriate to inform a jury of a lay witness’s 
qualifications and experience so that the jurors may assess the 
value of the opinion testimony:  
Had the agent been testifying exclusively as a lay 
witness about the code words he had learned the 
meaning of in the course of his investigation of 
the defendants’ conspiracy, it would not have 
been improper to introduce him to the jury as an 
experienced investigator, rather than a novice 
listening to taped conversations of drug 
conspirators for the first time, any more than it is 
improper to ask an eyewitness whether he has 
good vision.   
 
Cir. 2003) (concluding, based on the advisory committee’s 
note citing Asplundh, that “opinion testimony by business 
owners and officers is one of the prototypical areas intended to 




United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2012), 
holding modified on other grounds by United States v. Jett, 908 
F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018).   
   In light of our precedent, the error Savage says is in the 
jury instructions is certainly not “clear under current law.”  
Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 100.   
C. When viewed in context, the District Court’s 
instruction did not mislead the jury.  
We abide by the longstanding principle that jury 
instructions are not to “be evaluated in artificial isolation,” but 
“must be evaluated in the context of the overall charge.”  
United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 137 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citations omitted).  When the District Court’s lay opinion 
instruction is considered in context, the instruction does not 
suggest that Agent Lewis’s opinion testimony should be 
treated as that of an expert to whom the jury should defer.  See 
id. (“[A]n instruction that appears erroneous on its own may be 
remedied by the balance of the court’s instructions.”).   
Immediately prior to giving the instructions regarding 
Agent Lewis’s lay opinion, the District Court provided 
instructions regarding expert witnesses.  It used the term 
“expert” throughout those instructions, specifying that 
“because of their knowledge, their skill, their experience, their 
training and their education in a particular science or 
profession, these witnesses were permitted to give you their 
opinions in those areas of their expertise.”  A29:15118 
(emphasis added).  The District Court did not mention Agent 




When it reached its instructions regarding Agent Lewis, 
the District Court preceded those instructions with the 
transition that “a witness may be allowed to testify to his or her 
opinion if it is rationally based on the witness’ perception . . . .  
I’m speaking now about the testimony you will remember of 
Special Agent Kevin Lewis.”  A29:15119–20 (emphasis 
added).  Shortly thereafter, it stated that Agent Lewis’s 
opinions were based on his perceptions, rather than on 
expertise.  See A29:15120 (reiterating that “[Agent Lewis] 
gave you these opinions based upon his perceptions”) 
(emphasis added).  And the District Court concluded by 
explaining a third time the difference between expert opinion 
testimony and Agent Lewis’s lay opinion testimony: “So, 
ladies and gentlemen, you have opinions that were offered to 
you by experts who have special training, skill, knowledge and 
experience.  You have opinions that were offered to you by 
Agent Lewis, a lay witness, based upon his perceptions and his 
experience as it relates to this matter.”78  A29:15121 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, the District Court took appropriate care to 
explain to the jury that Agent Lewis’s lay opinion testimony 
 
78 Relatedly, the District Court instructed that a witness’s status 
as a law enforcement officer does not mean that the 
individual’s testimony is entitled to any special weight: “The 
fact that a witness is employed as a law enforcement officer 
does not mean that his or her testimony necessarily deserves 
more or less consideration or greater or lesser weight than that 





was based upon his personal perceptions and was different 
from the testimony of the expert witnesses. 
 The District Court also instructed the jury in multiple 
instances that it was not required to accept the testimony of any 
witness, including Agent Lewis.  See A29:15098 (“Ladies and 
gentlemen, you have to give the evidence whatever weight you 
believe it deserves.”); A29:15104 (“[Y]ou must decide what 
testimony you believe and what testimony you did not 
believe.”); A29:15107 (“[A]fter you make your own judgment 
about the believability of a witness, you can then attach to that 
witness’ testimony the importance or the weight that you think 
that witness’ testimony deserves.”); A29:15121 (“It is for you 
to weigh those opinions and give them whatever weight you 
believe they deserve.”).  And of course, as a general matter, we 
presume that juries follow the instructions given to them.  
United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 252 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Considered in context, then, the District Court’s 
instructions do not suggest the jury should give undue weight 
to Agent Lewis’s opinion testimony.  Savage has failed to 
establish that the District Court’s jury instruction on lay 
opinion amounts to plain error.   
XI.  NO ERROR OCCURRED DURING THE PENALTY-PHASE 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Finally, Savage raises six issues relating to his “penalty-





We start by reviewing the capital-sentencing process 
generally, and the Federal Death Penalty Act specifically.  
Every criminal prosecution involves two basic segments: First, 
is the defendant guilty?  And second, if he is guilty, what 
should the punishment be?  In most trials, the trier-of-fact—
paradigmatically, a jury—answers the first question; the judge 
decides the second, considering the government’s 
recommendation before choosing from the statutory menu of 
potential punishments. 
But when the government seeks the death penalty, 
recognizing the special need “to maintain a link between 
contemporary community values and the penal system,” the 
law requires that a jury answer the second question.  Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)); see 
also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  And to pass constitutional 
muster, a sentencing statute authorizing the death penalty must 
guide the jury’s discretion with “general rules that ensure 
consistency in determining who receives a death sentence.”  
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008).  It must also 
empower the jury to consider “the ‘character and record of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular 
offense.’”  Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
In federal courts, the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3591–3599, authorizes the death penalty for 




aggravating circumstance makes a death sentence neither 
“excessive” nor “grossly disproportionate.”  Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).  And even then, 
all the aggravating circumstances must outweigh any 
mitigating circumstances “that might induce a sentencer to 
give a lesser punishment.”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); see § 3593(e). 
If the government intends to seek the death penalty, it 
must file a pretrial notice “stating that . . . the circumstances of 
the offense” justify a capital sentence and specifying which 
“aggravating factor or factors” it “proposes to prove.”  
§ 3593(a).  The FDPA identifies sixteen statutory aggravating 
factors for homicide, and the government can propose 
additional nonstatutory aggravators tailored to the particular 
offense.  See § 3592(c).79  The FDPA also identifies seven 
 
79 The sixteen statutory aggravating factors are: 
1. if the homicide occurred during commission of another 
crime; 
2. if the defendant previously committed a violent felony 
involving a firearm; 
3. if the defendant previously committed an offense 
punishable by death or life imprisonment; 
4. if the defendant previously committed other serious 
offenses; 
5. if the homicide created a grave risk of death to other 
persons; 
6. if the homicide was especially heinous, cruel or 
depraved; 




mitigating factors, plus a catchall provision for any “factor[] in 
the defendant’s background, record, or character or any other 
circumstance of the offense that mitigate[s] against imposition 
of the death sentence.”  § 3592(a).80 
 
8. if the defendant committed the homicide for pecuniary 
gain; 
9. if the homicide involved substantial planning and 
premeditation; 
10. if the defendant previously committed two felony drug 
offenses; 
11. if the victim was particularly vulnerable; 
12. if the defendant previously committed a serious federal 
drug offense; 
13. if the homicide occurred during a continuing criminal 
enterprise involving drug sales to minors; 
14. if the victim was a high public official; 
15. if the defendant previously committed sexual assault or 
child molestation; or 
16. if the homicide involved multiple killings or attempted 
killings. 
See § 3592(c)(1)–(16). 
80 The seven mitigators include: 
1. if “[t]he defendant’s capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or to conform 
conduct to the requirements of law was significantly 
impaired”; 
2. if “[t]he defendant was under unusual and substantial 
duress”; 




The government’s notice triggers “a bifurcated 
procedure . . . in which the question of sentence is not 
considered until the determination of guilt has been made.”  
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190–91 (plurality opinion).  If the jury 
returns a guilty verdict, a second proceeding is conducted to 
determine the sentence.  Each side may offer opening 
arguments; the government presents testimony and exhibits 
supporting the noticed aggravators; the defense may present 
testimony and exhibits supporting any mitigators; each side 
may put on rebuttal testimony and exhibits; each side may offer 
closing statements; the District Court instructs the jury; the jury 
then deliberates.  See § 3593(c).  Notably, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply—the District Court may exclude 
relevant information only “if its probative value is outweighed 
by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
or misleading the jury.”  Id.  
To impose the death penalty, the jury must unanimously 
find that 
 at least one statutory aggravating factor exists beyond a 
reasonable doubt; and 
 
4. if another “equally culpable” defendant “will not be 
punished by death”; 
5. if “[t]he defendant did not have a significant prior 
history of other criminal conduct”; 
6. if “[t]he defendant committed the offense under severe 
mental or emotional disturbance”; or 
7. if “[t]he victim consented to the criminal conduct that 
resulted in the victim’s death.” 




 all the aggravating factors found unanimously beyond a 
reasonable doubt outweigh “the perceived significance” 
of all the mitigating factors that any juror found by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 150 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 408 (1999) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); see § 3593(c)–(d).   
Here, the Government sought the death penalty on all 
thirteen homicide counts.  The jury found multiple aggravators 
for each, including the statutory aggravator that the arson 
murders were especially heinous, cruel or depraved, and the 
nonstatutory aggravators that Savage posed a risk of future 
dangerousness, and that he caused the victims’ families injury 
and loss.81  The jury found several mitigators as well, including 
 
81 The jury found others too.  The longest list applied to Counts 
12 through 15, which relate to the arson murders. The jury 
found eleven aggravators, seven statutory and four 
nonstatutory: 
 Savage knowingly created a grave risk of death to other 
persons;  
 Savage committed the offense in an especially heinous, 
cruel or depraved manner;  
 Savage committed the offense as consideration for 
pecuniary gain; 
 the offense entailed substantial planning and 
premeditation; 





the statutory mitigator that Lamont Lewis, although an equally 
culpable defendant, would not receive the death penalty.  And 
they found nonstatutory mitigators that “Savage has been a 
positive influence in the lives of his children, niece, and 
nephew,” and that he “can continue to be an important 
influence in the lives of his children.”  A2:790.  Yet after 
weighing the aggravators against the mitigators, the jury 
unanimously agreed Savage should be sentenced to death on 
each count. 
Savage now contends that the Government offered 
erroneous argument supporting the “future dangerousness” 
aggravator, that the Government impermissibly offered victim-
impact statements supporting the “harm to victims’ families” 
aggravator, and that the District Court improperly admitted the 
arson victims’ autopsy photographs to support the “especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravator.  He also argues that 
the Government’s penalty-phase summation relied on 
unconstitutional inferences to undercut the “equally culpable” 
mitigator, that the Government improperly rebutted the 
mitigators concerning Savage’s relationship with his family, 
and that the verdict form layout impermissibly emphasized the 
 
 Savage intended to kill more than one person in a single 
criminal episode; 
 the victims were particularly vulnerable; 
 Savage posed a risk of future dangerousness; 
 Savage caused injury and loss to the victims; 
 Savage had committed additional murders; and  




aggravators while giving short shrift to the mitigators.  We 
reject each claim for the reasons that follow. 
B. The Government permissibly argued that 
Savage posed a risk of future dangerousness. 
As noted, the Government proposed—and the jury 
unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt—the 
nonstatutory aggravator “that Kaboni Savage would be a 
danger in the future to the lives and safety of other persons, and 
is likely to commit or procure the commission of, retaliatory 
and other criminal acts of violence in the future.”  A2:737–87.  
Savage now claims that three arguments the Government made 
to support this aggravator lacked factual support: First, that the 
“Special Administrative Measures” (SAMs) imposed by the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to constrict Savage’s ability to 
contact the outside world might not remain in effect 
indefinitely.  Second, that Savage might collude with his 
attorneys to circumvent the SAMs.  And third, that managing 
the security risks necessary to safely house Savage indefinitely 
would saddle the BOP with an enormous burden.   
We review a district court’s ruling as to whether a 
prosecutor’s argument is appropriate for abuse of discretion.  
Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001).  If the 
argument was improper, we determine whether it justifies 
relief by “examin[ing] the prosecutor’s offensive actions in 
context and in light of the entire trial, assessing the severity of 
the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the 




Applying that standard, we first conclude that there was 
no error: the prosecutor’s comments accurately summarized 
information before the jury.  And we also conclude that even if 
error occurred, it was harmless given the mounds of evidence 
against Savage and the other aggravating factors the jury 
found. 
1 
Before turning to the specific comments Savage 
challenges, we need to review what the jury knew about 
Savage’s SAMs and why they were considered necessary. 
a 
Recall that Savage planned, coordinated, and directed 
the killing of seven people while being held in a federal prison.  
Savage had Tybius Flowers killed to prevent him from 
testifying about Lassiter’s murder.  Then Savage orchestrated 
the Coleman house firebombing as retaliation for Eugene 
Coleman’s cooperation with prosecutors.  Two women, three 
children and one infant died as a result. 
The horrid nature of these murders is underscored by a 
disturbing series of comments Savage made from prison 
reflecting both his desire and ability to kill or intimidate 
witnesses: 
 “No witness, no crime.  No witness, no case.”  
A29:15551. 
 





 “Death before dishonor to the family.”  A29:15565. 
 
 “That’s why that N[*****]’s got to pay.  Those 
f[***]ing rats.  Those kids got to pay for making my 
kids cry.  I want to smack one of their four-year-old sons 
in the head with a bat straight up. I have dreams about 
killing their kids, killing their kids, cutting their kids’ 
heads off.”  A29:15566. 
 
 “These rats are going to pay.  Their momma is going to 
pay.  I’m sick of them.  I’m killing them what they love 
while they’re in there.”  A29:15568. 
 
 “These rats deserve to die.  Wars with the rats.  I’m 
going to hunt every last one b[****] that I can.  I’m 
going to kill ’em.”  A29:15570.  
 
 “By the time of trial everybody be dead. . . . [W]e’re just 
getting started.  The night’s still young.”  A29:15571. 
 
 “The fight don’t stop until the casket drop.”  
A29:15572. 
 
 “I can still get messages out over the bowl”—a 
reference to his ability to sneak communications 
through his cell toilet’s plumbing system.  A29:15572. 
 





 “Tears of rage, I’m flooded internally from ’em.  Tears 
of rage because these sons of b[*****]s are going to 
pay, man.  They gonna pay or my name ain’t what it is, 
my pop name wasn’t what it was, they gonna pay.  They 
kids gonna pay, they mommas gonna pay.  That’s the 
kind of conviction that I got for this s[***], man.  I’m 
dedicated to their death, man. . . . They better hope and 
pray I go to jail for a long time.  It don’t matter because 
while I’m still living, I’m a get them.”  A29:15572–73. 
In at least six cases, Savage was caught on tape actually 
threatening to kill a cooperator or his family: 
 Tybius Flowers, see A29:15552 (“Don’t worry about it.  
He’s not going to take the stand.  He’ll never make it to 
trial.”); 
 
 Paul Daniels, see A29:15565 (“Think about what you’re 
doing man, because your son, he’s history.  I got to tell 
you how I feel.  Everything must go.”); see also 
A29:15566 (“I’d rather just kill his mother f[***]ing 
mom.  I want this N[*****].  You see what I’m 
saying?”); A29:15567 (“I got to get [Daniels’s 
girlfriend]’s a[**], [her] and that little b[****]y baby he 
got.”); 
 
 Keith Daniels, see A29:15568 (“The rats, they got to 
pay.  I have dreams about hitting [his] daughter in the 
head, man, opening her head wide open with 40s, dum-
dums, man.  That’s all I dream about getting that 




man.  You hurt my kids sending me to jail.  Your kids, 
your mom.  Nobody is getting a pass, man.  Before I get 
a dollar, they are going to pay.  That’s all I dream 
about.”); 
 
 Juan Rosado, see A29:15565 (“You know what it’s 
going to cost you, your life and your mom’s life.  I’m 
going to kill your mother F[***]ing a[**].  Tell the 
prosecutor I threatened you, too, b[****].”);  
 
 Stanley Smith, see A29:15565–66 (“I’m going to kill 
everything that you love.”); see also A29:15566 
(“Yeah, he got a daughter down my way.  I’m going to 
blow her little head off.  She like five.”); and 
 
 Craig Oliver, see A29:15569 (“His family goes first.  
His mom, his pop, all of them.”). 
These comments led the BOP to separate Savage from 
potential government witnesses in BOP custody, and even 
required several witnesses to enter the Witness Protection 
Program. 
Savage made similar comments about a prison guard.  
See A29:15567–68 (“I want to F[***] the captain up. I want to 
blow his head off.  I want everybody to know it, too. . . . That 
captain is a mother F[***]er, man.  He’s going to die a 
miserable death, and I hope I’m there.  I hope I’m the cause of 
that mother f[***]er.  I’m going to torture his a[**].  I’m going 
to set him on fire alive.  That’s what I want to do with the 




him jump around like James f[***]ing Brown.  Get a metal 
chair and cuffs, douse him with that gasoline, set his a[**] on 
fire and say welcome to hell, b[****].  I’m going to get 
somebody.  That fire’s a motherf[***]er.”). 
And these comments take on added meaning when we 
consider Savage’s conduct while incarcerated.  In 2011, prison 
guards searching Savage’s cell discovered Savage had 
somehow obtained confidential prison records revealing 
information about potential government witnesses in BOP 
custody, including some of the ones who entered Witness 
Protection.  The BOP also terminated his ability to make 
monitored social calls after those calls “started to get kind of 
coded.”  A29:15713.  And as recently as fall 2012—during jury 
selection for this trial, and even under SAMs severely 
curtailing his ability to communicate with the outside world—
Savage exploited opportunities to make unmonitored legal 
calls by telephoning his attorney’s office and having them 
patch him through to unapproved individuals.  He instructed 
those individuals to send him packages disguised as legal mail, 
detailing what his attorneys’ address labels looked like so the 
packages would not attract attention.  Savage managed to 
illicitly receive at least one package this way.  Then once the 
Government discovered his abuse of legal calls, he bragged to 
a prison guard that he had “got a lot of information out on those 
calls and got a lot done during those calls.”  A29:15683. 
All told, the jury learned of Savage’s persistent efforts 
to thwart restrictions on his ability to communicate with the 
outside world, and the extraordinary danger he posed if he 





The jury also heard information about Savage’s present 
and potential future confinement conditions.  Because of the 
security risks described above, the BOP transferred Savage to 
USP Florence ADMAX—the highest security prison in the 
federal system.  Inmates at ADMAX fall into four categories 
depending on their security risk.  The BOP holds the lowest-
risk inmates—those demonstrating improvement during their 
time at ADMAX—in a step-down unit preparing them for 
transfer back to another penitentiary.  The BOP holds the 
“average” ADMAX inmate—still someone the BOP 
determines it cannot control in any other facility—in a general 
population unit, where they spend twenty-two hours per day in 
single cells and recreate in enclosures.  The “Control Unit” is 
even more restrictive, reserved for inmates “who have 
committed homicides” inside BOP facilities, “are serious 
escape risks[,] or [are] a severe threat to the orderly running of 
an institution.”  A30:16067.  Finally, there is the “H Unit”—
the most restrictive unit and the one for defendants like Savage 
who are subject to SAMs. 
The H Unit is comprised of thirty-six single-inmate 
cells.  When an inmate arrives at the H Unit, he typically 
spends at least the first year subject to the most stringent 
restrictions.  During that initial phase, the BOP permits inmates 
three showers per week and ninety minutes of daily recreation 
alone in an individual enclosure.  With the warden’s approval, 
an inmate can move to a more relaxed phase.  In that phase, a 
daily shower is available and although prisoners still recreate 




inmates.  After another year, an inmate may recreate with up 
to four inmates in the enclosure. 
The BOP allows an H Unit inmate one social call and 
five non-contact visits per month.  Visitors and callers must be 
pre-approved, and each call or visit must be arranged in 
advance and monitored by the FBI.  To initiate a call, a guard 
physically dials the number and ensures that the person who 
answers has been pre-approved.  The guard then passes the 
receiver to the inmate through a slot in the cell door while 
holding the phone.  H Unit inmates are permitted to make an 
unlimited number of legal calls, conducted in much the same 
way, though such calls are unmonitored.  (The guard “stand[s] 
back at a respectable distance” so he can see the phone but not 
hear what is said.  A30:16029–30.)  
The FBI x-rays and reviews all non-legal mail, and that 
mail can only come from pre-approved senders.  Similarly, 
legal mail must come from the inmate’s counsel of record; 
guards open it in the inmate’s presence and cursorily review it 
to ensure it contains no contraband. 
On top of these general H Unit restrictions, each inmate 
receives specific SAMs tailored to their individual security 
risks.  Savage faces even more limitations on who he can 
contact, who can visit him, and what publications he can 
receive—though he remains able to have unlimited and 
unmonitored legal calls.  A SAM expires if not renewed 
annually by the Attorney General. 
The BOP’s goal is to move inmates from the H Unit to 




rehabilitation to warrant lifting their SAMs.  And after entering 
the general population units, compliant inmates begin a three-
year process that gradually moves them through the step-down 
unit to a more typical penitentiary.  The point, as both a 
government and defense expert observed, is that ADMAX is 
not meant to be “a permanent assignment.”  A31:16566–67 
(“We don’t want people in there permanently.”). 
Once transferred to another penitentiary, inmates have 
much more freedom to move and interact.  Typical federal 
penitentiaries house roughly 1500 inmates in double cells, 
locked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.  Outside those hours, 
inmates are generally expected to be at a job or educational 
site.  In other words, “[t]here is nobody escorting them.  There 
is nobody standing over there, telling them what to do.  From 
the time the cells are opened . . . they are responsible to go 
where they are supposed to be.”  A31:16562.  “They have 
access to all of the 1500 other inmates and all the staff that are 
in the institution,” including recreating and eating together 
without physical restraint.  A31:16562.  The BOP records 
social calls but monitors only about 10% of them, and even 
then only partially. 
Some former H Unit inmates have been transferred to 
other federal institutions through this process.  See, e.g., Rezaq 
v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1004–06 (10th Cir. 2012) (four 
inmates, one involved in a 1985 airline hijacking that killed 
fifty-seven airline passengers, plus three planners of the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing).  Still other inmates remain on 
the H Unit but under relaxed conditions allowing greater 
contact with other inmates.  See, e.g., Mohammed v. Holder, 




bombed the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania moved to a less-
restrictive phase of H Unit incarceration); Yousef v. United 
States, No. 12-2585, 2014 WL 1908711, at *2–4 (D.  Colo.  
May 13, 2014) (1993 World Trade Center bombing leader 
remains on H Unit but under relaxed confinement conditions 
allowing him to communicate with other inmates during 
recreation, showers, at the law library, and while working as 
an orderly).  By the time of the sentencing proceedings in this 
case, Savage had already been recommended for a move to a 
more-relaxed phase of H Unit confinement, though the 
approving official denied the request.  Officials have also 
allowed Savage to work as an orderly, which affords him time 
outside his cell without physical restraints. 
2 
Against this backdrop, we conclude that the 
Government’s arguments supporting Savage’s future 
dangerousness accurately summarized and fairly characterized 
information before the jury.  See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 180–82 (1986) (holding comments casting the death 
penalty as the only guarantee against future similar acts do not 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial as long as they “d[o] not 
manipulate or misstate the evidence”).  Here are the specific 
statements Savage alleges constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct: 
 From the Government’s penalty-phase opening 
statement: 
 
o “They put tighter restrictions on Kaboni Savage.  




visits.  They put tighter restrictions on his ability 
to make phone calls and his ability to interact 
with other inmates.  Problem solved?  Not 
exactly, because you’re going to hear that, first 
of all SAMs restrictions have to be updated every 
year. They are not automatic.  There’s no 
guarantee.  They don’t follow him necessarily 
for life.  There’s no guarantee they will 
continue.”  A29:15574. 
 
 From the Government’s penalty-phase summation: 
 
o “You’ve heard the testimony of why he will be a 
future danger.  Why should everyone in BOP be 
on constant vigil for the next 40 years of his life?  
That is the question that you need to answer.  In 
order to protect the prisoners, staff, cooperators 
in jail, cooperators’ families out of jail, he will 
have to remain at AD[MA]X on SAMs forever.  
Even then you’re not sure that [] will be enough.  
Putting aside for a moment that no one will likely 
be on SAMs for life, and he will likely enter the 
step-down process at some point in time, 
remember what he did while on SAMs, while 
under the restrictions imposed by the Attorney 
General of the United States, the most severe 
sanctions and restrictions there can be.  [BOP] 
will have to monitor him until when?  For what 
purpose?  He’s vowed to fight to the death.  At 
what risk do we not take him at his word?  As he 




visits.  He still has the bowl.  You know he will 
find a way to get the word out.  You know that 
after the evidence presented to you in this penalty 
phase.  He manipulates and he abuses the 
systems in place to defeat their purposes.  SAMs 
restrictions, this highest level of restriction that 
you can have, no problem.”  A31:16705–06. 
 
o “You’ve heard the phrase, the reference, ‘The 
past is prologue.’ . . . It’s truly applicable in this 
case.  Kaboni Savage’s past has foretold you 
what the future will hold.  There truly is no other 
option in this case.  He will not be on SAMs 
forever.  He will not be at AD[MA]X forever. He 
will manipulate the guards.  He will compromise 
the guards, and he will compromise the system 
at every chance.  He will continue to do what he 
has done since the day he was incarcerated in 
2004.  He will seek revenge on every cooperating 
witness and everything that they [h]old dear, 
their family, and he will do that from behind 
prison walls.  Kaboni Savage refuses to stop.  
There’s no way to be truly safe from his 
conniving ways as he vows, ‘The fight don’t stop 
till the casket drops.’”  A31:16713–14. 
 
 From the Government’s penalty-phase rebuttal: 
 
o “[Defense counsel] says no one has been harmed 
[by Savage] in the nine years since 2004.  He’s 




harmed.  It’s not because of Kaboni Savage.  It’s 
in spite of Kaboni Savage. . . . It’s because of 
AD[MA]X.  It’s because of a lot of things.  It’s 
because of the [Witness Protection] program.  
You heard a number of the witnesses in this case 
had to give up their lives.  They gave up their 
names and were moved to locations where they 
have to start all over again all because of Kaboni 
Savage.  So the [Witness Protection] program 
worked for them.  Lamont Lewis is in [Witness 
Protection] in jail.  It’s worked for him.  How 
long does this program have to go on to keep 
Kaboni Savage from acting out?  At what cost 
and for what reason? . . . Now, if he is sentenced 
to life imprisonment, he goes to AD[MA]X for 
some period of time.  None of us know how long.  
It’s not going to be forever. . . . Now you have to 
put your trust and faith in people you don’t know 
hoping, praying that they will do their jobs and 
be as vigilant, and 24 hours a day they will stay 
on top of Kaboni Savage . . . . Do you really want 
to run that risk?  For what reason? . . . He starts 
at the H Unit.  Where he goes from there is up to 
Kaboni Savage essentially.  The SAMs are in 
place right now.  How long will they be in place?  
None of us know.  It’s a yearly renewal.  The 
Attorney General has to agree every single year 
to do this.  If the decision is made to take down 
the SAMs, Kaboni Savage can be sent to a 
general population at a U.S. penitentiary 




16 hours a day.  We’re not talking about a couple 
of years, ladies and gentlemen.  We’re talking 
about a lifetime.  In five, six, eight, ten years 
Kaboni Savage could easily be at a USP in 
general population, if that’s what he decided to 
do.  At that time, he has the freedom to do 
everything that he did at FDC and more.”  
A31:16769–71. 
 
o “I just want to make one point very clear. . . . 
There was a discussion [during cross-
examination of a government expert witness] of 
three-way phone calls and the ability to monitor 
three-way phone calls.  Let me be clear, that does 
not exist at the Bureau of Prisons.  You heard that 
testimony.  That does not exist.  If Mr. Savage 
compromises those phone calls, he will be able 
to make three-way calls without anyone 
monitoring them.”  A31:16771–72. 
 
o “Why is a sentence of death appropriate?  He 
killed 12 people, killed innocent mothers, killed 
helpless children.  He killed an innocent man 
over a car bump. He used fire to torture a family.  
He killed a witness to obstruct justice.  He killed 
a family to obstruct justice.  He coordinated 
killings from inside prison.  He vowed to kill 
cooperators and their families until he dies.  He 
manipulates the system to his advantage.  He 
compromises BOP employees.  You know the 




housed at AD[MA]X forever. There is no way to 
guarantee the safety of the community even 
while he’s incarcerated.”  A31:16774. 
 
o “While [Savage’s] children are certainly 
innocent victims in all of this, his very limited 
relationship with them does not outweigh the 
horrific violence that he has caused, and there’s 
no reason to exhaust BOP resources to keep him 
from himself. . . . I’ll rephrase the word, just to 
be clear . . . resources will be expended for him.  
Why do we need to expend resources for him?”  
A31:16775–76. 
 
o “[W]hy must you make a choice to spare him the 
punishment he earned when it comes with so 
much peril and constant monitoring and is so 
likely subjected to compromise with a 
potentially deadly result?”  A31:16777. 
Savage correctly points out that the government may 
not urge jurors to speculate that a defendant will pose a future 
danger because prison officials might act incompetently.  See 
Darden, 477 U.S. at 180 (condemning a prosecutor’s argument 
that executing a defendant for a murder committed while 
furloughed was the “only guarantee” to prevent future violence 
because corrections officials might release him again); Tucker 
v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1496, 1508 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) 
(deeming a prosecutor’s comments about future parole 
improper because they “extended beyond a mere argument 




account for errors to be committed by other actors in the 
criminal justice system”).  But that is not what the prosecutor 
argued here.  Rather than implying the Attorney General or 
BOP officials might erroneously or lawlessly remove Savage’s 
SAMs, prosecutors merely emphasized what both side’s 
experts had testified to—no one can really say how long 
Savage will remain on SAMs, but everyone knows SAMs are 
not intended as a permanent solution.  Additionally, as both 
experts conceded, although the H Unit/SAMs combination 
may effectively control Savage’s behavior, no precaution can 
eliminate all security risks.  See also Tucker, 762 F.2d at 1507 
(concluding prosecutorial comments about the possibility of a 
defendant killing a prison guard or inmate if given a life 
sentence were “proper because they concerned the valid 
sentencing factor of [the defendant]’s future dangerousness”); 
cf.  United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 625–26 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(finding parts of the government’s future-dangerousness 
argument “troubling” but refusing relief since they were 
isolated, responsive to the defendant’s suggestion that the BOP 
could adequately secure the inmate, and supported by the 
record). 
Savage again overreaches in claiming the prosecutor 
suggested that his lawyers “would criminally conspire to help 
him violate the SAMs at AD[MA]X by arranging to ‘patch him 
through’ for unmonitored communications with unauthorized 
persons.”  Def. Br. 230.  In examining the comments in 
question, we believe the Government merely highlighted the 
vulnerability of the legal-call system and Savage’s prior 
manipulation of it.  What’s more, while presenting testimony 




Savage’s trial counsel played no role.  See A29:15642–43 (“Q: 
I want to be absolutely clear here.  Different attorneys in 2004 
and 2005 than the attorneys who represent Mr. Savage here, 
correct?  A: Yes.  Q: If you can tell us, you are fully competent, 
his current attorneys and their offices in no way participated in 
this type of scheme?  A: Correct.”).  So prosecutors neither 
impugned Savage’s trial team nor strayed from information 
that had been presented to the jury. 
Finally, despite what Savage says now, the Government 
never directly argued that keeping Savage alive would be too 
costly.  It is indeed improper for prosecutors to “argue that 
death should be imposed because it [is] cheaper than life 
imprisonment.”  Blair v. Armontrout, 916 F.2d 1310, 1322–25 
(8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1412 
(11th Cir. 1985)) (holding the district court erred—though 
harmlessly—by permitting the prosecutor to argue “Why 
should we as taxpayers have to house this man for fifty years?  
Why should we have to feed him three meals a day for fifty 
years, clothe him for fifty years, furnish him recreation, 
medical care?”).  But only economic efficiency arguments that 
specifically reference the pecuniary cost of prosecuting a 
defendant or of keeping a defendant alive have been held to 
violate that rule.  See, e.g., Baer v. Neal, 879 F.3d 769, 787 (7th 
Cir. 2018) (“We are not anxious to file the death penalty . . . 
the cost is unbelievable.  Who knows what it’s going to cost 
our community.  Probably a half a million dollars.  We’ve got 
people laid off.  It’s not something you do haphazardly.  It’s 
something you do to seek justice in a community” (alteration 
in original)); see also Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204, 210 




relief after a prosecutor argued for a death sentence because the 
defendant could “watch television and live off the taxpayers’ 
money for ten years . . . [a]nd get fed and housed and given all 
the conveniences of life”).  In short, general references to the 
financial and administrative burden of ensuring a safe prison 
environment do not cross the line. 
And that’s what these comments did: they focused on 
the burdens the BOP faced to protect guards, other inmates and 
the public from Savage.  The only time the prosecutor used the 
word “cost” was in relation to the need to keep witnesses in the 
Witness Protection Program.  Even then, the reference was 
plausibly to emotional and psychological costs to witnesses 
rather than economic costs to taxpayers and the BOP.  Those 
references were not improper prosecutorial comment.82 
 
82 Even if it could be said that any of the comments complained 
of were improper, such error would have been harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The quantum of evidence 
mustered against Savage was weighty, and future 
dangerousness was just one of numerous aggravating factors 
the jury found unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.  See 
supra note 81.  With that constellation of aggravating factors 
in mind, we are “confident that the jury would have imposed 
the same sentences even if the [future-dangerousness] factor 
had not been submitted for their consideration.”  United States 




C. The District Court did not plainly err by 
admitting victim-impact statements. 
Savage next challenges the admission of victim-impact 
statements supporting the “harm to victims’ families” 
aggravator. Although he concedes some statements 
permissibly “relat[ed] to the personal characteristics of the 
victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim’s 
family,” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 817 (1991), he still 
argues that others crossed the line and impermissibly involved 
“characterizations and opinions . . . about the crime, the 
defendant, and the appropriate sentence.”  Bosse v. Oklahoma, 
137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016) (per curiam). 
1 
We must first determine the applicable standard of 
review.  Since Savage challenges the statements on Eighth 
Amendment grounds, plenary review will apply if he preserved 
the issue in the District Court.  See United States v. Torres, 383 
F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying plenary review to 
preserved challenges presenting legal questions).  If not 
preserved, we review the issue for plain error—an actual, 
obvious error that prejudiced Savage and that substantially 
affected his trial’s fairness, integrity and public reputation.  See 
United States v. Plotts, 359 F.3d 247, 248–49 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Savage contends plenary review applies.  He makes that 
argument because his counsel asserted during a pre-
sentencing-phase hearing that “there are issues with . . . about 
90 percent of the victim impact letters,” including “some things 




authors’ “thoughts [about] the punishment.”  A29:15431, 
15437.  But Savage’s counsel retreated from that position once 
the Government agreed to redact statements “mak[ing] 
reference to what the appropriate punishment should be.”  
A29:15437.  The District Court then recessed the hearing to 
“give [the parties] a chance to look at” the letters, adding: “If 
there’s any disputes, I’ll hear them before the day is out.”  
A29:15438–39.  Significantly, Savage’s counsel never 
returned to the issue.  And when it came time to admit the 
victim-impact statements, Savage’s counsel remained silent.  
See A30:15776–15825.  We therefore conclude that Savage did 
not “contemporaneous[ly] object[] to the victim-impact 
testimony.”  United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 683 (5th Cir. 
2010).  So we review his claims for plain error.  Id. 
2 
We begin our review by surveying the law governing 
use of victim-impact statements in capital sentencing cases, 
including some state court decisions in cases raising Eighth 
Amendment challenges.  The government may generally 
introduce victim-impact evidence “relating to the personal 
characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the 
crimes on the victim’s family.”  Payne, 501 U.S. at 817.  
Presenting that information “is simply another form or method 
of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm 
caused by the crime in question.”  Id. at 825.  And the 
government can always “remind[] the sentencer that just as the 
murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the 
victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to 
society and in particular to his family.”  Id. (quoting Booth v. 




Yet we are mindful that “admission of a victim’s family 
members’ characterizations and opinions about the crime, the 
defendant, and the appropriate sentence” violate the Eighth 
Amendment if they “distract the sentencing jury from . . . the 
background and record of the accused and the particular 
circumstances of the crime” and thereby “create[] an 
impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be 
made in an arbitrary manner.”  Bosse, 137 S. Ct. at 2; Booth, 
482 U.S. at 505–07, overruled on other grounds by Payne, 501 
U.S. 808.  In Booth v. Maryland, the Supreme Court considered 
victim-impact statements saying that the victims were 
“butchered like animals,” that the defendant could “[n]ever be 
rehabilitated” and should not be “able to . . . get away with it” 
or “to do this again,” and that even “animals wouldn’t do” what 
the defendant did.  482 U.S. at 505–08.  The Court held that 
those statements violated the Eighth Amendment because they 
directly characterized both the crime and the defendant in a 
way that “serve[d] no other purpose than to inflame the jury 
and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence.”  
Id. at 508. 
Mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition about 
jurors characterizing the appropriate sentence, courts have held 
victim-impact statements directly asking the jury for a death 
sentence violate the Eighth Amendment, too.  See, e.g., Dodd 
v. Trammell, 753 F.3d 971, 995–96 (10th Cir. 2013); Ex parte 
Washington, 106 So.3d 441, 445–46 (Ala. 2011) (same); 
Miller v. State, 362 S.W.3d 264, 283–84 (Ark. 2010) (same). 
That said, abstract pleas for justice, accountability or 
closure do not by themselves violate the Eighth Amendment.  




does “emotionally charged testimony” inviting the jury to 
“infer” a desire for “execution,” as long as “no evidence as to 
the witnesses’ preferred sentence [i]s actually admitted.”  
United States v. Whitten, 610 F.3d 168, 190–92 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(noting “[i]t cannot be expected that victim impact testimony 
will be cool and dispassionate” and concluding “anguished 
testimony . . . describ[ing] how [the victim’s] children visit the 
cemetery on Father’s Day and other occasions, write letters to 
their father, and embrace his headstone . . . . does not appear to 
exceed (or approach) the margins of what has been allowed”); 
see also Williams v. State, 251 S.W.3d 290, 293–95 (Ark. 
2007) (upholding admission of a victim’s testimony, “The 
meeting of my brother and sisters when we get together it’ll 
never be the same.  We ask ourselves what can we do in 
situations like this.  Well, we can’t do anything as a family but 
hold together and pray together.  But you can do something.  
You are in a position to do that.  What would you do if it was 
your brother or your sister or your baby that someone stole 
away from you.  I can’t do anything, but you can.  No words 
can express how we feel.  Silence, the silence of never hearing 
[my brother]’s voice again haunts me and it will continue to 
haunt me.  We miss him.  We want him back but we can’t.”); 
State v. Chinn, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1188 (Ohio 1999) (upholding 
admission of a victim’s testimony that “now we feel that the 
time has come for [the defendant] to be punished according to 
the law of Ohio.”). 
And statements expressing an ongoing fear of reprisals 
fall well within bounds since they “properly show[] how the 
victim’s death affected his surviving relatives.”  People v. 




v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1999); People v. 
Tully, 282 P.3d 173, 245–46 (Cal. 2012); Baker v. State, 71 
So.3d 802, 817–18 (Fla. 2011). 
To be sure, applying these rules requires a judge, 
inevitably, to engage in line-drawing.  At one end of the 
spectrum, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court plainly 
erred by admitting a father’s victim-impact statement saying, 
“our children were tragically and recklessly stolen from us. . . . 
[I]t was just a useless act of violence and a total disregard of 
life,” apparently concluding the statement would distract the 
jury and cause them to make an arbitrary sentencing decision.  
United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 480 (5th Cir. 2002). 
At the other end, the California Supreme Court 
permitted a sister to testify “that she could not understand why 
someone whom [her late brother] befriended and trusted would 
kill him,” holding the statement did not improperly 
characterize the defendant but rather merely addressed how the 
murder affected her.  Wilson, 114 P.3d at 790–92 (Cal. 2005).  
The Arkansas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
about a victim-impact statement expressing “disbelief,” 
“anger,” and the feeling of being “torn apart.”  Kemp v. State, 
919 S.W.2d 943, 957 (Ark. 1996).  The Fourth Circuit likewise 
upheld the admission of a mother’s victim-impact statement 
expressing her suffering through rhetorical questions posed to 
the defendant.  See United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775, 
797–800 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (“I didn’t get to tell her good-
bye.  She was the joy of my life.  Marc [the defendant] knew 
she was the joy of my life.  The only little girl I had.  You knew 
that, Marc.  You took her life.  Took away her future.  You 




baby?  Why you kill [sic] my baby, Marc?  She loved you, you 
know that.  She never mistreated you, Marc.”), vacated on 
other grounds, 546 U.S. 803 (2005); cf. United States v. 
McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1218–22 (10th Cir. 1998) (allowing 
emotionally “devastating” victim-impact statements about 
“witnesses’ last contacts with deceased family members” 
killed in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and their 
“agonizing efforts to find out what happened to their loved 
ones,” “the professional and personal histories of victims,” a 
mother’s “recovery and return of her deceased daughter’s hand 
six months after the explosion,” and a graphic depiction of the 
near-suicide of a victim’s husband). 
3 
Against this background, we turn to the specific victim-
impact statements Savage challenges: 
 “What gives anybody the right to blatantly take 
a life with no thought of remorse and audacity to 
play God?”  A30:15779–80. 
 
 “I disconnected myself from most of my family, 
not wanting to be in the presence of constant 
reminders of better times.  Also a lot of them 
didn’t want me around fearing that I would put 
them and their families in danger. . . . I 
questioned my faith because—let’s see.  The 
only positive I see in my future is justice. . . . I 
know it will not bring my family back, but this 
will not allow anyone to hurt anyone else.  This 




this victim worked as a prison guard, she also 
explained her “genuine concern of [being] where 
[Savage was] in any way affiliated with anyone, 
whether they know him.  When in the presence 
of inmates, it took me [to] a whole different 
level.  I began to have anxiety attacks when in 
the presence of a lot of them in the rec room[,] 
leading to my transfer and [a] no inmate contact 
agreement.”  A30:15797–98. 
 
 “[P]lease, we ask of you, the Court, let justice be 
done for all that have been killed by these people.  
Please let justice be done.”  A30:15805–06. 
 
 “How can anyone take the lives of women and 
kids[?]”  A30:15809. 
 
 “It is not fair or right for . . . the person directly 
or indirectly responsible for the death of those 
souls to walk around the earth free, not being 
held accountable for the part of the crime.  We 
deserve closure in this matter and for [the] full 
extent of the law to be done in this matter. . . . All 
I ask is for the members of our family’s lives not 
to be in vain.”  A30:15811–12. 
 
 “It hurts my heart when I look in their eyes, see 
the pain we all share.  Just waiting for justice. . . . 
My sister’s and nephew’s heart have been broken 
into many pieces.  What kind of man would kill 





 “I can’t understand how or why a person would 
do such a heinous act.  Then to say such hurtful 
words after you have did this to our family. . . . I 
feel that everyone involved should get the same 
sentence as if they all threw the gasoline and 
match.  How do they sleep at night?  My family 
didn’t deserve this at all.  We don’t trust no one 
with or around our children, and don’t feel 
protected because if calls were [monitored by the 
Government], why did we have to lose our 
family members? . . . I’m afraid of courtrooms 
due to you don’t know who is who and not living 
in a safe environment because of pollution of 
murderers who saw fit to kill children . . . . My 
prayer is full justice for all.”  A30:15813–15. 
 
 “[M]y son and his paternal family were brutally 
murdered for no reason . . . . This was the worst 
crime in the history of Philadelphia in 2004. . . . 
How do you live with yourself and the decisions 
you’ve made[?] . . . How do we go on in our 
daily lives knowing you could care less that you 
inflicted so much pain and grief to so many 
people?”  A30:15816–17. 
 
 “My daughter said to me, Mommy, I still can’t 
believe my brother is gone.  I have no closure.  
How do I comfort my child?  Honestly, I can’t 





 “I will never understand how someone could kill 
anyone, anyone kill innocent people who are full 
of life.”  A30:15819. 
 
 “Every year on October 9th I’m reminded how 
the evil actions of one man cost my family a 
tremendous loss.”  A30:15820. 
 
 “I will forever have the image of their bodies 
being carried out in those blue bags.  For a long 
time after the fire I couldn’t go past 6th Street 
because that’s all I saw.  He, Kaboni Savage, 
turned my last memory of a place that I and many 
of my other family members shared so many fun 
times, into the most terrible thing I ever saw, into 
a lasting image and heart-tearing image.”  
A30:15821. 
 
 “Sean Anthony Rodriguez’s life ended on 
October 9, 2004 at the age of 15.  His murder 
caused his family pain unlike no other.  He spent 
the night at a friend’s house and never came 
home, the life of an innocent child, and a part of 
his family died never knowing that you will get 
what is coming to you, and hopefully the next.”  
A30:15823. 
 
 “I’m still confused about how anyone could do 
something like this to anyone.  I personally 
continue to feel the pain of having to live with 




this crime have not been held accountable for 
their actions.  But with this having been said, I 
hope that this will bring some cleansing for 
myself and my family.”  A30:15824. 
None of these statements form a basis for plain error. 
The Government acknowledges some “came close to” the 
constitutional line, Gov’t Br. 203, and we don’t disagree.  But 
none are blatant violations of the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against direct and inflammatory characterizations.  
Nor do any explicitly request the death penalty.83  At most, the 
statements express a generalized desire for justice and closure.  
Some seem to gesture vaguely toward capital punishment.  
Others emphasize a victim’s individuality and the unique loss 
a victim’s death posed, or highlight a witness’s profound loss 
and vulnerability.  And most significantly for plain-error 
purposes, all resemble statements that other courts of appeals 
and state supreme courts have declared constitutional. 
In any event, even if a statement crossed the line (which 
we do not see here), we conclude Savage was not prejudiced 
“[i]n light of all of the other evidence, including the properly 
admitted victim impact testimony and the grisly nature of [the] 
crime.”  Storey v. Roper, 603 F.3d 507, 521 (8th Cir. 2010) 
 
83 Indeed, underscoring that none of the victim-impact 
statements directly opined on what Savage’s sentence should 
be, the District Court instructed the jury that “because the law 
does not permit any witness to state whether he or she 
personally favors or opposes the death penalty, you should 
draw no inference either way from the fact that no witness has 




(refusing relief for improper victim-impact testimony because 
it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights); see also 
Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding “the jury would have imposed a sentence of death 
even absent the improper victim impact testimony” because 
“the horrific nature of the murders”—the defendants forced the 
victims into a car trunk before setting the car on fire—“was 
uncontroverted” and “the evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt 
[and future dangerousness] was substantial”).  Either way, no 
victim-impact statement considered by the jury, nor any 
portion thereof, constituted plain error.84 
D. The District Court’s admission of autopsy 
photographs offered to support the 
“especially heinous, cruel, or depraved” 
aggravator was not improper. 
Savage challenges the District Court’s decision to admit 
the firebombing victims’ autopsy photographs.  Although the 
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply during a capital 
 
84 Savage also claims the Government compounded a 
constitutional violation by highlighting these victim-impact 
statements during its penalty-phase summation.  We reject this 
argument for many of the same reasons we reject his challenge 
to the statements themselves.  What’s more, we conclude that 
even if these prosecutorial comments were improper, they 
would not warrant plain error relief since they are “not, in and 
of themselves, nearly as inflammatory as the graphic evidence 
of the murders, or as powerful as the extensive victim impact 
testimony” itself.  Mikhel, 889 F.3d at 1056 (quoting United 




sentencing phase, the FDPA supplies a limitation paralleling 
Rules 402 and 403: “information may be presented as to any 
matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or 
aggravating factor,” but “may be excluded if its probative 
value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”  § 3593(c).85 
Here, Savage brings something akin to a Rule 402 
relevancy challenge.  The Government offered the autopsy 
pictures to show the arson murders were “especially heinous, 
cruel, or depraved”—a noticed statutory aggravator. 
§ 3592(c)(6).  That aggravator requires proof of “torture” or 
“serious physical abuse.”  Id.  As relevant here, prosecutors can 
prove “serious physical abuse” by showing a defendant 
“inflicted ‘suffering or mutilation above and beyond that 
necessary to cause death.’”  United States v. Montgomery, 635 
F.3d 1074, 1095–96 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Agofsky, 458 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2006)).  Savage argues 
the pictures are not relevant to that point since they don’t reveal 
anything about the cause of death, but “merely document the 
. . . . ‘gruesome spectacle’ of the murders’ aftermath.”  Def. Br. 
263 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 n.16 
(1980)). 
 
85 In fact, § 3593(c) is slightly more sensitive than 403, because 
Rule 403 only excludes evidence “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” (emphasis 
added).  That said, Rule 403 also allows for exclusion based on 
undue delay, waste of time or cumulativeness, none of which 




He also brings what is effectively a Rule 403 challenge, 
arguing “any conceivable probative value of the autopsy 
photographs was negligible and far outweighed by their unfair 
prejudicial impact.”  Def. Br. 274. 
The District Court disagreed on both fronts.  The Judge 
ruled that the gruesome postmortem injuries remained relevant 
to the “serious physical abuse” question.  And though 
acknowledging the photographs were “not pleasant,” he 
allowed the jury to view them under conditions designed to 
minimize unfair prejudice.  A32:16861.  We discern no error. 
1 
Here too the parties dispute the applicable standard of 
review.  Citing United States v. Trala, Savage argues for de 
novo review because he says the District Court’s decision to 
admit the autopsy photographs rested on an erroneous 
understanding of a legal standard.  See 386 F.3d 536, 545 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  For its part, the Government says any “decision 
regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.”  Gov’t Br. 220.  We need not decide the issue 
because the District Court’s rulings on relevancy and prejudice 
withstand even plenary review. 
2 
Here, the District Court got the relevancy question right.  
The autopsy pictures tended to show that the fire mutilated the 
victims above and beyond their cause of death.  And that fact 




aggravator.  Savage’s contrary argument fails, both on 
precedent and even on its own terms. 
Savage’s quasi–Rule 403 challenge fails as well.  The 
autopsy photographs may be horrific, but they have 
considerable probative value, and the District Court took 
adequate steps to ameliorate any risk of unfair prejudice. 
a 
Savage raises a narrow legal challenge to the 
photographs’ relevancy.  He claims that for a murder to involve 
serious physical abuse, the abuse cannot arise directly from the 
same force that caused death.  This position allows Savage to 
argue that the autopsy pictures lack relevancy because “[t]he 
exact same force that was used to kill the victims—the ignition 
of the arson—also produced the . . . post-mortem thermal 
injuries captured in the photographs.”  Reply Br. 90.  But that 
can’t be right. 
If Savage is correct, the “especially heinous, cruel, or 
depraved” aggravator would almost never apply to an arson 
murder.  Yet that’s not how some courts have seen it.  Several 
state courts have recognized that arson murders are often—if 
not always—especially heinous, cruel or depraved.  See, e.g., 
Scott v. State, 163 So.3d 389, 470 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012); 
Dunaway v. State, 746 So.2d 1021, 1039–41 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1998); State v. Knapp, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (Ariz. 1977) (en 
banc) (“We can hardly think of a more ghastly death than this 
for anyone.”); Hain v. State, 919 P.2d 1130, 1146–47 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1996); Smith v. State, 659 P.2d 330, 337 (Okla. 




in the bed of his pickup truck, and the truck was then set on 
fire. He died from the inhalation of flames and smoke.  It is 
clear that the defendant either intended to inflict a high degree 
of pain or else he was utterly indifferent to his victim’s 
suffering.”), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 924 (1983). 
Although those state court decisions do not directly 
interpret the federal statute at issue here, they clearly 
demonstrate that burning someone to death is a heinous crime 
within the ordinary meaning of that word.  And being burned 
to death certainly involves ‘torture or serious physical abuse’ 
as required by the FDPA.  § 3592(c)(7).  That is a more than 
sufficient basis to invoke the “especially heinous, cruel, or 
depraved” aggravator.  The autopsy photos were directly 
relevant to proving that the victims died as a result of the arson. 
They were thus directly relevant to the applicability of the 
aggravator. 
b 
The District Court also correctly held that the risk of 
unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the 
photographs.  Savage protests, arguing that the photographs are 
extremely graphic.  They are.  They depict the horrific results 
of a horrific crime.  Yet it should hardly be surprising that 
evidence probative of the “especially heinous, cruel, or 
depraved” aggravator will often be horrific in nature.  That fact 
alone cannot be a reason for excluding it. 
And it is worth emphasizing that these autopsy 
photographs came into evidence during the penalty phase of 




concluded Savage was guilty of the murders.  So the classic 
Rule 403 concern—that a photograph’s gruesome nature will 
“lure the factfinder into declaring guilt” based on emotion or 
passion, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 
(1997)—is inapposite here.  Put simply, the jury had already 
decided Savage was guilty of the six arson murders. Deciding 
just how brutal or cruel those murders were is inherent in 
penalty-phase determinations. 
On this point, the autopsy pictures—gruesome as they 
are—offer singular probative value.  Photographs convey a 
pictorial accuracy and detail that words cannot duplicate nor 
that advocates can spin.  Twelve jurors listening to a 
description of an abused corpse might walk away with twelve 
different understandings of the abuse’s severity.  Color 
photography, especially these photographs, leave little room 
for disparate impressions.  It is hard to imagine more accurate 
evidence of a murder’s cruelty, heinousness or depravity.  We 
therefore conclude that any danger of unfair prejudice did not 
outweigh the photographs’ probative value.86 
 
86 In so holding, we join several other courts of appeals in 
allowing autopsy photographs to support the “especially 
heinous, cruel, or depraved” aggravator.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1362 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding 
color photographs of stab wounds, both fatal and nonfatal, 
were admissible to prove the “especially heinous, cruel, or 
depraved” aggravator); United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 
43 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting autopsy photographs during the penalty 




Although we reach that conclusion based on our 
examination of the photographs themselves, we also consider 
the District Court’s prudent steps intended to mitigate the risk 
of unfair prejudice.  Even after admitting the photographs into 
evidence, the District Court did not immediately publish them 
to the jury.  Instead, the photographs were placed in an 
envelope, leaving it to the jury to decide whether they wished 
to view them.  When the jurors, during their deliberations, 
asked to see the photographs, the District Court returned them 
to the courtroom, warned that the photographs were “not 
pleasant,” reminded the jurors “that your decisions in this 
matter must be based upon the evidence and testimony and not 
based upon any bias or prejudice or emotion,” told them to 
“heed those instructions when you are looking at these 
photographs,” and directed them to return the photographs 
after they finished viewing them.  A32:16861.  The jury 
returned the photographs less than ten minutes later.87 To the 
 
victim was killed (an important integer in the jury’s 
determination of whether the murders were committed in an 
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner)”); United States 
v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 897 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding no abuse 
of discretion after a district court admitted “graphic” 
photographs of a murder “victim’s bloody corpse” to “support 
the government’s contention that the crime was particularly 
heinous and depraved”). 
87  The pictures’ quantity and composition further diminish the 
risk of unfair prejudice.  The District Court admitted only one 
photograph for each victim, and the bodies are depicted lying 
on a medical examination table, not amid the arson ashes and 




extent the photographs posed a risk of unfair prejudice—and 
we acknowledge that such risk is always present when 
photographic evidence of this nature is before a jury—the 
District Court took sensible and effective measures to mitigate 
it. 
*      *      * 
All told, the District Court correctly admitted the 
autopsy photographs as proof of the “especially heinous, cruel, 
or depraved” aggravator. 
E. The Government’s argument against the 
“equally culpable” mitigator did not violate 
the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. 
Savage’s penalty-phase strategy sought to cast Lamont 
Lewis as an equally culpable defendant who was nevertheless 
not facing the death penalty—a statutory mitigator jurors were 
to consider.  See § 3592(a)(4).  Indeed, it was Lewis who 
firebombed the Coleman home and later admitted to five other 
murders—yet ultimately pled guilty in exchange for forty years 
of imprisonment. 
In response, the Government sought to distinguish 
Lewis’s past conduct as less blameworthy than Savage’s.  
Savage now contends that making the distinction 
 
photos,” Hain, 919 P.2d at 1143, these photographs portray the 





impermissibly turned his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
against him. 
1 
We start with this passage from the Government’s 
penalty-phase closing argument (but ignore the underlining for 
now): 
I want to talk about . . . equally culpable 
defendants not getting death.  That is one of the 
mitigators.  You know in this case Lamont Lewis 
is not getting the death penalty.  You know that.  
He will be sentenced to 40 years to life. . . . 
When weighing that mitigator, consider Lamont 
Lewis’ acceptance of responsibility.  His 
acknowledgment of his wrongs, his willingness 
to cooperate, the fact that he does not have a 
vendetta against the rats or the rats’ families.  He 
doesn’t have a pact to kill loved ones.  He did not 
call out hits from inside the jail.  He’s not bent 
on destroying the justice system by killing 
witnesses.  He is not and has not abused the right 
to communicate while he has been in prison.  
While these two men, Kaboni Savage and 
Lamont Lewis, were engaged in the same 
criminal actions at times and Lamont Lewis is 
certainly responsible for his violent killing spree, 
these two men are not equally culpable.  They are 
not equally culpable for the rampage that Mr. 
Savage is responsible for. The only person 




That’s why justice warrants the ultimate 
punishment. 
A31:16708–09 (emphasis added). 
Then came the defense summation.  Savage’s attorney 
tried to reinforce the “equally culpable” mitigator by 
contrasting Lewis’s extensive criminal history with his lesser 
punishment.  Defense counsel also tried to use Lewis’s 
criminal history—including his admission during the guilt-
phase trial that he sold drugs in jail—to suggest Lewis himself 
posed a future danger.  “You should be [concerned] about 
future dangerousness,” he concluded.  Id. at 16742.  “You are 
looking at it right there, Lamont Lewis.”  Id. 
The Government pushed back during its rebuttal, 
acknowledging that recommending Lewis’s non-capital 
sentence required a “tough call,” but urging jurors to 
“remember [Lewis’s] testimony” when “comparing” him to 
Savage: 
He sat in this courtroom and he took 
responsibility for everything that he has ever 
done wrong.  He admitted he was wrong.  He 
didn’t say, “The rats had it coming.”  He didn’t 
say his problems were caused by rats.  He 
admitted he was the one who was at fault.  He 
isn’t a danger going forward.  He told you that he 
had time to reflect when he got to [jail] and 
realized the magnitude of all of the harm that he 
had caused.  He does not have the vendetta going 




to blame people on the outside for his situation.  
He is trying to take steps to try to get some 
amends for what he has done. . . . Never going to 
happen, but at least he’s trying.  Also, remember 
that . . . Lamont Lewis did the . . . murders under 
the direction and when ordered by Kaboni 
Savage.  Kaboni Savage is the one who wanted 
those people dead. . . . Lamont Lewis is not 
seeking revenge.  He’s not looking to kill 
witnesses. . . . Lamont Lewis is like a trigger on 
a gun.  Kaboni Savage is the trigger man. 
Id. at 16764–66 (emphasis added). 
As for Lewis’s criminal history, the prosecutor noted 
Lewis “admitted it was wrong” after 
ha[ving] time to reflect and think about what he 
had done and to understand and appreciate the 
magnitude of what he had caused.  He told you 
that’s one of the reasons he pled guilty.  That’s 
one of the reasons when you’re considering 
comparing Lamont Lewis to Kaboni Savage, that 
the two are not equally culpable.  Remember that 
Lamont Lewis has been in federal custody since 
2007.  Did you hear one peep during his 
testimony about him illegally using the legal 
mail or the legal phone calls to talk to, to 
coordinate, to make—touch base with people on 
the outside illegally?  Not once.  He did not order 
any murders from prison.  Kaboni Savage 




deaths.  I say this not because Lamont Lewis is 
an angel.  He is not.  He is a convicted killer of 
multiple people.  But when you’re comparing the 
two, he is not the danger that Kaboni Savage is.  
Kaboni Savage is a danger going forward. 
Id. at 16766–67 (emphasis added). 
2 
Savage contends that the prosecutorial comments that 
we have underlined violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
by faulting Savage for not pleading guilty and for failing to 
testify.  But in context, the statements he challenges weren’t 
about him at all; the Government was merely rebutting defense 
counsel’s suggestions of equal culpability and of future 
dangerousness by pointing to the fact of Lewis’s cooperation. 
a 
The parties again disagree about the standard of review.  
The Government argues for abuse-of-discretion review, the 
usual standard when a defendant challenges a district court’s 
decision to allow or excuse certain prosecutorial comment.  See 
Moore, 255 F.3d at 107.  But Savage argues for the more 
exacting de novo standard since these statements related to his 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  See Def. Br. 279 (citing 
United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 756 (1st Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1185 (9th Cir. 1994)).  
We need not resolve the issue since the prosecutor’s comments 





The Government’s penalty-phase closing and rebuttal 
did not impermissibly trench on Savage’s Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights.  True, the Fifth Amendment does forbid 
prosecutors from commenting on a defendant’s decision not to 
testify, just as the Sixth Amendment forbids prosecutors from 
commenting on a defendant’s decision to plead not guilty.  See 
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581–83 (1968).  But 
prosecutors cross these lines only when they use language 
“manifestly intended” or “of such character that the jury would 
naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure 
of the accused to testify” or plead guilty.  United States v. 
Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1971) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Hayes v. United States, 368 F.2d 814, 
816 (9th Cir. 1966)). 
So we consider the specific statements that Savage 
challenges.  Here’s how he describes them in his brief: “the 
prosecutor’s adverse references to Savage’s failure to 
‘cooperate,’ ‘ple[a]d guilty,’ ‘t[ake] responsibility,’ and thus 
‘get some amends for what he has done.’”  Def. Br. 292 
(underlining added) (alterations in original).   
None of these statements, nor all of them taken together, 
come close to violating Savage’s constitutional rights.  First of 
all, the underlined language does not describe Savage’s failure 
to do anything.  Rather, Savage plucks individual words and 
phrases from portions of the Government’s closing argument 
that highlighted the cooperation of Lewis.  Hearken back to the 
underlined language in the quotations.  Fairly viewed and read 




statements focus on Lewis, explaining why he wasn’t equally 
culpable and why he wouldn’t pose a future danger.  Savage’s 
invocation of the equally culpable mitigator necessarily invites 
just such testimony and argument. 
And Savage offers no authority to support his 
constitutional injury-by-implication argument.  Instead, courts 
find a constitutional injury only when a prosecutor explicitly 
faults a defendant’s exercise of his own constitutional rights.  
Lesko v. Lehman is just such a case.  There, a prosecutor 
impermissibly highlighted the defendant’s lack of remorse, 
“ask[ing] the jury to consider [the defendant’s] ‘arrogance’ in 
taking the ‘witness stand’ to present mitigating evidence about 
his background, without even having the ‘common decency to 
say I’m sorry for what I did.’”  925 F.2d 1527, 1544–45 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (quoting trial transcript) (describing “[t]he 
prosecutor . . . parod[ying] the gist of [the defendant]’s 
testimony: ‘I don’t want you to put me to death, but I’m not 
even going to say that I’m sorry.’” (quoting trial transcript)).  
So too in United States v. Whitten, where a prosecutor tried 
using a capital defendant’s own failure to take the stand to 
discredit the defendant’s penalty-phase allocution.  610 F.3d 
168, 198–200 (2d Cir. 2010) (restating “the uncontroversial 
rule that prosecutors can emphasize that an allocation is 
unsworn and uncrossed” but holding the prosecutor’s remark 
that “[t]he path to that witness stand has never been blocked 
for [the defendant]” could be understood as an impermissible 
comment on the defendant’s failure to testify during the guilt-
phase trial). 
If anything, the Government’s comments in this case 




a prosecutor rebutted the “equally culpable” mitigator by 
asking the jury to “compare [the cooperator’s] conduct with 
that of [the defendants]” and noting the cooperator “led the FBI 
to bodies they never would have found in this case.”  889 F.3d 
1003, 1060 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting trial transcript) (emphasis 
omitted).  Judge Bybee explained these comments did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment since they “would[n’t] naturally 
and necessarily be understood as commenting on defendants’ 
failure to testify.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  So 
too here.  Viewed in their proper context, the challenged 
statements merely rebut both Savage’s “equally culpable” 
mitigator stance and his argument concerning Lewis’s future 
dangerousness.  A jury would not naturally—and certainly not 
necessarily—take them as a comment on Savage’s choice to 
exercise his constitutional rights. 
And once again, any error in this regard would have 
been harmless since the jury unanimously agreed that the 
“equally culpable” mitigator did apply despite the prosecutor’s 
arguments to the contrary.  In that way, this case mimics United 
States v. Runyon, where a prosecutor undercut the “equally 
culpable” mitigator by pointing out that another defendant pled 
guilty rather than forcing “a jury[ to] weigh in on all the 
evidence and determine whether [he] was guilty.”  707 F.3d 
475, 508 (4th Cir. 2013) (second alteration in original).  
Without deciding whether this comment impermissibly shaded 
the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that any error would have been harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt since the jury unanimously found 
the “equally culpable” mitigator anyway.  Id. at 510 (citing 




list of aggravators and mitigators weighed by the jury would 
thus have been identical with or without the statements of 
which [the defendant] complains”). 
*      *      * 
In sum, the prosecutor rebutted the “equally culpable” 
mitigator without impermissibly faulting Savage for invoking 
his constitutional rights.  And even had he crossed the line, any 
error would have been harmless because the jury still found for 
Savage on the “equally culpable” mitigator. 
F. The Government properly rebutted the 
mitigators relating to Savage’s relationship 
with his family. 
We turn to two nonstatutory mitigating factors 
concerning Savage’s relationship with his family: that “Savage 
has been a positive influence in the lives of his children, niece, 
and nephew” and that “Savage can continue to be an important 
influence in the lives of his children.”  A2:790.  Although the 
Government sought to rebut these mitigators with testimony 
and argument tending to show Savage had maintained little 
contact with his family, eight jurors still found the first 
mitigator and four jurors found the second.  Despite those 
findings, Savage now rehashes the prosecution’s rebuttal, 
arguing the Government violated his constitutional rights by 
limiting his contact with family while he was imprisoned, and 





For analytical purposes, we separate his argument into 
two claims: First, that the Government unconstitutionally 
interfered with his ability to develop mitigation evidence about 
family relationships; second, that the Government’s rebuttal of 
the “familial relationship” mitigators unfairly characterized 
those relationships as limited. 
Distilled to its essence, the first claim challenges 
Savage’s confinement conditions.  To be sure—and for reasons 
previously explained—the Government broadly circumscribed 
Savage’s ability to communicate generally with the outside 
world.  Those restrictions reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests and, at all events, the record shows 
Savage still had an adequate opportunity to develop and 
present mitigation evidence about his familial relationships. 
The second claim boils down to allegations of improper 
cross-examination and prosecutorial argument.  Here too, we 
discern no error.  The challenged cross-examinations reiterated 
facts the defense itself had already elicited, and the challenged 
argument appropriately rebutted the defense’s mitigation 
evidence. 
1 
The first claim—that the Government 
unconstitutionally interfered with Savage’s ability to develop 
mitigation evidence about his familial relationships—simply 
retreads disagreements over the time, place and manner of 
Savage’s family visits.  These disagreements began during voir 
dire, and prompted a memorandum opinion from the District 




develop . . . evidence” to “present at the sentencing phase of 
his trial.”  The District Court also agreed with the defense that 
“the ability to visit with his children could impact the 
preparation of [Savage]’s mitigation case.”  A1:46–48.  The 
Judge ultimately refereed ongoing disputes over the time, place 
and manner of the visitation throughout the trial.  Savage, 
however, was never satisfied. 
One such example stems from the BOP’s confinement 
of Savage on FDC-Philadelphia’s maximum-security floor 
during the trial.  Although the maximum-security floor had a 
visitation room, the BOP did not allow the presence of minors 
on that floor. That led defense counsel to demand either that 
the BOP make an exception and allow Savage’s children onto 
the maximum-security floor, or that the BOP transfer Savage 
to another facility that could accommodate minors’ visits under 
maximum-security conditions (like, apparently, the 
Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York, where the 
BOP sometimes held Savage during breaks in his trial).  For its 
part, the BOP offered to shut down the entire lower-security 
floor’s visitation area and to conduct the visit there.  But 
because of the lower-security environment, the BOP said 
Savage would have to be immobilized by keeping him in a 
seated position.  Defense counsel bristled, protesting that 
“[t]hat is inappropriate to meet with his children,” thereby 
precipitating an impasse that went unresolved.  A34:18080. 
Yet we fail to see how this impasse amounts to a 
constitutional deprivation.  The defense team still managed to 
arrange two occasions for the defense’s expert social worker to 
observe Savage interacting with his children.  The social 




formed an educated opinion—an opinion that was very 
favorable to Savage, and that went largely unchallenged by the 
Government.  A30:16264–68.  She never suggested that more 
observation would have changed her opinion, and Savage 
never specified what additional witnesses or information he 
was prevented from offering.  Although more familial contact 
may have strengthened his ability to build mitigation evidence 
generally, the same could be said for every capital defendant.  
The Constitution simply does not guarantee capital defendants 
unfettered access to their families. 
At all events, to the extent Savage challenges the BOP’s 
refusal to allow him to be unrestrained on a lower-security 
floor, he is essentially challenging the reasonableness of a 
prison regulation.  But “restrictive prison regulations are 
permissible if they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests[]’ and are not an ‘exaggerated response’ 
to such objectives.”  Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 
(1987)).  Savage never explains why the BOP’s conditions 
violated this standard; indeed, Savage doesn’t even cite the 
standard.  That failure is fatal to his argument since “the 
prisoner ‘bears the burden of persuasion’ when he is 
challenging a regulation.”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 
157 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Banks, 548 U.S. at 529). 
We regard the BOP’s insistence on immobilizing 
Savage in a seated position as well within bounds.  “[P]rison 
administrators are not required to use the least restrictive 
means possible to further legitimate penological interests,” 
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 207 (3d Cir. 2008), and we 




discretion,’” Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 232 (2001) 
(quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989)).  
“We must accord substantial deference to the professional 
judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant 
responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections 
system and for determining the most appropriate means to 
accomplish them.”  Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 
(2003).  Given Savage’s extraordinary history of initiating 
violent crime through his contact with the outside world, we 
are especially unwilling to second-guess the BOP’s assessment 
of the risks Savage posed outside his specially modified, 
maximum-security cell. 
Savage’s proposed alternatives—allowing minor 
children onto a maximum-security floor or transferring him to 
another facility—would “burden . . . prison resources.”  Jones 
v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2006).  That factor, plus 
that Savage “retain[ed an] alternative means of” visiting his 
children and that no “alternative” would “fully accommodate” 
Savage’s request “at de minimis cost to valid penological 
interests,” underscore the reasonableness of the BOP’s 
position.  Id. 
2 
Next, Savage identifies four prosecutorial comments—
two made during cross-examination and two in closing 
arguments—which he contends improperly exploited his 





Before we discuss the comments themselves, we 
summarize the relevant portions of Savage’s mitigation case.  
The mother of one of Savage’s children described Savage as “a 
good father, a loving person, very family-oriented,” and 
someone who “always wanted all the kids . . . . to come over 
and spend time with him.”  A30:16224, 16228.  She also 
testified that their daughter Siani 
loves her father very much.  She wants to talk to 
him.  She wants to come visit him, but we 
haven’t been able to do that on a regular 
basis. . . . Kaboni has always been a positive 
factor in his daughter’s life.  These negative 
things that people are bringing about is nothing 
that we have witnessed, his daughter has not 
witnessed.  He’s been a positive influence on her. 
. . . 
They have a bond with each other that just was 
unbreakable. . . . [S]he loves him regardless of 
anything that is happening in this case.  This has 
been her father since birth.  She’s grown up and 
basically looked up to him.  He has been her 
hero.  She was daddy’s little girl from the 
beginning, so it’s really difficult and hard for her 
to not have him around.  She still loves him and 
wants him in her life, and I want him to be part 
of her life as well.  He needs to be around.  She 




him in her life.  She doesn’t want to function 
without him in her life.  She still goes to school 
and does well anyway and gets good grades and 
wants to make him proud, and that’s what she 
focuses her goals on. 
A30:16228–29, 16241–42. 
Savage’s own mother similarly noted that Savage still 
communicated with his children through letters, and that “they 
love him so hard.”  A31:16400.   
Savage’s son Kaiion testified that before his father’s 
arrest, they “went out every weekend to the movies” and that 
Savage “stayed on us all the time about school” and “made sure 
he raised us like men.”  A31:16527.  Kaiion also expressed a 
belief that despite Savage’s incarceration, his father “c[ould] 
continue to have influence in [his] life.”  A31:16543. 
Similarly, Savage’s nephew Yusef described a “school 
project” from “2004” when he 
had to choose the person of the year, the person 
who impacted [his] life the most, and [he] 
nominated [Savage] because of the role that 
[Savage] played on [him] and pushing [him] in 
[his] education and stuff [Savage] taught [him] 






The defense also introduced letters Savage wrote to his 
children, niece and nephew over the years.  That said, Kaiion 
conceded during his testimony that he “ha[dn’]t gotten a letter 
in a long time.”  A31:16533. 
To buttress the significance of Savage’s familial 
relationships, defense witnesses reiterated the barriers Savage 
had to overcome to maintain contact with family.  Both Kaiion 
and Savage’s sister Conchetta testified that Savage’s niece and 
nephew were not permitted to visit Savage since they were not 
his children.  Conchetta noted that it became much harder to 
communicate with Savage once the Government moved him to 
ADMAX, and that Savage’s niece and nephew communicated 
with him through phone calls and letters “up until the point 
where we could.”  A30:15974.   
The Government did little to refute this evidence.  
Prosecutors briefly cross-examined Kaiion: 
Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Savage. 
A: How you doing. 
Q: You are 17 years old? 
A: Yes. 






Q: Your mother has been your primary 
caregiver? 
A: Yes. 
Q: It’s safe to say that for most of your life your 
father has been incarcerated, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: On that letter that [defense counsel] just 
showed you[,] there was no date on that 
letter? 
A: No. 
Q: But that letter was sometime within the last 
year that that was written to you by your 
father? 
A: No. 
Q: Last—approximately when was it written, do 
you know? 
A: 2011, 2010, something like that. 
Q: So sometime within the last couple of years, 
is that correct? 
A: Yes. 





Q: Since he has been charged in this case? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And you are, as Mr. Savage’s son, you are 
allowed visits occasionally, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You are allowed to have phone calls with 
your father, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: But despite that, you said you have not gotten 
a letter from him in a long time? 
A: No. 
Q: How long has it been since you last got a 
letter from your father? 
A: Around like two, three years ago. 
[Prosecutor]: Nothing further. 
A31:16544–45.  And when cross-examining Yusef, the 
Government reiterated that his “Man of the Year” project took 
place in 2004—a fact defense counsel had already elicited.  
Compare A30:15991 (defense’s direct) (“Q: In 2004, did you 
in a school project put him in for some sort of award?  A: 




counsel] showed us this certificate that you did for your uncle 
when you were a young man, correct?  A: Yes.  Q: What’s the 
date on that?  A: December 8, 2004.”). 
During its sentencing summation, the Government 
admonished the jury to “not allow [Savage] to use his children 
as a mercy shield from imposing the ultimate sentence.”  
A31:16683.  And after the defense summation had emphasized 
mitigating evidence involving Savage’s family, the 
prosecution used its rebuttal to remind the jury about the dearth 
of recent correspondence, and to argue that “[w]hile his 
children are certainly innocent victims in all of this, his very 
limited relationship with them does not outweigh the horrific 
violence that he has caused.”  A31:16775. 
b 
Savage claims the following comments improperly 
leveraged his restricted familial relationship against him: 
 the Government’s cross-examination of Yusef, which 
reiterated the “Man of the Year” school project was in 
2004; 
 the Government’s cross-examination of Kaiion, which 
established Savage had not written him in several years; 
 the Government’s summation comment that Savage 
shouldn’t be able to use his children as a “mercy shield”; 
and 
 the Government’s rebuttal assertion that Savage had a 




Savage concedes his trial counsel failed to object to 
these comments, so we review them for plain error.  See Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 52(b).  None clear that high bar. 
First, the one-off question asked during Yusef’s cross-
examination and which reminded the jury that Yusef’s school 
project nominating Savage as “Man of the Year” took place 
back in 2004.  But defense counsel had already elicited this fact 
on direct examination, so the Government’s query was not an 
error let alone a plain one.  See Glass v. Phila.  Elec.  Co., 34 
F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Fed.  R.  Evid. 611(b)). 
Second, a fleeting comment during Kaiion’s cross-
examination similarly rehashed a point already made on direct 
examination.  The jury knew from defense questioning that 
Kaiion had admitted his father hadn’t written him a letter “in a 
long time.”  A31:16533.  Again, this cannot constitute error. 
Third, there is also the “mercy shield” comment.  To be 
sure, the locution was derisive.  But stripped of its rhetorical 
gloss, the term merely underscored the Government’s position 
that Savage’s relationship with his children did not outweigh 
the aggravating factors.  The “mercy shield” reference may 
have been a hard blow, but it is not one we can rule as a foul. 
Finally, characterizing Savage’s parental relationship as 
“very limited” is innocuous.  Savage’s limited familial contact 
was hardly news to the jurors: the defense itself had cataloged 
the severe restrictions Savage faced and the strain those 
restrictions placed on his familial relationships.  In fact, much 
of Savage’s mitigation case was an attempt to prove that 




then, could it be plain error for the Government to suggest that 
the same limited contact might cut against mitigation?  The 
prosecution was merely arguing a competing inference.  See 
also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (“The government . . . shall be 
permitted to rebut any information . . . and shall be given fair 
opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the 
information to establish the existence of any aggravating or 
mitigating factor . . . .”); United States v. Montgomery, 635 
F.3d 1074, 1097–98 (8th Cir. 2011) (permitting the 
government to rebut a “familial relationship” mitigator by 
disparaging the defendant’s parenting, including asking the 
defendant’s young daughter whether the defendant had “ever 
apologize[d] for what she put you and your siblings through”). 
*      *      * 
In sum, because the Government did not act to obstruct 
Savage’s opportunities to develop his mitigation case, and 
because the Government properly rebutted his argument 
supporting the “familial relationship” mitigators, there was no 
error. 
G. The verdict sheet’s format did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment. 
Finally, we take up Savage’s argument that the District 
Court constitutionally erred by producing a verdict form 
“dramatically overemphasiz[ing]” the aggravating factors 
“while relegating” the mitigating factors “to an afterthought.”  
Def. Br. 325.  As the District Court correctly concluded, this 




Savage specifically faults the verdict form for marching 
count-by-count through the various aggravating factors the 
Government offered while merely enumerating the defense’s 
blanket list of mitigating factors once at the end of the form.  
Alternatively, he suggests the form could have listed the 
mitigating factors once if it had listed the aggravating factors 
only once.  The error, he contends, was “unfairly elevat[ing] 
the significance of the aggravating factors by repeating them 
over and over while relegating the mitigating ones to a single, 
short list at the back of the form.”  Def. Br. 332. 
 
Once again, the parties do not agree on our standard of 
review.  Though this claim deals solely with the District 
Court’s verdict form, not its instructions, Savage analogizes to 
United States v. Sussman’s de novo review of “a district court’s 
refusal to give a jury instruction on a defendant’s ‘theory of 
defense.’”  709 F.3d 155, 175 (3d Cir. 2013).  But Savage isn’t 
arguing that the District Court refused to include the mitigators 
on the form; he merely protests how the mitigators appeared on 
the form.  So the closer analogy would be to a “refusal to give 
a particular instruction or the wording of instructions,” which 
Sussman reviewed for “abuse of discretion.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008)).  The 
Government offers United States v. Hedgepeth as more support 
for abuse-of-discretion review.  That case involved a “District 
Court’s decision to submit a special verdict form to the jury.”  
434 F.3d 609, 612 (3d Cir. 2006).  And of course, applying the 
abuse-of-discretion standard here tracks how we review trial 
management rulings generally.  See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. 




Accordingly, we review Savage’s challenge to the verdict 
form’s layout for an abuse of discretion. 
 
Yet the verdict form would pass muster under any 
standard.  Repeating the aggravating factors for each count but 
listing the mitigating factors once at the end makes sense both 
legally and factually. 
 
Legally, a capital defendant’s default sentence is life 
imprisonment.  A death sentence can be reached only after all 
twelve jurors find a statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Sequentially, then, finding and weighing mitigating 
factors becomes important only after a jury has already 
found—unanimously—at least one aggravating factor.  This 
means that if jurors go through all capital counts without 
finding a single aggravating factor, there is no need for them to 
consider any mitigators.  Their work is over, and the defendant 
must receive a sentence of life imprisonment.  Listing the 
mitigators after the aggravators tracks this order of jury 
deliberations, and should be of assistance to the jurors in their 
work.  This format makes good sense. 
 
And viewed factually, it makes sense for two reasons.  
First, each of the thirteen capital counts had a unique set of 
applicable aggravators; the Government tailored thirteen 
separate lists, weaving different statutory aggravators with 
different non-statutory aggravators.  But the defense sought to 
globally apply the same general list of twenty mitigators to all 
counts.  So although the verdict form needed to specify which 
aggravators applied to which counts, nothing demanded 




Second, and relatedly, the FDPA obliges jurors to 
consider “any mitigating factor,” while limiting jurors to the 
aggravating factors “for which notice has been given.”  
§ 3592(a), (c) (emphasis added).  That means the verdict form 
had to include several blank lines for the jury to add any 
additional mitigators.  So when the District Court produced the 
verdict form, although a certain subset of aggravators applied 
to each count, it was not clear in advance how many mitigators 
might apply, and what mitigators might apply to what counts. 
 
Moreover, the District Court prevented any risk of 
confusion by emphasizing the need to apply the mitigating 
factors to each capital count.  On the verdict form itself, 
prominent oversized text preceded the list of mitigators and 
notified jurors that  
IN CONSIDERING THE MITIGATING 
FACTORS, YOU MUST KEEP IN MIND 
THAT EACH MITIGATING FACTOR IS 
ALLEGED WITH RESPECT TO EACH OF 
THE CAPITAL COUNTS. IF YOU 
DETERMINE BY A PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT A 
MITIGATING FACTOR IS PRESENT, 
THEN IT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE 
WEIGHING PROCESS FOR EACH AND 
EVERY CAPITAL COUNT. 
A2:788.  Elsewhere, the verdict form tasked jurors with 
specifying “the number of jurors who have found the existence 
of that mitigating factor to be proven by a preponderance of the 




(emphasis added).  And when instructing the jury during the 
sentencing phase, the District Court repeatedly highlighted the 
need for a count-by-count analysis. 
In sum, the District Court reasonably formatted the 
verdict form to reflect this case’s unique factual and legal 
circumstances.  And it took several additional steps to ensure 
that jurors correctly understood and followed the form.  We 
commend the District Judge for crafting and approving a 
verdict form that so intelligibly presented to the jurors the 
many difficult questions they were being asked to resolve.  
Nothing in the verdict form gave rise to legal error. 
XII.  CONCLUSION 
As Savage reminds us in his opening brief, “it has been 
nearly a century since this Court last adjudicated a direct appeal 
in a capital case.”  Def. Br. 1.  That passage of time has given 
rise to considerable debate over the death penalty: Is it just?  Is 
it moral?  Is it applied and administered in a manner that does 
not discriminate on the basis of race?  These and other serious 
questions resound within the public square. 
 Yet none of those questions are what this Court is called 
upon to resolve. 
 We have meticulously combed the very substantial 
record provided us.  We have given scrupulous attention to, 
and taken great care in resolving, each of the issues brought 
before us.  And we have done so with what the late Justice 
Thurgood Marshall called “especial concern”—because, as he 




most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties.”  Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 Exercising the heightened responsibility required of us, 
we discern no grounds entitling Savage to relief on any of the 
issues he raises.  The judgment of the District Court therefore 
will be affirmed. 
